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Abstract  
In March 2017 I commenced the Master of Applied Epidemiology program, hosted in 
the Communicable Diseases Branch at Health Protection New South Wales (NSW). 
Presented in this bound volume are four research projects: an epidemiological study, 
data analysis study, outbreak response, and an evaluation of a public health surveillance 
system. I was also heavily involved in routine public health work including on-call, 
outbreak investigations and follow-up of laboratory notifications.  
The epidemiological study was an audit that estimated true immunisation coverage of 
NSW children at one year of age on the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR), and 
explored reasons associated with under-reporting. Our estimate of true coverage was 
96.2% with a 95% Confidence Interval 95.9%-96.4%; 2.1% higher than AIR reported 
coverage of 94.1%. The under-reporting was mainly due to data errors at the provider 
level and duplicate records. Included is a peer-reviewed article that I wrote and 
published on the subject in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health. 
The data analysis project investigated the over-representation of Aboriginal people 
diagnosed with Q fever in NSW, particularly in Western NSW. Following indirect 
standardisation, we found that Aboriginal people across Western NSW were notified 
with Q fever almost 35% more often as non-Indigenous people living in the same area. 
Aboriginal people reported working in occupations such as shearing at a much younger 
age than non-Indigenous people. Aboriginal community governance over the public 
health actions that arose from this analysis is provided in detail.  
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I evaluated the NSW Acute Rheumatic Fever (ARF) and Rheumatic Heart Disease (RHD) 
Surveillance System, including the RHD Register. Using open ended and closed question 
surveys, network consultation and analysis of data, the system was found to be useful 
in improving the management of ARF/RHD. Recommendations for improving attributes 
were made based on the Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance 
Systems by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.  
I led an investigation into a large protracted outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium with 
a novel multi-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis type profile that affected 
235 people in the Australian Capital Territory, NSW and Queensland from 10 October 
2018 to 31 May 2019. The chapter describes the outbreak investigation including 
epidemiological, environmental and laboratory components, and control actions taken.  
I had the opportunity to teach and present my research during the MAE and through 
concurrent employment as an academic tutor. I delivered presentations at local, state, 
national and international conferences throughout the placement, and produced a 
Lesson from the Field competency with the Gamilaraay title ‘nginda MAE waala wiitha’ 
(throwing the MAE into the fire); an acknowledgement of the feeling many peers felt 
undertaking data linkage projects with inconsistent or missing data. I saw an opportunity 
to start a conversation about reasons why Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander identity 
data may be missing in datasets, which prompted the group to explore why an individual 
may identify in one place and not another.  
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Main prologue 
Being alive is marvellous isn’t it. 
Sure, it’s not the easiest ride. For starters, living comes with more fine print than 
anything else in the universe. From the moment you are born, you are expected to 
navigate your fleshy shell throughout space and time, all the while ensuring that 
fourteen body systems (that you know absolutely nothing about) are working in perfect 
harmony. Then you have to grow, and as you do, so will your responsibilities, until one 
day you are doing it all on your own. That’s the rules. The rest of the fine print is about 
how you have to master this without thinking about it, as well as a bunch of other things 
I’ll never understand, like how to do a tax return by myself or perfectly boil an egg. In 
summary, just being alive is very busy, even when we think we are doing nothing. Life is 
so consuming that unless in certain circumstances, one does not have much time to 
focus on being dead.  
But let me ask you, just how many times have you cheated death? 
I'm not talking about the time you choked on broccoli at a family gathering, or when 
some idiot on their mobile phone nearly crashed into your car. I'm talking about those 
bona fide moments where you brushed the fingertips of debilitating illness or death, by 
avoiding measles, meningococcal disease or diphtheria. You were meant to die when 
you were two, but your vaccinations repelled pertussis. This momentum has kept up 
your entire life, as you ducked away from tetanus, heated the life out of your 
contaminated food, or made influenza’s song quieter. Right now, you are probably so 
busy going about your day that you, a giant Goliath, have completely forgotten that the 
world and its billions of microscopic David’s are completely out to get you. 
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So how is it, that you and I haven’t died already? 
The short answer is that we’ve got a lot of people behind us. Hundreds upon thousands 
of people, all with the common goal of not dying, developed the vaccines and medicines 
you took, educated the health professionals you needed, or improved the safety of your 
food.  
But don’t get too comfortable, because things can slip through the cracks. People still 
get sick and die from preventable diseases. At times entire groups of people become 
unwell from a common source. And unfortunately, there are diseases lingering out there 
that should have been eliminated already. This bound volume is a collection of stories 
about some of those diseases, and the people who responded them. Along the way you 
will witness me do my best to play the roles I was given, as a leader, follower, student, 
and now scribe. I will highlight both success and failure from these past two years and 
hope this adds another (albeit small) lantern along that well-worn path to the knowledge 
base of communicable diseases control.
Chapter 1 
Introduction  
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Introduction 
This chapter is an overview of my placement at Health Protection NSW, including the 
routine activities and project work undertaken to complete MAE requirements. 
Overview of the Experience in Health Protection NSW 
On 20 March 2017, I commenced a placement at the Communicable Diseases Branch 
(CDB) at Health Protection NSW. Health Protection NSW sits under the Population and 
Public Health Division of the NSW Ministry of Health, the central driver of the NSW 
public health system. A key function of the Ministry is to support the NSW Health Cluster 
which encompasses 230 public hospitals across fifteen Local Health Districts (LHDs). (1) 
The overarching legislative framework for public health and infectious diseases is the 
Public Health Act 2010 and Public Health Regulation 2012. (2, 3) 
Health Protection NSW are responsible for monitoring and coordinating the public 
health responses to notifiable infectious diseases and environmental threats. The CDB 
has six areas: Tuberculosis and Rheumatic Heart Disease, Respiratory and Vaccine 
Preventable Diseases, Surveillance Systems, Blood-borne Viruses and Sexually 
Transmitted Infections, Immunisation, and Enteric and Zoonoses. (1) The Director, Dr 
Vicky Sheppeard was also my MAE supervisor. My other supervisor was Dr Kirsty Hope 
in the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases Team. I was involved in all daily aspects of the 
Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases Team. This included attending meetings, report writing 
and involvement in the response to notifiable communicable diseases of enteric or 
zoonotic nature.  
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Other projects and tasks undertaken during my placement were as follows:  
• On-call for Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases 
• Weekly surveillance and reporting on Cryptosporidium during Summer and 
Autumn 2017 
• Preparation of a joint report between NSW Health and the NSW Food Authority 
on Salmonella surveillance  
• Preparation of information for quarterly OzFoodNet reports 
• Attended CDNA fortnightly meetings and prepared the CDNA jurisdictional 
status report for NSW every fortnight 
• Attended weekly Communicable Diseases Branch surveillance meetings  
• Attended monthly Bug Breakfast presentations and coordinated the monthly Epi 
Grand Rounds for NSW  
• Public health experience for a week at South Eastern Sydney Local Health District  
• Interviewing measles and Salmonella Typhimurium cases and contacts 
MAE Competencies 
There were coursework and research project requirements to complete the MAE. The 
coursework was done in blocks at ANU and included the following subjects: 
1. Outbreak Investigation 
2. Public Health Surveillance 
3. Issues in Applied Epidemiology 
4. Analysis of Public Health Data 
5. Research Design and Methods 
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To apply theoretical knowledge gained from course work, four projects were 
undertaken, plus a teaching requirement (Table 1). 
Projects 
1. Designing and conducting an epidemiological study  
2. Analysis of a public health dataset 
3. Response to an acute public health problem or threat  
4. Evaluation of a public health surveillance system 
Teaching requirement 
1. Prepare at least one and participate in “Lessons from the field” 
2. Prepare and conduct a lesson for first year MAE students 
Other inclusions 
A core requirement was for one or more of the four projects to include:  
1. Literature review  
2. A report to a non-scientific audience (community or other stakeholder), as a 
press release, ministerial brief or lay sheet 
3. Preparation of an advanced draft of a paper for publication in a national or 
international peer-reviewed journal 
4. An abstract and oral presentation of the project at a national or international 
scientific conference 
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Public Health Impact Summary  
The epidemiological project “A question of coverage or underreporting? An Audit of 
the Australian Immunisation Register” had a positive public health impact, particularly 
from a programs perspective. We estimated that the true immunisation coverage for 
children at 1 year of age on the AIR was 96.2% (CI:95.9-96.4), 2.1% higher than the AIR 
reported coverage. While the difference may only be a couple of per cent in absolute 
terms, from a public health policy and program perspective the difference was 
significant, particularly when this determined whether state and national program 
indicators had been met. Underreporting at the provider level was an important 
contributor to underestimation of true coverage on AIR. The paper was published in the 
ANZJPH which may have impact on the level of data errors in AIR uploading (at provider 
level) and duplicate records. 
The analysis of a public health dataset project “Investigation into increased Q fever 
notifications in Aboriginal people living in Western NSW Local Health District” had 
multiple public health impacts. As the study had a focus on Aboriginal people, it was 
carried out on the foundations of Aboriginal governance through community 
consultation in the form of an Aboriginal Advisory Group. I performed an analysis of Q 
fever notifications of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people living in Western NSW LHD 
with the principal objective to interpret exposure data to identify factors and other 
explanatory variables that may have driven the disproportionate rate of Aboriginal 
people diagnosed with Q fever. I established and consulted closely with an Aboriginal 
Research Advisory Group who identified priorities in the data and messaging channels 
to target for Q fever prevention and awareness campaigning.  
 24 
The “Multi-state outbreak investigation of Salmonella Typhimurium caused by a novel 
multi-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) type, 2018-2019” 
demonstrated the power of MLVA to detect clusters and point source outbreaks, and 
the role of whole genome sequencing (WGS) to determine whether clusters originated 
from a single source. The outbreak showed that despite acceptable compliance at the 
industry level, Salmonella can still enter the food production chain. For this reason, the 
responsibility of Salmonella prevention and control lies with the entire egg production 
chain, from farm to plate. Many clusters in this outbreak were related to businesses 
using centralised kitchens, which shows that regulatory activities in storefront 
businesses may have little impact if the centralised food processor or distributor is not 
complying with food safety measures.  Many cases reported eating eggs at home, 
indicating that public egg safety awareness should remain a public health priority.  
The “Evaluation of the NSW Acute Rheumatic Fever and Rheumatic Heart Disease 
Surveillance System, including the Rheumatic Fever Register” resulted in a number of 
changes made to improve these systems in NSW. Methods of reporting were improved 
for key stakeholders, and the evaluation has drawn topics for the consideration of NSW 
Health to improve the monitoring and reporting of ARF/RHD in NSW.  
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Prologue 
Sometime around October 2016, a remarkable group of people came together to talk 
about the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR), the national system used to assess 
immunisation coverage and enable the mobilisation of targeted programs and resources 
toward populations with low vaccination coverage.  The expertise around the table 
included those who had previously researched underreporting on the AIR, coordinators 
and analysts of state-wide immunisation programs, nurses who had delivered 
community-based immunisation programs, and biostatistics; the kind of perspectives 
that can only be cultivated through years of experience. Together they became the AIR 
Working Group, with the aim to quantify the magnitude of under-reported 
immunisations on the AIR for NSW children at one year of age.   
Due to a series of constraints the project was put on hiatus until May 2017, when I was 
given the opportunity to pick up the project with the role of lead investigator. The state-
wide audit provided a positive result for NSW, estimating that true immunisation 
coverage was higher than expected. From a program perspective this had important 
implications for NSW Health. Although I was given the autonomy to manage this project, 
everyone in the AIR working group made a significant contribution to this research. I 
truly believe the findings of our study will have great utility in advocating for the 
mobilisation of public health resources towards areas that genuinely experience 
low coverage and assert that reported immunisation coverage estimates for this age 
group should only be considered as a minimum estimate of coverage. 
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MAE role  
As the lead investigator the approach I used to reach these competencies included 
designing and conducting a state-wide audit which required significant stakeholder 
participation. I worked closely with the AIR Working Group to form an appropriate 
research question and strategy to answer this. To meet our main objective to estimate 
true immunisation coverage of children in NSW at one year of age, and determine 
reasons for under-reporting I developed a protocol and literature review and obtained 
ethics approval. I developed a questionnaire and audit tool closely assisted by Su Reid, 
Salwa Gabriel, Colleen Gately and Jody Stephenson. Attached to this was a project 
summary (Appendix B) and expression of interest (Appendix C) for interviewers in the 
LHDs. Rhydwyn McGuire was an essential force in the biostatistical side of the research, 
choosing the appropriate outcome factors methodology for collecting data, as well as 
assisting me to interpret the results of the study.  
I conducted a very small pilot study, and when the main audit tool (Appendix D) and 
questionnaire (Appendix E) was distributed I provided oversight and assistance to public 
health unit staff who were undertaking interviews. I collected and cleaned the returned 
data and wrote a report with recommendations appropriate for the target audience 
(policy makers, government stakeholders and the scientific community). I wrote and 
submitted a manuscript as lead author for publication in the ANZJPH.  This included 
managing feedback from multiple authors and liaising with the journal. I presented our 
findings at the 9th Southeast Asia and Western Pacific Bi-regional Training Programs in 
Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Scientific Conference 
in Vientiane, Laos, from 5-9 November 2018.  
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Lessons learnt  
Publication submission and development 
The manuscript submitted to the ANZJPH was returned with minimal changes from the 
reviewers. I managed the response to questions from the reviewers and ensured that 
milestones were met. This process was completely novel to me, and I gained very much 
from it which will help me when publishing in the future.  
Coordinating a multi-jurisdictional and multi-level working group 
The AIR Working Group was established in 2016 and included participants across NSW. 
Membership included time-poor, high-level public health staff. The working group was 
challenging to navigate at times and required careful forward planning and negotiation. 
All members had worked on immunisation and/or the AIR at some level, bringing many 
different perspectives, knowledge and opinions. It was a challenge ensuring that these 
experiences could be considered and balanced in the study. A PHU Director chaired the 
meetings and this assisted in ensuring meetings were kept on track. 
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Introduction  
Since its establishment in 1996, the AIR has been a crucial tool in assessing immunisation 
coverage on local, state and national levels. Despite the strengths and improvements of 
the AIR, systematic issues such as errors and underreporting persist, generating much 
interest toward the mechanisms behind these problems. (1-4) Over the last decade NSW 
has adopted many major immunisation policy initiatives. In 2009 we joined the National 
Partnership on Essential Vaccines, where states and territories committed to working 
towards 95% vaccination coverage (5, 6). In 2012 the NSW Aboriginal Immunisation 
Healthcare Worker program was launched, with the overarching goal of improving 
timely vaccination of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children (5); and in 2016 the 
Australian Governments ‘No Jab No Pay’ policy was implemented (7), generating 
controversy and interest in its effectiveness. In this research, we raised the hypothesis 
that we may now see improved coverage estimates and less error in reporting due to 
drivers such as these.  
This chapter is comprised of the manuscript published in the June 2019 edition of the 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health (ANZJPH) (1) and an additional 
section expanding on the methodology, sampling frame and limitations of the study. The 
manuscript is a contemporary analysis of the magnitude of underreporting 
immunisation encounters on the AIR for NSW children at one year of age. Overall, the 
study acted as a coordinated version of an activity that is undertaken routinely by public 
health units (PHUs) in local health districts (LHDs) throughout the state in accordance 
with their normal responsibilities and processes in order to (a) improve immunisation 
coverage; (b) improve AIR recording of encounters; (c) understand barriers to childhood 
 38 
 
immunisation and (d) understand barriers to reporting of encounters.  
We raised the question about whether vaccine coverage areas, socio-economic status, 
or the provider’s location would have any significant impact on underreporting. We 
discovered that for our sample, it was none of the above; it was actually the local health 
district that the child was based in that would influence whether their encounter was 
recorded incorrectly on AIR. We found most of the errors on AIR were due to errors in 
transmitting the child’s immunisation encounter at the provider level or duplicate 
records. Other Australian research has highlighted that these types of errors are 
historical, and hence remain highly relevant. (3, 4, 8) We discovered our estimated true 
immunisation coverage for NSW children at one year of age is 96.2%, which exceeds the 
national coverage target and the AIR reported estimate of 94.1%. (6) We also believe 
these findings will have great utility in advocating for the mobilisation of public health 
resources towards areas that are truly impacted by low immunisation coverage, and 
assert that reported immunisation coverage estimates for this age group should be 
considered as a minimum estimate of coverage only.  
Further information about sampling frame and sample size calculations  
The sample was created using stratified random sample of September 2017 quarter data 
taken from the AIR. The sample size was selected to give 80% power for each of the 
following questions at a 5% significance level, taking the conservative assumption 
assuming that 50% of children reported as overdue were incorrectly recorded: 
1. Does underreporting vary by reported local coverage level (low, medium, high)? 
2. Does underreporting vary by socio economic status (low, medium, high)? 
3. Does underreporting vary by provider setting (urban or rural and remote)? 
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The highly significant p-value of the Wald told us that overall, the local health district 
the child was based in was an important determinant of whether vaccines were correctly 
reported to the register. When exploring which test to use to analyse these variables, 
the group-wise Wald test in our opinion was the strongest because it did not increase 
the risk of a type-2 error on the basis of multiple comparisons.  
The strata and sample size for each stratum was calculated using constrained 
optimisation, implemented in the R Package Sampling Strata, which minimised the 
required sample size while answering our research questions. The final sample was 
selected using a random number generator. In order to produce an approximate 
estimate before the third quarter overdue vaccine data was available, we calculated an 
approximate sample size based on a simple random sample. We assumed that 50% of 
children would be underreported, and maximum reported population of 3000, and that 
loss to follow-up would be 10%.  On the basis of these numbers we would need to 
sample 380 children. 
Although the baseline sample was powered for a good result, some LHDs expressed 
interest in over-sampling or auditing all overdue records in their jurisdiction. The over-
sampling would result in tighter confidence intervals or assist where there were future 
plans for an LHD based analysis.  To understand the effect that over-sampling would 
have at an LHD level, the biostatistician provided four approximate simulations to 
describe the potential effect of oversampling across health districts. For simplicity, a 
model district example assumed there were: 
• No lost to follow-up and no duplicate records in this calculation, using simple 
random sample methods; and  
 40 
 
• The LHD had an average level of vaccination, and an example with 88% recorded 
vaccination, which was the lowest recorded LHD coverage level in 2016.  
The simulations were as follows:  
1. Using the main sample, the study was powered to provide a maximum 
confidence interval width of 2.7 percentage points for an LHD with the average 
recorded rate of vaccination. That is, if the true percentage of children who were 
fully vaccinated is 96% then the confidence interval would be expected to be 
approximately (94.6, 97.4).  
2. Using the main sample and an extra sample in a LHD with an average level 
recorded vaccination, the width of the confidence interval would tighten to 1.3 
percentage points, so that the new confidence intervals would be expected to 
be approximately (95.3, 96.7). 
3. Using the main sample with a lower level of coverage (example of 88% 
vaccination coverage) would produce a confidence interval width of 4.7. 
Assuming the true vaccination rate is 94% we would expect confidence intervals 
of approximately (91.6, 96.3).  
4. Using the main and extra sample with a lower level of coverage the confidence 
interval width tightens to 1.3. Assuming the true vaccination rate is 94% we 
would expect confidence intervals of approximately (93.3, 94.7). The fact this has 
the same confidence width as scenario 2 is purely coincidence.  
Public health units received their sample in early October and had four weeks to follow 
up overdue children, to allow for over-sampling for those LHDs who wished to do so. 
After the survey was conducted, the stratified sample was reweighted to account for 
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loss to follow-up. The data was probability weighted on the basis of the population and 
the population was estimated through the total number of children in the right age 
group according to the AIR. 
Overall, the analysis showed that areas with the least amount of error had dedicated 
programs aimed at following up overdue children, and areas with no active follow up 
programs experienced the highest proportions of incorrect reporting. In consideration 
of this we recommended developing systematic data cleaning methods that do not rely 
on local resourcing.  
An expansion on the limitations of the study  
This cross-sectional study provided a snapshot in time, raising the prospect that if 
another time frame had been sampled, different results may be uncovered. Although 
we were able to ascertain whether children were accurately recorded as overdue on the 
AIR, we lost an additional level of detail about the antigen type and dose number when 
the 491 records were returned. This was due to information bias through inaccurate 
recording by interviewers and incomplete or missing data. The benefit of having this 
detail could focus public health resources on a specific disease. 
Another limitation relates to children who are vaccinated overseas. If there was no 
written record of the vaccination and no option for follow-up, the child was listed as 
overdue, which could introduce bias into our final estimate. We conducted a sensitivity 
analysis that highlighted that even in an extreme scenario; the estimated true coverage 
for NSW would continue to exceed both the AIR coverage estimate and the national 
aspirational target for immunisation for the 1 year of age cohort. This study was not 
tailored to measure specific factors relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
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status or people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, who may have 
different drivers influencing immunisation coverage.  
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Abstract 
Objective 
Vaccinations in Australia are reportable to the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR). 
Following major immunisation policy initiatives, the New South Wales (NSW) Public 
Health Network undertook an audit to estimate true immunisation coverage of NSW 
children at 1 year of age, and explore reasons associated with under-reporting. 
Methods 
Cross-sectional survey examining AIR immunisation records of a stratified random 
sample of 491 NSW children aged 12-<15 months at 30 September 2017, >30 days 
overdue for immunisation. Survey data were analysed using population weights.  
Results 
Estimated true coverage of fully vaccinated 1 year old children in NSW is 96.2% (CI:95.9-
96.4), 2.1% higher than AIR reported coverage of 94.1%.  Of the children reported as 
overdue on AIR, 34.9% (CI:30.9-38.9) were actually fully vaccinated.  No significant 
association was found between under-reporting and socio-economic status, rurality or 
reported local coverage level. Data errors in AIR uploading (at provider level) and 
duplicate records contributed to incorrect AIR coverage recording. 
Conclusions 
Despite incentives to record childhood vaccinations on AIR, under-reporting continues 
to contribute to significant underestimation of true coverage in NSW.  
Implications for public health  
More reliable transmission of encounters to AIR at provider level and removal of 
duplicates are required.  
 44 
 
Introduction  
In 1996 the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR) was launched by the 
Australian Government to record the immunisation status of children less than 7 years 
of age. (3) In 2016, the ACIR became the Australian Immunisation Register (AIR), an all-
of-life immunisation register designed to include all vaccines on the National 
Immunisation Program (NIP) schedule as well as most privately purchased vaccines. (9) 
The AIR is used to assess local, state and national immunisation coverage, which in turn 
enables the mobilisation of targeted programs and resources to areas with lower 
coverage. At the individual level, the AIR identifies vaccinations that are overdue and 
required to be followed up to ensure children are fully vaccinated. 
To be considered by the AIR to be fully vaccinated at 12 months of age on the NIP (prior 
to 1 July 2018), children must have three doses of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis-
containing vaccine (DTPa); three doses of polio vaccine; three doses of Haemophilus 
influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine; three doses of hepatitis B vaccine and three doses of 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine. Two doses of PRP-OMP - containing Hib vaccine is also 
considered fully vaccinated (Table 1). (10) 
Table 1 Vaccines and dosages required to be considered fully vaccinated at 12 months of age on the 
National Immunisation Program (NIP)  
Vaccine Number of doses 
Diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis-containing vaccine (DTPa) 3 
Polio vaccine 3 
Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine 3* 
Hepatitis B vaccine 3 
Pneumococcal conjugate vaccine  3 
*2 doses of PRP-OMP – containing Hib vaccine is considered fully vaccinated 
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Immunisation coverage varies substantially across NSW. Historical surveys, conducted 
prior to the ‘No Jab No Pay’ policy found imprecision in ACIR reported coverage. (2-4, 8) 
Coverage figures based on the Register cited in parliament and the media do not 
acknowledge that these estimates are lower than true coverage reported in these 
studies. (4) This raises the potential for undue public concern and perception of risk, as 
well as inappropriate resource mobilisation toward populations that may not require 
interventions as much as others. With the introduction of the ‘No Jab No Pay’ policy in 
2015, (7) families of children who are not recorded as fully vaccinated on the AIR may 
be ineligible to receive Commonwealth benefits including the child care rebate, child 
care benefits and a family tax benefit. (11) In NSW and some other states, children must 
be recorded on the AIR as fully vaccinated to access childcare services. (7, 12) 
We postulated that as incorrect reporting on AIR may leave families financially 
disadvantaged, records on the AIR may have become more accurate, so an audit was 
conducted to determine whether the accuracy of AIR coverage estimates had improved.  
The primary aim of the audit was to provide a better estimate of immunisation coverage 
in NSW for children at one year of age by identifying those who were genuinely overdue 
on the AIR. Secondary objectives included identifying reasons for AIR underreporting 
and exploring whether the rate of underreporting varied by reported local coverage 
level, socio economic status or provider setting (urban or rural and remote). 
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Methodology 
Ethics approval was granted by Australian National University as a Low-Risk Expedited 
E1 Protocol on 21/08/2017: Protocol 2017/570. 
i. Selection and Description of Participants  
The audit examined the provider- and/or parent- held immunisation records of 
a sample of NSW children listed on the AIR as >30 days overdue. The cross-
sectional sample frame comprised all children aged 12-<15 months (birth cohort 
1 July to 30 September 2016), residing in NSW, and recorded on the AIR as 
overdue as at 30 September 2017 for at least one immunisation. These children 
were identified using the AIR011A report (13) extracted in early October 2017. 
Using the ‘third dose assumption’ in our definitions allowed our coverage 
estimates to be compared to national reporting. (14) The third dose assumption 
aims to minimise the impact of underreporting on AIR coverage estimates due 
to delays registering the child onto Medicare by assuming that children are fully 
vaccinated if they have a record of receiving the third dose of a vaccine, 
regardless of whether a record exists of their previous doses. (15)  Children 
without at least one of the following contact details were excluded: parental 
email address, phone number or provider information.  
ii. Technical information  
Taking the conservative assumption that 50% of children reported as overdue 
were incorrectly recorded, a stratified random sample (16) was selected to 
provide 80% power at a 5% significance level for each of the planned analyses to 
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detect a significant difference between overall NSW coverage according to the 
AIR and the audit. In addition, analyses were undertaken at a smaller 
geographical area level, based on Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Statistical 
Area Level 3 (SA3) to detect differences in under-reporting between: areas of 
low (bottom third of SA3 areas<92%), medium (middle third of SA3 regions 92-
94%) and high (top third of SA3 regions>94%) reported coverage; areas of low, 
medium and high socioeconomic status tertiles. We used the 2011 Index of 
Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage (IRSD) which is an indicator value of the 
ABS Socio-Economic Indicators for Areas (SEIFA) (17), and provider setting 
(urban/rural and remote) according to the Accessibility and Remoteness Index 
of Australia (ARIA+). (18) We chose SA3 areas to assess coverage for this study 
as they reflect meaningful regional areas of the state instead of focusing on 
population alone; areas are segmented into standardised regions with similar 
characteristics in socio-economic status and geography. These areas usually have 
a population of 30,000 to 130,000 and generally share borders with other 
administrative boundaries such as State Regional Development Areas or at least 
one Local Government Area. (19) 
iii. Statistical methods 
The strata and sample size for each stratum were calculated using constrained 
optimisation, implemented in the R Package Sampling Strata. (20) This allowed 
us to minimise the required sample size while answering our research questions. 
The final sample was selected using a random number generator. A stratified 
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random sample (main sample) was selected by local health district (LHD) of 
residence. Where resources were available, public health unit staff in each LHD 
could opt to survey extra records sampled in order to improve precision of 
estimates at LHD level and overall. Including this extra sample, a total of 491 
records were surveyed (Figure 2).   After the survey was conducted, the stratified 
sample was reweighted to account for loss to follow-up. For each coverage 
estimate we calculated 95% confidence intervals and used a Wald test for 
association to gain an overall p-value for differences in coverage over multiple 
parameters.  
iv. Data collection – provider level  
Details of children in the main and extra samples were provided to each public 
health unit via secure file transfer for follow-up in accordance with an audit tool 
developed to capture the relevant information from provider and parent-held 
records of children recorded on AIR as overdue.    
Figure 1 summarises the audit process. Public health unit staff interviewed 
immunisation providers by telephone using a standardised questionnaire. 
Providers were asked questions about the type of practice (general practice (GP), 
Aboriginal health service, council clinic, community health centre, public/private 
hospital, public health unit or flying doctor service). If the provider type was a 
general practice, further questions were asked about how many GPs and 
authorised nurse immunisers were in the practice to gauge the size of the 
provider setting.   
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Figure 1 Interview process for the NSW audit of the Australian Immunisation Register 
 
 
If the overdue vaccines had in fact been administered, the provider was asked: 
the date of vaccination; where the child received the vaccine (at the practice, 
overseas, another provider or other); and where the vaccines were recorded in 
the child’s medical record (immunisation tab or clinical notes). The interviewer 
then confirmed whether this was a data error (error in transmission of 
information from child’s medical record to the AIR) or a clinician’s error (human 
error in putting incorrect vaccination information in the child’s medical record, 
or incorrect vaccine or dose administered). The provider was asked to forward 
any corrected vaccination details to the AIR. Providers were also asked whether 
the child’s medical record indicated the reasons why a vaccination had not been 
administered (child sick, medical contradiction, parental hesitancy, parental 
refusal, family overseas, ‘other’ or unknown). In addition, the provider was asked 
about their primary method for transmitting immunisation encounters to the 
AIR.  
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v. Data collection – parents and guardians  
If the provider did not hold a record of administration of the overdue vaccine(s), 
or if the provider was unable to be reached, up to three attempts were made to 
contact the child’s parents. Parents who were contacted and stated that their 
child was vaccinated were asked where the child received the vaccine (overseas, 
another provider, or ‘other: specify’), the provider’s name and date of 
vaccination. Where a vaccination was recorded, parents were asked to provide 
evidence of the vaccination and Medicare details so the interviewer could 
correct the AIR record. Evidence of completed vaccination required the parent 
to read out to the interviewer details from their parent-held child health record 
(Blue Book) or other evidence such as overseas vaccination record with antigens 
compatible with the NIP schedule. When parents claimed the child was fully 
vaccinated but were unable to provide documentation of the record, the child 
was classified as not fully vaccinated. Children of parents who were unable to be 
contacted after three attempts were listed as ‘lost to follow-up’ (LTFU). 
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Results 
i. Primary results 
Of the 25,934 children born from 1 July to 30 September 2016 and recorded on 
the AIR as residing in NSW, 1551 (6.0%) were reported as not fully vaccinated at 
30 September 2017. Of the 1551 records, 286 were excluded (24 had insufficient 
residential address information to be assigned a SEIFA or ARIA+ index value; and 
262 had no contact information including phone number, provider number or 
email address), leaving 1265 records to sample from (Figure 2).  
Of these, 491 were randomly selected for audit. Seventy seven (15.7%) were 
classified as lost to follow up. One GP and parents of three children declined to 
be interviewed, and for the remaining 73 cases the interviewer made at least 
three attempts to contact the parent, provider or both, with no answer or 
response to voice messages or email. Of the 414 children whose immunisation 
status was able to be confirmed, 271 were correctly recorded on AIR as not fully 
vaccinated and 143 had evidence of being fully vaccinated (detailed in medical 
record or parental-held Blue Book). 
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Figure 2 Sampling frame flowchart for the NSW audit of the Australian Immunisation Register. 
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ii. Reasons for non-vaccination  
Although it was not a requirement for parents to be asked or to offer reasons for 
being overdue for vaccination, information was obtained for 113 (41.7%) of the 
271 children in the sample confirmed as not fully vaccinated. 
Reasons given were vaccine refusal (n=54); parental hesitancy (n=17); vaccinated 
overseas with no evidence of vaccination (n=9); child overseas and not 
vaccinated (n=8); vaccinated in Australia with no record (n=8); currently on a 
catch-up schedule (n=8); child sick at the time (n=5); parent forgot to vaccinate 
(n=2); GP refused to vaccinate (n=1); and interstate provider (n=1). 
iii. Reasons for error on AIR  
Of the 143 children incorrectly recorded as overdue on the AIR, 29 had duplicate 
AIR records (due to children having two Medicare numbers or name errors). 
Vaccinations of 102 children were not recorded on the AIR due to presumed data 
transmission errors, and two were due to clinician errors, where incorrect doses 
had been recorded in one case and no reason offered for the second. Seven 
children had evidence of being vaccinated overseas; two children had received 
vaccines which were slightly delayed by documented illness. At the time of 
sampling, the encounter had not reached AIR for these two children. The reason 
was not stated for one child. Practices experiencing data errors used a range of 
patient record software brands and versions. 
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iv. Coverage calculations 
Overall, after adjustment for loss to follow-up from the defined sample, 34.9% 
(95%CI: 30.9-38.9%) of overdue children were actually up-to-date for 
vaccination, leading to an estimate of true coverage in this cohort of 96.2% 
(95%CI: 95.9-96.4%), compared to the AIR based coverage of 94.1% (Table 1). 
We found significant variability between LHDs in whether vaccinations were 
incorrectly recorded on AIR, with the proportion of children incorrectly recorded 
as overdue ranging between 12% and 54% (Table 1). Level of incorrect reporting 
was not associated with coverage level, rurality or socioeconomic status (Table 
2). However, for the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander children in the sample, 
reporting error was significantly less than for non-Indigenous children (Table 2).  
v. Sensitivity analysis  
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine whether non-response would 
affect the conclusions of the study, and how it would affect true coverage 
estimates (Table 3). In the first scenario, lost to follow up records were set as 
‘fully vaccinated’ (AIR incorrect), giving a true coverage estimate of 96.8% (CI: 
96.6, 97.0).  In the second scenario, lost to follow up records were set as ‘not 
vaccinated’ (AIR correct), changing the true coverage estimate to 95.8% (CI: 95.6, 
96.0). A third scenario was created where those who claimed to be vaccinated 
but had no evidence of the encounter (AIR correct) were set as truly vaccinated 
(AIR incorrect). This had little effect on the true coverage estimate, which was 
slightly increased to 96.4% (CI: 96.2, 96.7). 
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The sensitivity analysis highlighted that even in an extreme scenario the estimated true 
coverage for 1 year old children in NSW would continue to exceed both the AIR coverage 
estimate of 94.1% and the Australian Governments national aspirational immunisation 
target of 95% coverage. (5) 
Table 2 Sensitivity analysis accounting for children overdue for immunisation on the Australian 
Immunisation Register who claimed to be vaccinated with no evidence, or were lost to follow up 
All NSW n= 
% 
Incorrectl
y reported 
95% CI 
Reported 
coverage 
True 
coverage 
95% CI 
Reported results 
(excluding 77 LTFU) 
414 34.9 (30.9,38.9) 94.1 96.2 (95.9,96.4) 
Counting vaccinated 
without evidence as yes 
(excluding 77 LTFU) 
414 39.6 (35.5,43.7) 94.1 96.44 (96.2,96.7) 
Including LTFU as fully 
vaccinated  
491 45.8 (41.9,49.6) 94.1 96.80 (96.6,97.0) 
Setting LTFU as not 
vaccinated  
491 29.0 (25.5,32.5) 94.1 95.81 (95.6,96.0) 
Discussion  
In this cohort of one-year-old NSW children 34.9% (95% CI: 30.9-38.9%) recorded as 
overdue on AIR were found to be incorrectly assessed as overdue. Thus the true 
immunisation coverage in NSW is estimated at 96.2% (95% CI: 95.9-96.4%), 2.1% higher 
than the AIR estimate of 94.1%. Despite the policy incentives for families to ensure that 
their children are fully immunised, (7, 11) national recorded coverage remains 
inaccurate. (5) Research prior to the 2015 policy change found that in 2001 a cohort of 
children from South Eastern Sydney Local Health District (SESLHD) aged 12-<15 months 
old, reported to have an immunisation coverage rate of 81% on the ACIR had a true 
coverage rate of at least 91%. (4, 8) A similar study in Waverley and Sydney City local 
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government areas in 2013 found that 33% of the cohort reported to be overdue for a 
vaccination were not overdue. This boosted the coverage rate of that area from 87% to 
91%, a 4% difference. (4) The current audit found a lower underreporting rate that was 
fairly homogenous over most of the factors tested, with local coverage rates (low, 
medium and high), socio-economic status (low, medium and high) and provider setting 
(urban/rural and remote) having no statistically significant association. Underreporting 
did vary significantly by local health district and Aboriginality. This may reflect the impact 
of existing programs for all Aboriginal infants in NSW (21) and that in some local health 
districts immunisation providers routinely review the status of children shown as 
overdue on AIR, correcting missing data and recalling overdue children. (22, 23) 
Earlier research suggested that the primary reason for underreporting in the AIR was 
due to immunisation providers being unable to submit the patient vaccine encounter 
details in a timely manner. (3, 4, 8) Encounter forms are now an infrequent method of 
reporting with primary care patient record systems transmitting vaccination records 
directly to the AIR, usually on the same day. The introduction of medical practice 
software may alter the coverage estimates of the AIR positively through automatic 
notification, or negatively if there are systematic errors with data transfer or data errors. 
Later studies undertaken in the era of widespread use of electronic patient record 
systems have found lower, but consistent levels of underreporting in the range of 2-4%, 
(2, 4) similar to this audit. The local study by Ferson & Orr 6 found that key contributors 
to undercounting in the AIR included lack of knowledge by GPs about the reporting 
process, incorrect data entry and systematic issues relating to medical practice software 
feeding into the AIR. (4) 
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The main factor found to contribute to contemporary underreporting is an error in data 
transmission of information from the child’s medical record to the AIR. Almost three-
quarters (102 of 143) of the incorrect classifications of children as overdue on the AIR 
were due to data transmission errors. We were unable to identify a consistent cause for 
data errors, which appeared unrelated to the brand or version of patient record 
software used, however examination of specific software or transmission errors was 
beyond the scope of this study. 
The second most common source of AIR inaccuracy was duplicate records, responsible 
for 20% of errors. Duplicates may occur on the AIR when a child has more than one 
Medicare number, or encounters are entered without a Medicare number. Other 
duplicates arose through errors in birth dates, use of different surnames, or in situations 
such as foster care. If PHU staff were able to locate the duplicate records pair (whether 
the pair was in the sample or not) they updated the AIR to consolidate them into one 
complete record. The AIR uses registration data from Medicare to calculate the 
denominator. Duplicate records artificially inflate the denominator, which in turn 
reduces estimated immunisation coverage. Clinician errors, either human error entering 
information in the child’s medical record or incorrect vaccine dose recorded, appear to 
be rare causes of being assessed as not fully vaccinated, with only two instances 
detected in our sample. 
Twenty-four children who had moved overseas permanently were recorded as overdue 
on AIR. This information was reported by the provider or other family members 
(remaining parent, grandparent). Parents of 16 children who were living overseas 
claimed their child was up-to-date with vaccinations. Of these, seven were able to 
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provide evidence of vaccination and were thus moved to the ‘AIR incorrect: child 
vaccinated’ category.  
As these children live overseas, leaving them on the AIR adds to underestimation of 
coverage as they contribute to the denominator without being able to contribute to the 
numerator irrespective of whether they are vaccinated, unless a parent and a local 
provider take the trouble to manually register the overseas vaccines with the AIR. The 
procedure to remove children from the AIR when they are overseas requires an 
immunisation provider to tick a “returned mail indicator” within the child’s AIR record, 
or to contact the AIR in writing. The Department of Human Services advises that this will 
then remove the child from state coverage reports. 
There were 54 children in the sample whose parents reported they had chosen not to 
vaccinate. Many of these children were already known to the health services so were 
not re-contacted. Some parents who were contacted offered reasons why they have not 
vaccinated their children. One parent stated a family history of allergic reaction to 
Boostrix® and another stated that a family member had died as a result of an adverse 
reaction to an unspecified vaccination. One family was not willing to vaccinate their 
child, citing cultural reasons.   
A further 17 children had not been fully vaccinated as their parents were hesitant to 
vaccinate, some delaying their children’s vaccinations until ‘later’; vaccinating slowly, 
one vaccine at a time; or selectively choosing some vaccines.  
This study shows that in NSW the national aspirational target of 95% fully vaccinated 
coverage (5) has been achieved for children at one year of age, but confirms that despite 
policy settings encouraging accurate recording of vaccinations on the AIR, 
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underreporting continues at around 2%. For Aboriginal children, and in regions where 
resources are dedicated to ensuring accurate and timely recording of vaccination on AIR, 
error rates are lower. (5, 21-23) Given the persistence of reporting errors in the absence 
of active local programs to clean and correct AIR records, consideration should be given 
to developing cost effective centralised automated measures to identify and correct 
errors and duplicate records. Until this can be routinely achieved at a national level, AIR 
coverage data for children at 1 year of age should be treated as the minimum estimated 
coverage level for that age group. Similar audits in the future may assess the magnitude 
of underreporting in other age cohorts and provide further evidence of undercounting 
to enrich our understanding of how sociodemographic or practice level characteristics 
may contribute to underreporting. 
Limitations  
As this study is cross-sectional, the prospect is raised that if another time frame had 
been sampled, different results may be uncovered. However, given the similarity 
between this and other relatively recent local audits we do not expect that would occur. 
The 77 records that were lost to follow up may have introduced non-response bias into 
the study, and was countered by conducting a sensitivity analysis that indicated that 
conclusions of the study were not materially affected (Table 3). We aimed to minimise 
interviewer bias by providing a questionnaire with mostly closed form responses. 
Possibly of greater importance is that the underreporting estimate at one year of age is 
not generalisable to other age groups. As children become older they are increasingly 
likely to enrol in early childhood education which should prompt correction of data 
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transmission and clinician errors, as they are required to be recorded as fully vaccinated 
on the AIR to enrol in childcare in NSW and to receive Australian Government financial 
assistance to attend. Thus, if overdue children were sampled at 2 or 5 years of age the 
underreporting rate is likely to be lower. Lastly, this study was not tailored to measure 
specific factors relating to people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, 
with potentially different drivers influencing recorded immunisation coverage.  
Conclusion  
Despite widespread use of electronic patient record systems and policy settings 
encouraging accurate recording of childhood vaccinations, publicly reported coverage 
estimates at one year of age are approximately 2% lower than true vaccination rates. 
This systematic underestimating of coverage should be clearly conveyed whenever AIR 
coverage estimates are quoted. Data transmission errors were the most frequent cause 
for errors on the AIR; however other factors included duplicate records and children 
living overseas. Reasons for correctly recorded incomplete vaccination included vaccine 
hesitancy or refusal, lack of documentary evidence/records of vaccination, delays due 
to illness or children on catch up schedules. Cost effective measures should be 
developed to routinely identify and correct common errors leading to incomplete or 
duplicate records on the AIR. 
   
 61 
 
References 
1. Law C, McGuire R, Ferson MJ, Reid S, Gately C, Stephenson J, et al. Children overdue for 
immunisation: a question of coverage or reporting? An audit of the Australian Immunisation 
Register. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health. 2019;43(3):214-20. 
2. Hull BP, Lawrence GL, MacIntyre CR, McIntyre PB. Immunisation coverage in Australia 
corrected for under-reporting to the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register. Australian 
and New Zealand journal of public health. 2003;27(5):533-8. 
3. Conaty SJ, McAnulty JM. The Australian Childhood Immunisation Register: validation of 
the immunisation status of children who are very overdue. Australian and New Zealand journal 
of public health. 2001;25(2):139-40. 
4. Ferson MJ, Orr K. Some truths about the “low” childhood vaccination coverage in 
Sydney’s eastern suburbs. The Medical journal of Australia. 2015;203(3):153. 
5. Hendry A, Beard F, Dey A, Meijer D, Campbell-Lloyd S, Clark K, et al. Closing the 
vaccination coverage gap in New South Wales: the Aboriginal Immunisation Healthcare Worker 
Program. The Medical journal of Australia. 2018. 
6. Australian Government Productivity Commission. National Partnership Agreement on 
Essential Vaccines Performance Reports 2019 [cited 2019 10 Feb]. Available from: 
https://www.pc.gov.au/research/ongoing/essential-vaccines-assessment. 
7. Social services Legislation Amendment (No Jab, No Pay) Act 2015 No. 158 [statute on 
the Internet]. (c2015). 
8. Botham SJ, Poulos RG, McFarland KJ, Ferson MJ. Getting it right—the Australian 
Childhood Immunisation Register and immunisation rates in south-eastern Sydney. Australian 
and New Zealand journal of public health. 2004;28(1):68-71. 
9. Australian Government Department of Human Services. Australian Immunisation 
Register for health professionals. 2018 [cited 2018 Oct 2]. Available from: 
https://www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/health-
professionals/services/medicare/australian-immunisation-register-health-professionals  
10. Australian Government Department of Health. National Immunisation Program 
Schedule (NIP). 2016 [cited 2017 May 29]. Available from: https://beta.health.gov.au/health-
topics/immunisation/immunisation-throughout-life/national-immunisation-program-schedule  
11. Australian Government Department of Health. Immunisation requirements. 2017 [cited 
2017 May 23]. Available from: 
https://www.humanservices.gov.au/individuals/enablers/immunisation-requirements/35396. 
12. Public Health Act 2010 No 127, NSW [statute on the Internet]. (c2019). 
13. Australian Government Department of Human Services. Reports available from the AIR 
site. 2018 [cited 2018 Oct 2]. Available from: 
https://www.humanservices.gov.au/organisations/health-professionals/enablers/reports-
available-from-air-site. 
14. O'Brien ED, Sam GA, Mead C. Methodology for measuring Australia's childhood 
immunisation coverage. Communicable Diseases Intelligence. 1998;22(3):36. 
15. McIntyre P, Hull B, Lawrence G, MacIntyre C. Estimating immunisation coverage: is 
the'third dose assumption'still valid? Communicable diseases intelligence quarterly report. 
2003;27(3):357. 
16. Ballin M, Barcaroli G. Joint determination of optimal stratification and sample allocation 
using genetic algorithm. Survey Methodology. 2013;39(2):369-93. 
17. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Socio-Economic Indexes for Areas.: ABS; 2018. 
18. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS): 
 62 
 
Volume 5 - Remoteness Structure, July 2016, ABS cat. no. 1270.0.55.005. ABS; 2016. 
19. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Australian Statistical Geography Standard (ASGS): 
Volume 1 - Main Structure and Greater Capital City Statistical Areas, ABS cat. no. 1270.0.55.001. 
ABS; 2016. 
20. Barcaroli G. Sampling Strata: An R package for the optimization of stratified sampling. 
Journal of Statistical Software. 2014;61(4):1-24. 
21. Miles T, Granger L, Gately C, editors. Improving the accuracy of ACIR data and increasing 
vaccination rates. 15th National Immunisation Conference, Immunisation: the jigsaw – fitting 
the pieces two decades on #NIC2016; 2016 7-9 Jun; Brisbane City (Australia): Public Health 
Association Australia. 
22. Miles T, Brown S, editors. Transmitting data electronically to ACIR: How accurate is it? 
15th National Immunisation Conference, Immunisation: the jigsaw – fitting the pieces two 
decades on #NIC2016; 2016 7-9 Jun; Brisbane City (Australia): Public Health Association 
Australia. 
23. Australian Government Department of Health. Immunisation coverage rates for all 
children. 2018 [cited 2018 Sep 4]. Available from: https://beta.health.gov.au/health-
topics/immunisation/childhood-immunisation-coverage/immunisation-coverage-rates-for-all   
 
 63 
 
Appendices  
Appendix A. Article published in the ANZJPH  
 
  
 64 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 
 66 
 
 
 67 
 
 
 68 
 
 
 69 
 
 
  
 
  70 
 
Appendix B. Project summary  
 
 
  
  
 
  71 
 
Appendix C. Expression of interest 
 
  
  
 
  72 
 
Appendix D. AIR Audit Tool  
 
  
 
  73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  74 
 
 
Appendix E. AIR Questionnaire 
 
 
 
  
 
  75 
 
 
 
     76 
 
 
NOTES (e.g. duplicate records or other problems): 
  
 
  77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  79 
 
 
 
     80 
 
 
 NOTES (e.g. duplicate records or other problems
  
Chapter 3  
Analysis of a public health dataset 
Investigation into high Q fever rates in Aboriginal 
people living in Western NSW 
 82 
This page is intentionally left blank. 
  
 83 
Chapter 3 Table of Contents 
Acronyms ........................................................................................................................ 87 
Prologue .......................................................................................................................... 88 
Lessons learnt .................................................................................................................. 90 
MAE Role ......................................................................................................................... 91 
Abstract ........................................................................................................................... 93 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 95 
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 102 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 111 
Qualitative results ......................................................................................................... 122 
Discussion ...................................................................................................................... 126 
Recommendations: NSW Government ......................................................................... 130 
Recommendations: Western NSW ............................................................................... 132 
Limitations ..................................................................................................................... 133 
Appendices .................................................................................................................... 140 
Appendix A. Q fever infographic for job seekers .......................................................... 141 
 
  
 84 
This page is intentionally left blank.  
  
 85 
Tables and figures 
Tables 
Table 1 Vaccination status information aggregated into categories of Q fever in New 
South Wales between 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017 ...................................... 106 
Table 2 Details of the Aboriginal Research Advisory Group for Q fever in Western New 
South Wales at 30 March 2019 showing meaningful representation through affiliations, 
other vocational skills and knowledge relevant to the Q fever investigation .............. 109 
Table 3 Summary of Q fever notifications in New South Wales by selected demographic 
factors between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017. ........................................... 112 
Table 4 Notifications and ratesa per 100,000 population of Q fever notifications in New 
South Wales by Indigenous status, local health district, 1 January 2012 to 31 December 
2017 ............................................................................................................................... 114 
Table 5 Counts and average ratesa per 100,000 per population year of Q fever in Western 
New South Wales before and after data completeness of Indigenous status, 1 January 
2012 to 31 December 2017 ........................................................................................... 117 
Table 6 Comparison between selected age and sex demographics of people in Western 
New South Wales notified with Q fever between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017.
 ....................................................................................................................................... 118 
Table 7 Risk ratio of animal and occupational exposures, and vaccination status of 
people with Q fever in Western New South Wales, by Indigenous status, 1 January 2012 
and 31 December 2017 ................................................................................................. 120 
 
  
 86 
Figures 
Figure 1  Rates* of Q fever notifications for NSW local health districts that exceed the 
state average of 2.7 per 100,000, by year and, 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017
 ....................................................................................................................................... 113 
Figure 2 Epidemiological curve of Q fever notifications in Western New South Wales local 
health district, by notification month and year, 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017 by 
Indigenous status. ......................................................................................................... 116 
Figure 3 Age group distribution of Q fever notifications in Western NSW local health 
district between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017 by age group and Indigenous 
status ............................................................................................................................. 118 
Figure 4 Percentages of notified cases of Q fever in Western New South Wales by sex, 
age group and Indigenous status, between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017 . 119 
Figure 5 Accountabilities of the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases Team including 
information flow of messaging channels and actions recommended by the Aboriginal 
Research Advisory Group for Q fever in Western New South Wales at 30 March 2019.
 ....................................................................................................................................... 125 
Figure 6 Proposed Q fever vulnerability and resilience response model to assist 
consultation groups to understand the context and potential responses to Q fever across 
New South Wales .......................................................................................................... 132 
 
  
 87 
Acronyms 
ACCHS Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services 
AH&MRC Aboriginal Health and Medical Research Council of NSW 
AMS Aboriginal Medical Service 
ANU Australian National University 
ARA Aboriginal Research Advisory (Group) 
CDNA Communicable Diseases Network Australia 
DPI Department of Primary Industries 
EHO Environmental Health Officer 
HREC Human Research Ethics Committee 
IgA immunoglobulin class A 
IgG immunoglobulin class G 
IgM immunoglobulin class M 
LGA Local Government Area 
MAE Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology 
NCIMS Notifiable Conditions Information Management System 
NQFMP National Q Fever Management Program  
NSW New South Wales 
NQFMP National Q Fever Management Program 
PCR Polymerase chain reaction 
PPE Personal protective equipment 
SAPHaRI Secure Analytics for Population Health Research and Intelligence 
TOR Terms of Reference  
Yr Year 
 
  
 88 
This page is intentionally left blank.  
  
 89 
Prologue 
During a routine analysis of notifiable zoonotic diseases in New South Wales (NSW), the 
Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases team discovered an over-representation of Q fever in 
Aboriginal people, particularly in Western NSW local health district. (1) When I was 
asked to investigate this, I immediately thought a confounder was at play. Q fever is not 
a disease that should act differently across racial demographics. Its causative agent, 
Coxiella burnetii, (2) is too tiny to care about what mob you are from (or if you even have 
one), and is instead preoccupied being the Bear Grylls of its genus; surviving the most 
extreme conditions, gliding kilometres along the wind into a respiratory tract near you, 
or spelunking through the flesh and blood of an unsuspecting ruminant.  
It did not make sense to describe what was occurring in Western NSW by numbers alone 
without understanding the situation on the ground. I formed an Aboriginal Research 
Advisory Group to find meaning behind the numbers. I worked with agencies who 
described the impact Q fever had on their client’s livelihoods. I listened to personal 
stories about the impact of Q fever on peoples’ daily lives, about relatives who became 
sick and even died. People who had the disease but were reluctant to tell their 
employers. When I considered what I had learnt along with the information I scoured 
from six years’ worth of questionnaires and case notes, I realised that it was through 
these stories that we could find pathways toward meaningful action.  
I present to you another onion layer to the overall story, about a fresh-faced MAE and 
Q fever, Australia’s most prevalent and prolific vaccine-preventable zoonotic disease 
- that nobody has ever heard of - and most importantly, the public health action that 
arose from this. 
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Lessons learnt 
Lesson 1: Ensuring Aboriginal community control in an infectious disease investigation 
Our investigation focused on Aboriginal people, so ethics approval was required from 
the Aboriginal Health and Medical Research Council (AH&MRC). This was my first time 
performing an investigation that required these ethics approvals. Key principle 4.2 of 
the AH&MRC Guidelines for Research into Aboriginal Health stated that Aboriginal 
governance over the project was required. 
” There must be Aboriginal community control over all aspects of proposed 
research including the design and conduct of the research, ownership of data, 
interpretation of data, and the reporting and publication of findings from research 
affecting the health of Aboriginal people.”  
- AH&MRC Guidelines for Research into Aboriginal Health 2016, page 5 (3) 
It took time and negotiation to ensure this could go forward in a meaningful way. 
Because the investigation involved confidential medical record information, there was 
rigidness to how it was conducted. To ensure Aboriginal governance over the project 
could be upheld without releasing identifiable data, I formed an Aboriginal Research 
Advisory group consisting of representatives from Aboriginal Community Controlled 
Health Services (ACCHSs), NSW Health and a tertiary institution. The group reviewed the 
results from the study and identified appropriate pathways and messaging channels to 
report and use the findings. These messaging channels have become a part of the 
strategic actions for Q fever prevention in NSW over the next four years. Meaningful 
representation is crucial because ultimately, we know our people best. By allowing this 
to evolve organically rather than bureaucratically we had a good outcome, and those 
benefits flow to the people who are at risk of Q fever.  
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Lesson 2: Advocacy 
Later in the investigation the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases team received funding for Q 
fever awareness campaigning, with a small window of time to produce campaign 
materials. It was bought to my attention that the funding had pre-prescribed conditions 
that we could only produce tangible materials such as brochures and posters. I co-
produced an information sheet about Q fever, of which the content and outlay was 
determined by the community to ensure maximum impact and effectiveness in 
communicating health messaging (0). I learned how to design and implement a 
consultation remotely, when I normally would have conducted it face-to-face. I also 
would have gone out to areas affected and held town hall meetings for health services 
and community to attend. The learning curve in this instance was to work with what 
resources are available, and advocate for changes in the way we utilise funding in future 
campaigns.  
MAE Role  
My role in this investigation was to perform an enhanced analysis of Q fever notifications 
of Aboriginal and non-Indigenous people living in Western NSW local health district). My 
tasks included: 
• Desktop literature review using the PubMed database. 
• Enhanced analysis of Q fever notifications reported in NSW between 2012-2017 
using data from the NSW Notifiable Conditions Information Management 
System (NCIMS).  
• Extensive data cleaning including a review of all attachments to confirmed Q 
fever cases on NCIMS (clinical notes, discharge summaries, questionnaires and 
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lab results) to improve data completeness and fill missing variables; and the 
merge and categorisation of animal, occupation and vaccination status 
variables. 
• Ethics application and approval from Australian National University (ANU) and 
the Aboriginal Health and Medical Research Council (AH&MRC). 
• Locate missing information about Western NSW cases that have not listed their 
Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status to ensure that we can get the 
most accurate results particularly as there are small numbers. 
• Creation of Aboriginal Research Advisory Group which included the 
development of a Terms of Reference (TOR), delivery of teleconferences, 
follow-up to internal and external agencies and development of strategic 
resources to address recommendations of the group. 
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Abstract  
Background 
Higher rates of Q fever infection were notified in Aboriginal people relative to non-
Indigenous people in NSW in 2015-2016. Further analysis found the majority of 
Aboriginal cases were located in Western NSW local health district. We sought to 
determine whether there was a true difference in rates and if specific factors had driven 
the overrepresentation of cases. 
Methods 
Secondary data analysis of Q fever notification data for the period 2012-2017. Data was 
extracted from the NSW Notifiable Disease Information Management System. Statistical 
analysis was conducted using STATA 15 (4) and Microsoft Excel. Data was analysed by 
indirect standardisation of age, sex and location, and a risk ratio exposure analysis of 
occupation, animal exposure and vaccination status. 
Results 
There was an over-representation of Q fever cases notified in Aboriginal people living in 
Western NSW (56.1% of all cases). The majority were under 29 years of age (66%), 
whereas the majority of non-Indigenous people were aged between 40-59 years (44%).  
Rates of Q fever in Western NSW for Aboriginal people were 16.7 per 100,000 and 13.8 
per 100,000 for non-Indigenous people. The indirectly standardised rate for Aboriginal 
people in Western NSW was 19 per 100,000 (95%CI 12.8-26.3) and 14 per 100,000 for 
non-Indigenous people. The indirectly standardised morbidity ratio was 135.4 (95% CI 
92.6-191.1,) indicating there were 35% more cases of Q fever in Aboriginal people in 
Western NSW compared to non-Indigenous people, consistent with the rest of NSW. In 
Western NSW, farm animals were the most common animal exposure reported by 
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Aboriginal (n=28/32, 87.5%) and non-Indigenous (n=187/203, 92.1%) people. Living or 
working on a farm was the most reported occupational exposure for both Aboriginal 
(n=28/32, 87.5%) and non-Indigenous people (179/203, 88.2%). Risk ratio (RR) 
calculations showed that shearing exposures in Aboriginal people (n=18, 56.3%) were 
4.2 times higher than those reported in non-Indigenous people (n=37, 18.2%), (RR 4.2 
95% CI 2.2-7.9, p value=<0.01). Aboriginal people were 2.6 times more likely to have no 
high-risk occupation compared to non-Indigenous people, which was likely attributed to 
age (RR 2.6 95%CI:1.4-5.0, p value 0.01). Aboriginal people were 5 times more likely to 
be too young for vaccination when compared with non-Indigenous people (RR 5.1 
95%CI: 2.8-9.1, p=<0.01). Aboriginal community consultation identified target groups 
and strategic actions for people living in rural NSW, hunters and shooters, job seekers, 
and primary industries workers and students which included the development of 
information, education and communications material. 
Conclusion 
Q fever is the most common vaccine-preventable zoonotic disease in Australia, which 
can cause debilitating and long term illness. Aboriginal people in Western NSW are 
disproportionately affected by Q fever.  Aboriginal community consultation identified 
messaging channels to reach at-risk groups with a particular focus on young Aboriginal 
people in Western NSW. On-going engagement with the Aboriginal community in 
understanding the problem and finding culturally appropriate solutions is crucial to 
address Q fever in communities of Western NSW. 
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Introduction 
On 31 October 1935, a man named Edward Holbrook Derrick hastily filled a page of his 
laboratory notebook, leaving just enough room at the bottom to sketch some unusual 
things he observed on an impression smear from a guinea pig. Derrick had been 
undertaking a tireless investigation into a strange flu-like illness affecting abattoir 
workers in South-East Queensland. He coined the condition Q (for Query) fever.  
On that October day he was probably unaware of the great things his laboratory journal 
would come to detail, and that his sketch was likely the first depiction of the causative 
agent of the disease. (5) He forwarded his research to Frank Macfarlane Burnett, along 
with his suspicions that this may not be a virus as the majority believed, but a rickettsia. 
By 1937, Burnett and his colleague Mavis Freeman had isolated the pathogen; and at 
almost the same time on the other side of the world, another man, Herald Cox, had done 
the very same. (5)  The causative agent was named Coxiella Burnetii, after the men who 
had isolated the pathogen. (6)   
Though much has changed in the eighty-four years since those humble notes on paper, 
one thing has not: that both Derrick and Q fever have probably not received the 
recognition they deserve. For starters, the public health impact of Q fever is profound. 
With the exception of New Zealand and Antarctica, C. burnetii has been found all across 
the world. (7) Outbreaks have occurred overseas, the largest in the Netherlands 
between 2007-2010 (8) with over 3500 cases in the first two years. (9) In Australia, Q 
fever is the most common notifiable zoonotic disease that can be prevented in humans 
by vaccination. (10, 11) Outbreaks of Q fever have occurred in Australia on small scales 
including veterinary staff becoming infected by a single animal (12) to larger scale 
outbreaks at high-risk workplaces such as abattoirs (13) or high animal density areas 
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including the saleyards. (14) Attempts to mitigate the risks for disease are further 
weakened by gaps in knowledge on best practice to detect, promote awareness and 
prevent the disease.  
In 2016 the Health Protection NSW Communicable Diseases Branch published the NSW 
Zoonoses Annual Surveillance Report: 2016. (1) The report stated that although the 
number of confirmed cases in 2016 (225 cases, 2.8 cases per 100,000) had decreased 
from 2015 (15), they were still higher than the five year annual mean (180 cases, 2.41 
cases per 100,000). The most significant increases for 2016 were observed in remote 
regional areas of Western NSW and Far West NSW local health districts. Of the 225 
cases, 89% (n=200) had data indicating the cases Indigenous status. Of these, a 
disproportionate rate of Q fever infections among Indigenous Australians living in NSW 
were observed (n=13, 5.60 cases per 100,000) compared to NSW residents who were 
listed as not Indigenous (n=187, 2.47 cases per 100,000). (1) The annual incidence of Q 
fever in Australia during this time period has hovered around 2.2 per 100,000 with up to 
85% of the burden shared by Queensland and NSW, respectively. (16)  
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Transmission pathways 
Q fever has a complex range of transmission pathways and risk factors. The primary 
reservoir are ruminants, particularly cattle, goats and sheep. (17) Other carriers include 
feral animals including rabbits (7), camels (18) and wild dogs (19); native animals 
including kangaroos and wallabies (20); and domestic animals including cats and dogs 
(20, 21).  A number of tick species carry C. burnetii although there is more to learn about 
the role they play in the transmission cycle of the disease. (22) Animals shed C. burnetii 
through their tissues (flesh and blood), products (wool and milk) and discharges (vaginal 
excretions and faeces). Birthing products are one of the most significant sources of Q 
fever. (23) These tissues, products and discharges are easily desiccated into the soil, 
aerosolized and carried large distances via the wind. (17, 24-26) Increased herd density 
and movement is shown to enhance the risk of Q fever. (18, 24) While dry and dusty 
weather increases the risk of transmission, rainfall is shown to be a protective factor for 
Q fever infection (17, 24). Q fever appears to follow a seasonal pattern worldwide that 
aligns with birthing seasons of ruminants and when people are more likely to be 
outdoors. (6) The introduction of an animal or animals that have the disease (shedder 
animals) is a clear pathway to introduce C. burnetii into a previously uninfected 
population. (17, 24) Ruminants have been found to continually shed C. burnetii  in urine 
or faeces after the acute phase of their infection. (23) While animals that are infected 
with C. burnetii are mostly asymptomatic they can suffer spontaneous abortion or give 
birth to animals with low weight. (23) Humans are infected by Q fever though infected 
animal tissues, products and discharges, particularly placentas and birthing products 
that are either splashed or sprayed onto them. However, the most efficient pathway for 
human infection is through inhalation of contaminated dust or droplets contaminated 
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with C. burnetii. (14) People have also been exposed to Q fever through cuts in their skin 
or by ingesting contaminated dairy products. (24) There have been rare accounts of 
sexual transmission (27, 28), transmission following human childbirth (29) and infection 
following bone marrow transplantation. (30) 
Symptoms 
The incubation period is around 2-3 weeks, with many asymptomatic of disease. Those 
with symptoms may have pneumonia, hepatitis (usually without jaundice), arthritis or 
(rarely) meningitis. (31) Symptoms of Q fever in the acute phase may include debilitating 
headaches and severe, prolonged fever which can last well over a month. (23) This fever 
may be characterised by ‘drenching’ sweats. (32) The most common co-morbidity to C. 
burnetii infection in humans is hepatitis which can elicit fever, abdominal pain, lack of 
appetite, diarrhoea, nausea and vomiting. Cases may present without jaundice or 
asymptomatically. (23) The most common symptom after the acute phase is a type of 
extreme fatigue known as Q fever fatigue syndrome (QFS). (33) A study in the 
Netherlands showed that although most will recover after an acute Q fever infection, a 
third will continue to have poor health including severe fatigue and reduced quality of 
life for over two years post-infection. (34) Q fever can result in severe illness which may 
be compounded if there is delay in the disease to be diagnosed and treated. (35) 
Additionally longer term, more severe illnesses known as persistent focal infections, 
which have also been described as ‘chronic Q fever’ can arise. Persistent focal infections 
mostly present as endocarditis or a vascular infection. Cases with hepatitis in the acute 
phase may end up with granulomas on the liver. The proportion of those with persistent 
focal infections in NSW is not known as this data is not collected. 
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Laboratory confirmation 
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) is the most acceptable testing method of Q fever, 
particularly if the case is positive, however the more recent qPCR is potentially more 
useful despite being less sensitive. (25) A serological immunoglobulin class G (IgG) result 
or an immunoglobulin class M (IgM) result against phase I and II antigens describes an 
acute infection. An IgG >= either 1/800 or 1/1600 against phase I antigens, often with 
an immunoglobulin class A (IgA) against phase I and II antigens may characterise a 
persistent focal infection. (25, 31) Doxycycline is a highly effective baseline treatment 
for Q fever (25, 31). 
 Risk factors 
Q fever is more commonly reported in men than women. This is most likely due to 
differential exposure with traditional male roles being more likely to be exposed to 
animal/environmental sources. However animal models indicate that there may also be 
a differential immune response to C. burnetii between males and females, which may 
contribute to the predominance of persistent focal infections amongst males.(36) 
Notifications are generally highest individuals aged 45-69, perhaps due to this being an 
appropriate working age group for people in high-risk, animal related industries. (25) 
People at the highest risk of long-term health impacts are those who are 
immunosuppressed or have pre-existing conditions (particularly cardiac co-morbidities 
and pregnant women in the first trimester of pregnancy), children and young adults. (31, 
34) Due to the great distances that C. burnetii can travel after being aerosolised and 
carried by the wind, infection can occur in people that do not appear to have any risk 
factors. (26) Generally, those in rural settings are at greater risk of getting Q fever due 
to the animal and occupational risk exposures common to the rural lifestyle. (14, 35)  
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Vaccination  
Globally, Q fever vaccination is manufactured for veterinary use only. Australia is the 
only country where a human Q fever vaccine, ‘Q-VAX®’(37) has been developed and 
made available to people over the age of 15. (38) The vaccine has a high estimated 
efficacy of 83-100%. (39) The reason Q fever vaccination is directed at humans in 
Australia rather than animals is largely due to the fact that the disease is considered 
endemic in many parts of the country and as such, an animal control approach may not 
be useful in Australian primary industries. (25) 
Public health significance 
Due to the severity and broad range of short and long-term health issues that may be 
associated with the disease, Q fever has a high public health significance. (32) It is 
therefore crucial to understand the epidemiology of the disease particularly when 
anomalies are detected among populations.  
Gaps in existing knowledge     
Q fever is found across non-traditional occupations and age groups, and in areas where 
people would not have been previously considered to be at risk. As knowledge increases, 
so does the complexity of building appropriate prevention strategies. There is no 
uniform approach to controlling Q fever, and more work is to be done to understand the 
aetiology the disease, particularly in non-traditional areas. (40) The development of 
preventative measures is dependent on many factors including animal density and 
movement, land characteristics, precipitation, temperature and industry type. (17, 24) 
It is important to gain a clearer understanding about the context of Q fever in NSW, and 
whether any risk groups are missing public health messages about the disease. 
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Objective 
The aim of this study was to: 
• Describe the epidemiology of Q fever in people living in Western NSW  
• Determine if Aboriginal people are disproportionately affected by Q fever in 
Western NSW and examine exposure data to identify factors and other 
explanatory variables that may have driven this. 
• Provide a community perspective of the data and understanding of the relevance 
of Q fever to the community.  
Research Question 
Are Aboriginal people disproportionately affected by Q fever in Western NSW compared 
to non-Indigenous people in the same area, and if so, are there any explanatory factors 
contributing to this? 
Specific hypothesis under study 
Aboriginal people are not disproportionately affected by Q fever in Western NSW.  
  
 102 
Methodology 
Context 
As the data focused on Aboriginal people, decision-making and control by Aboriginal 
people over implementation and interpretation of findings through input, advice and 
oversight over the outcome of data was essential. To ensure elements of community 
control were upheld, an Aboriginal Research Advisory group was formed to provide a 
community perspective from the organizations that they represented and the 
communities they were from. Public health resource mobilisation may be ineffective if 
based on data alone without understanding if these approaches are relevant for 
community. The group reviewed and endorsed the results from the study and identified 
appropriate pathways to report and use the findings. This was done through a series of 
formal teleconferences and ad hoc communications. This approach allowed us to gain 
meaningful representation from the community and identify the most relevant matters 
to address which may not have been the key findings in the data.  
Ethics  
Ethics approval was granted from Australian National University (ANU), HREC number: 
2018/030 and the AH&MRC, HREC number: 1367/18.  
Study design  
The study design followed a two-step process. The first was a secondary data analysis 
and the second was a community consultation to understand and interpret the findings, 
and to provide guidance to the government on potential strategies. 
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1) A secondary, descriptive data analysis was undertaken using Q fever notification 
data between 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017 extracted from the NSW 
Notifiable Conditions Information Management System (NCIMS). 
2) A community consultation was undertaken with Aboriginal people who 
represented organisations and communities affected by Q fever, and an 
Aboriginal Research Advisory group was formed to strengthen decision making. 
Section 1: Retrospective data analysis 
Study population 
A case was defined as any NSW resident meeting the NSW Health control guideline case 
definition for confirmed Q fever from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017. A confirmed 
case requires laboratory definitive evidence, or the combination of laboratory 
suggestive evidence and clinical evidence: (41)  
Laboratory definitive evidence  
• Detection of C. burnetii by nucleic acid testing, OR 
• Seroconversion or significant increase in antibody level to Phase II antigen in 
paired sera tested in parallel in the absence of recent Q fever vaccination, OR 
• Detection of C. burnetii by culture (this practice should be strongly discouraged 
except where appropriate facilities and training exist) (41) 
Laboratory suggestive evidence 
• Detection of specific IgM in the absence of recent Q fever vaccination (41) 
Clinical evidence 
• Clinically compatible disease (41) 
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Extraction of notification data 
Q fever is a notifiable condition under the NSW Public Health Act 2010. (11) This 
investigation used retrospective NSW Q fever notification data as a .CSV file extracted 
from NCIMS for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017 based on notification 
date. Data was drawn from NCIMS in January 2018, and again in December 2018. The Q 
fever data extract downloaded from NCIMS had 380 variables. Of these, approximately 
95 variables included animal, environmental, or occupational exposure information. The 
remaining variables included demographic, hospital and laboratory data.  
Geographical location 
NCIMS automatically generates multiple options for geographical location based on the 
address of the person at the time of notification. If the address was inadequate, the 
geographical location was assigned to the provider’s address. Local health district 
borders (defined in 2010) were chosen as the unit for geographical analysis.  
Indigenous status 
In the database there were initially five options for Aboriginal status: “Aboriginal”, “Both 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander”, “Not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander”, “Not 
stated or unknown”, and “Missing”. For clarity and in line with accepted NSW Health 
terminology these were condensed into three variables as follows: 
• Aboriginal includes "Aboriginal," (as there were no Torres Strait Islanders or 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders identified in the dataset) 
• Non-Indigenous - includes "Not Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander" 
• Missing - includes "Not stated or unknown" and "Missing" 
Fifty-seven people from Western NSW did not have their Indigenous status recorded on 
NCIMS. Their NCIMS ID was sent by secure server to the Western NSW Public Health 
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Unit. Staff checked the NCIMS record against their hospital electronic medical records 
system ‘PowerChart’ to determine whether they had identified as Aboriginal, resulting 
in 100% completeness of Aboriginal status data. This was only done in Western NSW as 
the scope of the investigation was focused on that area. Aboriginal status was classified 
using the ‘ever-Indigenous’ algorithm, described by the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare as defining a person as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander if they are 
recorded as such on any data set. (42) This approach is an acceptable method for 
determining Indigenous status because of its simplicity and minimal data requirements, 
particularly where there are only two data sets to link. (42) It is also appropriate for 
health research as there may be complex reasons why a person will identify in one 
health setting and not another. (43)  
Age distribution 
The data was aggregated into <20, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69 and 70+ year age 
groups.   
Animal and occupational exposures 
Occupational, animal and environmental exposure variables were aggregated from 95 
variables into four main exposure variables: 
1. Animal contact: Contact with birthing products; tissues, products and discharges; 
farm animals; native animals; feral animals and vectors (ticks)* 
2. Species: Contact with cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, wild pigs, wild deer camels, 
alpacas/llamas, bandicoots, birds, kangaroos/wallabies, possums, rats and 
                                                     
 
* The variable ‘vector (ticks) would also be included when reviewing species categories 
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domestic animals 
3. Occupational exposure: All reported occupational exposures including abattoir, 
animal related, dairy farm, living or working on a farm, living or working near a 
farm or abattoir, grazier, shearing, hunting for work or recreation, attending 
saleyards, livestock carrier, veterinary, other or no risk occupation  
4. Environmental exposure: Any report of dry, dusty and windy weather, lawn 
mowing including visiting or mowing at a golf course, contact with faeces and 
laundering contaminated or dirty work clothing 
Missing data was cross checked with case notes, interview summaries, questionnaires 
and discharge summaries. 
Vaccination History 
The nine vaccination status variables were aggregated into five, including having 
awareness of Q fever; not having awareness of Q fever; accessibility issues; medical 
contraindications preventing vaccination; and a not stated category (Table 1).   
Table 1 Vaccination status information aggregated into categories of Q fever in New South Wales between 
1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017  
 
Category Variables that were aggregated into this category 
Accessibility issues 
Accessibility issues 
Employer delay or refusal 
Aware of Q fever but not vaccinated 
Aware of vaccine but forgot 
Chose not to have vaccine 
Medical contraindications 
Hx infection or medically unable 
Too young 
Unaware of Q fever 
Not considered a risk for Q fever 
Unaware of disease or vaccination 
Not stated Not stated  
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Data analysis  
We used STATA 15 (4) and Microsoft Excel (44) to summarise and interpret the data. It 
is important to note as a caution in interpreting results that the local health district of 
residence does not necessarily reflect place of acquisition of exposure. Q fever is 
underreported across all jurisdictions. Q fever notifications are reflective of testing data 
and undercounts are likely. 
1) NSW data 
Frequencies and proportions were produced for the descriptive analyses of all NSW Q 
fever data by occupational and animal exposures, sex, age group, Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander status and geographic location. Denominator data to calculate rates by 
age, sex, jurisdiction and year were obtained from the SAPHaRI portal and exported as 
a Microsoft Excel (44) worksheet. These data were generated by the Centre for 
Epidemiology and Evidence within the NSW Ministry of Health. Age- and sex-specific 
estimated resident populations (ERPs) for NSW local health districts at 30 June were 
obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) for use with calendar year data. 
2) Western NSW data 
Frequencies and proportions were produced for the Western NSW data stratified by 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status for all of the following variables:  
occupational and animal exposures, sex, age group, geographic location. Population 
data by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander status was obtained from the ABS and 
utilised to produce rates and age-specific rates. Because of the differences in size 
between Aboriginal and non-Indigenous populations, indirect standardization was an 
appropriate tool to determine whether there was a higher incidence of Q fever in 
Aboriginal people compared to non-Indigenous people of similar age and location using 
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the ABS dataset. (45, 46) To determine whether there was an association between the 
exposure and vaccination status variables of Aboriginal and non-Indigenous people, 
ratio risks were calculated for occupational and animal exposures and vaccination 
status.  
Section 2: Qualitative community consultation 
For an effective and appropriate public health outcome, it was crucially important to 
engage with communities to identify the most appropriate method for transmitting 
information, education and communication; and have meaningful participation in the 
co-development of those materials. (47) A community-led approach benefits NSW 
Health through the appropriate utility of public health resources, and benefits 
communities through the development of culturally appropriate and relevant public 
health action strategies. Community priorities may differ from what may appear to be 
priorities in the data and can only be identified by those with intrinsic knowledge of 
these areas. This was conducted in six stages.  
i. Establishment of an Aboriginal Advisory Group 
Ensuring Aboriginal governance  
The purpose of the advisory group was to strengthen decision-making and control by 
Aboriginal people over implementation and interpretation of findings, by providing 
input, advice and oversight over the outcome of data produced from the investigation. 
Membership included Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services (ACCHSs) 
representatives, NSW Health representatives, a tertiary institution representative, and 
ex-officio who did not participate in decision making. Members were Aboriginal and had 
links to Western NSW. Members had professional experience in health and knowledge 
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on activities having the risk of Q fever including hunting, shearing and abattoir work; 
and knowledge of the schools and job agencies in the region. Table 2 details information 
about the advisory group members, their affiliations and other skills and knowledge 
relevant to the investigation. 
Table 2 Details of the Aboriginal Research Advisory Group for Q fever in Western New South Wales at 30 
March 2019 showing meaningful representation through affiliations, other vocational skills and 
knowledge relevant to the Q fever investigation 
Members Sex Affiliation 
Other vocational skills or knowledge 
relevant to Q fever investigation 
Member 1 Female 
Aboriginal Medical 
Service  
Shearing schools and shearing industry/ 
employment agency network 
Member 2 Female 
Aboriginal 
Immunisation Health 
Worker 
School children in agricultural schools of 
NSW, barriers and enablers to vaccination 
Member 3 Female 
Aboriginal 
Environmental Health 
(NSW Health)   
Q fever in rural communities of NSW/ Q 
fever and animal health 
Member 4 Male 
Aboriginal Medical 
Service 
Meat works/ abattoir industry, 
employment agency network 
Member 5 Male 
Aboriginal Public Health 
Training Program 
Initiative (NSW Health) 
Hunting/ recreational shooting/ 
employment agency network 
Member 6 Male 
Epidemiologist 
(Australian National 
University) 
Investigation design/ health perspectives 
in community 
 
ii. Reflection and interpretation of data by health and community 
Is this a problem? 
The advisory group contributed to the interpretation of data around reported risk 
factors for Q fever by providing community perspectives from the organisations they 
represented and communities to which they were affiliated. Three formal 
teleconferences were held where a mutual understanding of the investigation was 
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gained. Members used this time to reflect and identify questions, issues and priority 
groups in the data. 
iii. Collaborative planning 
What can be done about the problem? 
The advisory group identified appropriate messaging channels to report and use the 
findings and pathways to reach these channels. Barriers and enablers were discussed 
around Q fever prevention and vaccination.  
iv. Review mainstream Q fever campaign 
Are current strategies adequate? Who do we need to link in with? 
We reviewed the organisations NSW Health were currently working with, as well as the 
target groups identified in the mainstream Q fever campaign. Strategies were developed 
by the advisory group to either broaden Q fever actions with existing organisational 
partnerships or create new links and strategies with relevant organisations who were 
not currently involved in the NSW Q fever campaign. 
v. Acceptable strategies 
Keeping things on track. 
The final strategies and draft Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials 
were sent to the advisory group and a wider group of ACCHS representatives in an email 
list provided by the Chief Executive Officer of the Walgett AMS for endorsement or 
amendment.  
vi. Monitoring and evaluation  
Updates on progress were communicated to the group as they were actioned, and a 
sustainability plan was set to communicate findings after the MAE role ended.  
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Results 
Q fever notifications in New South Wales  
There were 1648 notifications for Q fever recorded in NCIMS across NSW from 1 January 
2012 to 31 December 2017. Of these, 1178 met the case definition for confirmed Q fever 
as per NSW Health control guidelines. (32) The remaining 470 were excluded from 
analysis. There were 50 confirmed cases of Q fever in Indigenous Australians, 982 in non-
Indigenous people, and a further 146 cases had unknown Indigenous status (Table 3). 
The rate was 3.7 per 100,000 for Indigenous Australians and 2.6 per 100,000 for non-
Indigenous people.  Males were most affected with 79% (n=933) of all notifications. The 
median age at the time of notification was 49 years with a 95% confidence interval (CI) 
48.1-49.9% and a standard deviation of 16.5 years (Table 4). The local health districts 
with highest average rates per 100,000 population per year were Far West NSW (25.4 
per 100,000), Western NSW (14.08 per 100,000), Northern NSW (11.08 per 100,000) and 
Mid North Coast (10.61 per 100,000). These local health districts all saw an upward trend 
into 2014 and 2015, when rates began to decline in most districts. However, Western 
NSW rates continued to climb until mid-2016, exhibiting the highest rates in NSW (Figure 
1). In 2015 Far West had an elevated case count and rate due to an outbreak in 
Lightening Ridge where 14 confirmed cases were identified between 1 December 2014 
and 31 May 2015. (48)  
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Table 3 Summary of Q fever notifications in New South Wales by selected demographic factors between 
1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017. 
Demographic characteristics 
Number of notifications 
N (%) 
Average rate per 100,000 
population 
Total cases 1178 2.6 
Sex:   
Male 933 (79%) 111.5 
Female 245 (21%) 29.6 
Indigenous status:   
Indigenous 50 3.7 
Non-Indigenous 982 
2.6 
Unknown 146 
Mean age 49 years (95% CI 48.1-49.9, standard deviation 16.5 years) 
<20 years 82  NA 
20-29 140 NA 
30-39 134 NA 
40-49 242 NA 
50-59 308 NA 
60-69 196 NA 
70+ 74 NA 
Local Health District   
Hunter New England 290 5.36 
Western NSW 235 14.08 
Northern NSW 195 11.08 
Mid North Coast 136 10.61 
Southern NSW 82 6.74 
Murrumbidgee 69 3.95 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 56 2.35 
Far West 46 25.42 
South Western Sydney 23 0.41 
Northern Sydney 20 0.37 
South Eastern Sydney 11 0.21 
Central Coast 6 0.30 
Nepean Blue Mountains 6 0.28 
Western Sydney 2 0.04 
Sydney 1 0.03 
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Demographic characteristics 
Number of notifications 
N (%) 
Average rate per 100,000 
population 
Vaccination status   
Not considered a risk for Q fever 305 (25.9%) NA 
Not stated  286 (24.3%) NA 
Chose not to have vaccine 223 (18.9%) NA 
Unaware of disease or vaccination 192 (16.3%) NA 
History of infection or medical 
contraindication 
54 (4.6%) NA 
Employer delay or refusal 36 (3.1%) NA 
Too young 34 (2.9%) NA 
Aware of vaccine but forgot 26 (2.2%) NA 
Vaccinated 12 (1.0%) NA 
Accessibility issues 10 (0.8%) NA 
 
Figure 1  Rates* of Q fever notifications for NSW local health districts that exceed the state average of 2.7 
per 100,000, by year and, 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017 
*Rates were calculated using Indigenous Australian and non-Indigenous population data from SAPHaRI.   
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Far West 6.5 16.3 13.1 66.3 23.5 26.8
Western NSW 4.7 6.2 9.4 23.7 24.3 16.1
Northern NSW 10.0 11.0 14.4 12.6 10.5 8.1
Mid North Coast 8.6 10.4 11.3 12.6 7.4 13.4
Southern NSW 5.0 5.5 5.9 7.9 8.3 7.8
Hunter New England 4.2 5.3 5.7 6.4 5.8 4.8
Murrumbidgee 1.4 2.1 4.8 7.2 4.8 3.4
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Indigenous status 
Over half of Q fever cases in Aboriginal people were in Western NSW (26/50, 52%). 
Other local health districts where substantial proportions of Aboriginal cases lived were 
Hunter New England (5/50, 10%), Far West NSW (5/50, 10%) and Northern NSW (4/50, 
8%). The most common local health districts of residence for non-Indigenous cases were 
Hunter New England (270/982, 27%), Northern NSW (175/982, 18%) and Western NSW 
(155/982, 16%). The highest rates of Q fever notifications for Aboriginal people in NSW 
were in Far West NSW (21.8 per 100,000), Western NSW (13.6 per 100,000) and 
Northern NSW (4.5 per 100,000) (Table 4). Similarly, the highest rates per 100,000 for 
non-Indigenous people and those who did not state their Indigenous status were in Far 
West NSW (25.2 per 100,000), Western NSW (14.02 per 100,000) and Northern NSW 
(11.03 per 100,000) (Table 4).  
Table 4 Notifications and crude ratesa per 100,000 population of Q fever notifications in New South Wales 
by Indigenous status, local health district, 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017  
Local health district 
Indigenous Australian Not identified as Indigenous Australian 
Indigenous 
(n) 
 Crude 
rate per 
100,000 
Not 
Indigenous (n) 
Not 
Stated 
 Crude rate per 
100,000b 
Hunter New England 5 1.6 270 15 5.6 
Western NSW 26 13.6 155 54 14.2 
Northern NSW 4 4.5 175 16 11.3 
Mid North Coast 3 3.8 122 11 11.1 
Southern NSW 1 2.3 68 13 6.9 
Murrumbidgee 3 3.7 60 6 4 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 3 3.7 43 10 2.3 
Far Westc 5 21.8 27 14 25.2 
South Western Sydney 0 0 21 2 0.4 
Northern Sydney 0 0 19 1 0.4 
South Eastern Sydney 0 0 9 2 0.2 
Central Coast 0 0 4 2 0.3 
Nepean Blue Mountains 0 0 6 0 0.3 
Western Sydney 0 0 2 0 0 
Sydney 0 0 1 0 0 
Grand Total 50 3.7 982 146 2.6 
a) Rates were calculated using Indigenous Australian and non-Indigenous population data from 
SAPHaRI. 
b) Where Indigenous status was not stated were included in the rate for non-Indigenous category.  
 115 
c) Results in Far West NSW are shown to be statistically high however this is due to an outbreak 
between 2014-2015   
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Western New South Wales 
An average of 39 cases of Q fever were notified annually in Western NSW between 2012 
and 2017 (range 13-68 cases). The year with the highest notifications was 2016, with a 
peak of 9 cases in the month of September (Figure 2). An epidemiological curve of Q 
fever notifications is presented by month and year in Figure 2.  
Figure 2 Epidemiological curve of Q fever notifications in Western New South Wales Local Health District, 
by notification month and year, 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017 by Indigenous status. 
 
Data cleaning to improve Indigenous status completeness 
There were 54 cases in Western NSW that did not have Indigenous status information. 
After linking the data to PowerChart, six people were identified as Aboriginal and forty-
eight as non-Indigenous. The differences in counts and rates before and after 
completeness of Indigenous status data is presented in Table 5. Prior to data cleaning 
the rate in the non-Indigenous population was slightly higher than the rate in the 
Aboriginal population, however after measures to ascertain Indigenous status the rate 
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was found to be higher in the Aboriginal population then the non-Indigenous 
population.    
Table 5 Counts and crude ratesa per 100,000 population per year of Q fever in Western New South Wales 
before and after data completeness of Indigenous status, 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2017 
Aboriginal status 
Western NSW Western NSW after data completeness 
Number of 
cases 
 Crude rate 
per 100,000 
Number of 
cases (n)  Crude rate per 100,000 
Aboriginal 26 13.6 32 16.7 
Not Indigenous 155 14.2b 
 
203 13.8 
Not Stated 54 0 NA 
Total cases 235 14.1 235 14.1 
a) Crude rates were calculated using Indigenous Australian and non-Indigenous population data 
from SAPHaRI. 
b) Notifications where Indigenous status was not stated were included in the rate for non-
Indigenous category.  
Indigenous status 
Rates of Q fever in Western NSW for Aboriginal people were 16.7 per 100,000 and 13.8 
per 100,000 non-Indigenous people. The indirectly standardised rate for Aboriginal 
people living in Western NSW was 19 per 100,000 (95%CI 12.8-26.3) and a reference 
rate of 14 per 100,000 for non-Indigenous people living in Western NSW. The 
standardised morbidity ratio was 135.4 (95% CI 92.6-191.1,) which indicated that 
Aboriginal people in Western NSW were notified with Q fever almost 35% more often 
as would be expected in non-Indigenous people living in the same area.  
Comparison between Aboriginal and non-Indigenous notifications 
Age distribution  
A difference was observed in the age distribution of Aboriginal and non-Indigenous 
people (Table 6). Aboriginal cases were positively skewed toward younger age groups 
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relative to the more symmetrical distribution of age among non-Indigenous people living 
in the same area (Figure 3). Half of all Aboriginal cases were under 30.  
Table 6 Comparison between selected age and sex demographics of people in Western New South Wales 
notified with Q fever between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017. 
Demographics 
Number of 
Notifications Population data   Crude rate per 100,000 
Aboriginal 
(n) 
Non-
Aboriginal 
(n) 
Aboriginal 
(n) 
Non-
Aboriginal 
(n) 
Aboriginal Non-Aboriginal 
Sex Male  28 163 96368 740464 29.1 22 Female 4 40 95255 733475 4.2 5.5 
Age 
group 
<15 5 7 67957 279814 7.4 2.5 
15-29 16 45 51884 259907 30.8 17.3 
30-39 4 25 19907 168001 20.1 14.9 
40-49 4 43 21108 189367 19.0 22.7 
50-59 1 46 16135 201800 6.2 22.8 
60-69 1 20 9634 179335 10.4 11.2 
70+ 1 17 4997 195713 20.0 8.7 
Totals 32 203 191622 1473937 16.7 13.8 
 
Figure 3 Age group distribution of Q fever notifications in Western NSW local health district between 1 
January 2012 and 31 December 2017 by age group and Indigenous status 
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Sex 
The burden of disease by sex was similar for both Aboriginal and non-Indigenous 
populations (Figure 4). When stratifying sex by age group, the age groups with the 
highest Q fever notifications appear to be different for Aboriginal men in Western NSW 
(Figure 4).  Q fever notifications in women are quite small.  It appears that similar age 
groups of Aboriginal and non-Indigenous women are affected by Q fever (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 Percentages of notified cases of Q fever in Western New South Wales by sex, age group and 
Indigenous status, between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017 
 
Animal exposures 
The animal exposures reported in Western NSW were similar for both Aboriginal and 
non-Indigenous people (Table 7). Cases may have reported more than one animal 
exposure. Farm animals were the most common animal risk exposure reported by 
Aboriginal (n=28/32, 87.5%) and non-Indigenous (n=187/203, 92.1%) people. Exposure 
to tissues, products and discharges was the second highest reported exposure reported 
by Aboriginal (n=24/32, 75%) and non-Indigenous (n=119/203, 58.6%) people. Contact 
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Aboriginal people (n=5/32. 15.6% each). Exposure to birthing products was the third 
highest exposure for non-Indigenous people (n=66/203, 32.5%). Risk ratio calculations 
in Table 7 demonstrate there was no statistically significant different exposure between 
the Aboriginal and non-Indigenous people who reported animal exposures. 
Table 7 Risk ratio of animal and occupational exposures, and vaccination status of people with Q fever in 
Western New South Wales, by Indigenous status, 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2017 
Exposure 
Aboriginal 
N (%) 
Non-
Indigenous 
N (%) 
Risk Ratio 
(95%CI) 
P-value 
Animal 
exposure 
Farm animals 28 (87.5) 187 (92.1) 0.65 (0.25-1.67) 0.38 
Tissues, products 24 (75.0) 119 (58.6) 1.9 (0.9-4.1) 0.08 
Feral animals 5 (15.6) 37 (18.2) 0.9 (0.4-2.1) 1 
Native animals 5 (15.6) 34 (16.7) 0.9 (0.4 – 2.3) 1 
Vectors (ticks) 2 (6.3) 5 (2.5) 2.17 (0.6 – 7.3) 0.24 
Birthing practices 4 (12.5) 66 (32.5) 0.3 (0.1 – 0.9) 0.02 
Occupational 
exposure 
Lives or works on farm 28 (87.5) 179 (88.2) 1.0 (0.4-2.5) 1 
Shearing 18 (56.3) 37 (18.2) 4.2 (2.2-7.9) <0.01 
No risk occupation 10 (31.3) 25 (12.3) 2.6 (1.4-5.0) 0.01 
Hunting 4 (12.5) 22 (10.8) 1.14 (0.4 – 3.0)  0.76 
Wool classing 2 (6.3) 9 (4.4) 1.4 (0.4 – 5.0) 0.65 
Sales yard 2 (6.3) 17 (8.4) 0.8 (0.2-2.9) 1 
Lives near farm 2 (6.3) 8 (3.9) 1.5 (0.4 – 5.4) 0.63 
Abattoir 2 (6.3) 9 (4.4) 1.4 (0.1-0.4) 0.65 
Veterinary 0 (0.0) 2 (1.0) NA NA 
Vaccinated Yes 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) NA NA 
Reason for 
no 
vaccination 
Choose not to 9 (28.1) 76 (37.4) 0.7 (0.3 – 1.4) 0.3 
Too young 9 (28.1) 8 (3.9) 5.1 (2.8-9.1) <0.01 
Unaware of disease 5 (15.6) 47 (23.2) 0.6 (0.3-1.6) 0.37 
Not stated 3 (9.4) 30 (14.8) 0.6 (0.2 – 2.0) 0.6 
Not considered at risk 3 (9.4) 7 (3.4) 2.3 (0.9-6.4) 0.1 
Employer refusal 2 (6.3) 6 (3.0) 1.9 (0.5-6.6) 0.3 
Accessibility issues 1 (3.1) 4 (2.0) 1.4 (0.2 – 8.6) 0.5 
History of infection 0 (0.0) 20 (9.9) NA NA 
Aware but forgot  0 (0.0) 5 (2.5) NA NA 
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Occupational exposures 
Reported farm exposures were similar between Aboriginal people and non-Indigenous 
people in Western NSW. Notably, the number of shearing exposures reported in 
Aboriginal people (n=18, 56.3%) was 4.2 times higher than the number observed in non-
Indigenous people (n=37, 18.2%) and this was statistically significant (RR 4.2 95% CI: 2.2-
7.9, p value=<0.01) (Table 7). The majority of Aboriginal people with Q fever in Western 
NSW either lived or worked on a farm (n=28, 87.5%). A further ten cases (31.3%) 
reported having no high-risk occupation, statistically significantly higher when 
compared to non-Indigenous people (RR 2.6 95%CI:1.4-5.0, p value 0.01) (Table 7). 
Hunting native or feral animals was reported by four Aboriginal people (12.5%).  
Vaccination 
Aboriginal people living in Western NSW primarily were too young to receive the vaccine 
(n=9, 28.1%) or knew about Q fever but chose not to have the vaccine (n=9, 28.1%) 
(Table 7). Of all nine people too young to receive the vaccine, four were siblings who 
had been exposed to a relative’s contaminated shearing gear, three lived on a farm, one 
had been to the saleyards and the other had a parent who was a professional kangaroo 
shooter. One of the children living on a farm had direct hunting exposures shooting 
native and feral animals. Aboriginal people were 5 times more likely to be too young for 
vaccination when compared with non-Indigenous people (RR 5.1 95%CI: 2.8-9.1, 
p=<0.01) (Table 7). There were accounts across both groups of employers delaying or 
refusing to vaccinate, and other barriers accessing the vaccine.   
  
 122 
Qualitative results 
The main concern of the community representatives involved was the fact that 
Aboriginal people, particularly youths, in Western NSW were being notified with Q fever, 
and the level of community awareness about the disease was low to non-existent.  This 
was a disconnect with how the government health authority interpreted the notification 
data, where concern was raised around comparisons between Western NSW and the 
rest of NSW (i.e. trying to determine if those being infected in Western NSW were 
somehow different to the those being infected in the rest of NSW). The strong and 
recurring themes from the group were the need to protect those community members 
most at risk and provide culturally appropriate education material to improve awareness 
especially among young people.   
High risk groups identified within the community  
The advisory group identified five risk groups and discussed the barriers and 
opportunities around these. The risk groups included people in rural NSW, hunters and 
shooters, high-risk workers, rural job seekers; and students and teachers:  
1. People in rural NSW: the advisory group recognised that people do not need to 
have a high-risk occupation or animal exposure to get Q fever. 
2. Hunters and shooters: include people who hunt game or feral animals 
professionally or recreationally. Educational modules must be completed to 
obtain firearms licensing through the DPI Game Licensing department. The 
advisory group discussed the importance of Q fever education, particularly in 
relation to safe handling of animals and preparation of meat. 
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3. High-risk workers: Discussion about the barriers around Q fever prevention 
related to the nature of transient employment in the area. Many people in the 
area undertake work such as shearing as an independent contractor, or an 
individual knowing where to turn up for the day. As such, there are often no 
formal employee/employer arrangements which potentially leaves workers 
(regardless of whether they work under a business or not) at a greater chance of 
not receiving information about Q fever prevention and vaccination. Group 
members shared stories about the reluctance of workers to disclose injuries or 
illnesses, and most (if not all) will not report their illness to Safe Work NSW as 
they are concerned this would minimize their chance for more work in the future.  
4. Rural job seekers: A major barrier was the limited support to jobseekers in having 
no awareness about Q fever risks in the jobs they are seeking. Employment 
agencies often cover personal protective equipment costs for job seekers. While 
SafeWork NSW is able to provide rebates to small businesses and self-employed 
workers to equip them against hazards in the workplace, vaccines for 
occupationally prescribed conditions are not covered. In addition, this rebate is 
not available to jobseekers because their legislation relates to people who are 
already employed. There appears to be a gap in reaching information to people 
before they engage in Q fever risk occupations. As people in our dataset had 
experienced delays or refusals for vaccination by their employers, it is important 
that people know about their rights and responsibilities before they engage in 
risk occupations. Education about Q fever before entering the industry was 
identified as an important way to minimise risks for the disease. 
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5. Students and teachers: The largest barrier discussed was the lack of Q fever 
disease and vaccination awareness in high risk vocations and institutions 
including high schools, TAFE or other high school vocational courses. The group 
advised that there are many agricultural high schools across the region, as well 
as schools that raise and present animals at shows (e.g. the Sydney Royal Easter 
Show). Discussion was raised about shearing schools not having Q fever 
vaccination as a requirement for students and teachers. 
Acceptable messaging channels 
Pathways were identified to reach these groups and strategic actions were developed 
that were designed to feed into the overall NSW Health Q fever campaign for 2019-2022.  
Actions speak louder than words 
Appendix B summaries the actions taken for each identified high risk group to build Q 
fever awareness, identified by the advisory group at 30 March 2019. This large body of 
work involved a commitment by the NSW Health Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases team to 
ensure these actions are carried out over the next few years. An email list was provided 
to the team who will update this group on progress on a 6-12 month basis. Figure 5 
illustrates where the Q fever investigation arose from core work of the Enteric and 
Zoonotic Diseases Team (1, 10, 15); outlines response actions from the control 
guidelines that were fed back into core work activities (32); and advisory group 
recommendations to address the overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in the data. 
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Figure 5 Accountabilities of the Enteric and Zoonotic Diseases Team including information flow of 
messaging channels and actions recommended by the Aboriginal Research Advisory Group for Q fever in 
Western New South Wales at 30 March 2019.  
  
Appropriate material for distribution through messaging channels 
The mainstream Q fever campaign materials were not considered relevant to people 
that the community perceive as having an obligation to protect, such as school children 
and young people about to enter the workforce.  
“I can’t see myself in these (sic)” 
“This is too wordy, and probably better suited for a veterinarian” 
 The group co-developed and approved a lay sheet to inform people in the community 
about Q fever, particularly those who were looking for work (Appendix A). 
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Discussion  
This secondary data analysis described the epidemiology of Q fever in Western NSW; 
determined that Aboriginal people had been disproportionately affected by the disease; 
and identified explanatory factors that may have driven this. Using indirect 
standardisation, we discovered there were 35% more cases of Q fever in Indigenous 
Australians compared to non-Indigenous populations. Western NSW had the highest 
notification rates of Q fever, with over half of all Aboriginal cases living in the region. It 
should be noted that Western NSW accounts for only a third of the NSW Indigenous 
Australian population. Despite this disproportion, a series of community consultations 
indicated that the community was not concerned about comparing itself to the non-
Indigenous population, but were more alarmed that Aboriginal people, particularly 
youths, were getting Q fever in settings where community awareness was low.  While a 
mainstream Government-led Q fever awareness campaign had recently been released, 
the community consultation showed that the content was not fitting for their 
community and specific target material was required to have a broader and more 
meaningful impact in Western NSW. 
Why were notifications higher in Western NSW compared to rest of NSW? 
A possible explanation is related to the geographical and meteorological features of 
Western NSW. Wind speed and windy areas increase the risk of Q fever infection in 
humans and animals (14, 26), and generally occurs in open, flat landscapes, 
characteristic of Western NSW . The risk is further enhanced by climatic factors including 
lowered precipitation and high temperatures. (17, 18, 24) Western NSW region has been 
in a prolonged period of drought for many years, with some areas being in an intense 
drought phase, defined by the Bureau of Meteorology as a combination of no soil 
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moisture, very low plant growth and low rainfall across the preceding 6-12 months. 
Droughts in this region are expected to increase in severity and intensity, which enhance 
the risk of Q fever through increased dust and hand-feeding of animals. (49) Consistent 
with other research, (6, 36) there were more notifications of Q fever in males than 
females. Due to the variance or absence of symptoms, Q fever is an underreported 
disease. (6) Past research has aimed to quantify the burden of disease, including a 
national study in the United States that analysed Q fever testing data between 2012-
2016. The study conservatively estimated that acute Q fever cases were underreported 
annually by an average of 63%. (6)  
High Q fever rates in young Aboriginal people 
Our study showed young Aboriginal people specifically are at risk of developing Q fever.  
Five (16%) Aboriginal children with Q fever were under age 15 and half (n=16, 50%) were 
aged 15-29. All had direct or indirect shearing or hunting exposures; a family member 
who was in a high-risk occupation, or had contact with contaminated work gear. 
Australian research on pediatric Q fever found that symptomatic children may visit a 
health service numerous times before Q fever is investigated. (6, 39, 40) Evidence from 
a two-year cohort study by van Loenhout et al. found that children are particularly 
vulnerable to lower quality of life and long-term reduced health outcomes, including 
severe fatigue lasting years, or severe persistent focal infections. (34) As rural children 
grow their exposure risks increase and diversify, particularly if their responsibilities 
increase on a farm. (50) This places rural children as a particularly vulnerable group for 
Q fever due to the current unavailability of a vaccine. (38) The safety and efficacy of 
administering Q fever vaccination under 15 years of age is currently being explored (38) 
including clinical trials in the 10-15 year age group. (51) Between 2006-2017 twelve 
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children across Australia at severe risk of Q fever infection were administered the 
vaccine off-label with no serious side effects. (38) Q fever education for children and 
their parents is crucially important to minimise the risk of Q fever for this group. 
Higher proportion of Aboriginal people with Q fever had exposure to shearing 
Q fever in the workplace is a notifiable incident under the NSW Work Health and Safety 
Act 2011. (52) Employers must ensure employees are not vulnerable to infection in high-
risk areas. (52) There were reports from Aboriginal and non-Indigenous who had made 
a genuine attempt to be vaccinated and their employer acted as a barrier to their 
vaccination.  
There were 18 (56.3%) Aboriginal people working as shearers which was significantly 
higher (4.2 times higher) than non-Indigenous people (n=37, 18.2%). Five Aboriginal 
shearers had not heard about Q fever at all, so never had the chance to ask the employer 
about vaccination. The Commonwealth Government’s National Q fever Management 
Program (NQFMP) was launched in late 2000, heavily subsidizing vaccines for abattoir, 
meat industry workers and transient work such as shearing. (37, 39)  
A community perspective 
Appropriate community representation and perspectives were vital to this investigation, 
as the data analysis alone did not reflect what was considered to be most important for 
the community. While government found interest in comparisons between the 
phenomenon in Western NSW compared to the rest of NSW, the community 
consultation identified higher priorities relating to the health of specific groups at risk in 
Western NSW. Aboriginal governance and consultation were essential to produce 
meaningful, worthwhile and impactful public health action that is not only culturally 
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appropriate but also builds resilience capacity for the community to minimise the risk of 
Q fever, long after the investigation has ended. 
Raising community awareness 
Raising awareness is best achieved through the lenses of people who have intrinsic 
knowledge of the community. Community-led methodology has been advantageous in 
other settings to deliver impactful messages to people that may not be reached easily. 
An example of successful co-development of information, education and 
communications (IEC) material development was an initiative to provide HIV/AIDS 
education in remote communities of Nepal. Despite high illiteracy levels, the initiative 
was successful, mostly due to engaging local outreach workers from the community to 
oversee the development, testing and launch of the materials. The consultants intrinsic 
knowledge of culture, social norms and literacy levels of the communities allowed 
crucial messages to reach people in a meaningful way. (47)  
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Recommendations: NSW Government 
Update Q fever terminology  
This research recommends the term ‘chronic Q fever’ be amended to ‘persistent focal 
infections’. An extensive clinical review by Eldin et al in 2017 puts forward reasonable 
argument for the change in terminology. (2)  As we have a better understanding of the 
different diagnostic pathways, morbidities and treatments associated with the disease 
it no longer makes sense to group all of the persistent focal infections sequel to acute Q 
fever under the umbrella term ‘chronic Q fever’.  In the review the authors highlighted 
the issues in combining different illnesses that require different approaches to 
treatment and clinical management into the same group. (2) 
Advocate to reinstate the National Q fever Management Program 
Review the health economics of the National Q fever Management Program (NQFMP), 
which offered heavily subsidised vaccines for people working in high-risk occupations. 
This program coincided with a 50% reduction of Q fever notifications and outweighed 
the overall health cost of a person that gets Q fever. (37) 
Reduce barriers to Q fever vaccination 
It is acknowledged that more work is required to determine the minimum dose 
recommendation, efficacy and overall safety of the vaccine, as well as ways to ensure 
adequate surveillance through a potential register. Current research suggests that the 
Q fever vaccine may be safe and beneficial for children under 15 years of age who live 
in high-risk areas. (38) Reducing barriers to the availability and accessibility of the 
vaccine is highly important to protect those at risk. (39) We consulted with SafeWork 
NSW to find ways to improve vaccination of people in risk industries. Although the 
NQFMP is no longer operational (37) other financial assistance is available. The 
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Australian Taxation Office ruled that Q fever vaccine is tax-deductible for people 
engaging in relevant employment, but this information is not widely known and is one 
of the points highlighted in the NSW Health Q fever awareness campaign. (53) 
Prioritise community consultation 
Community collaboration is essential to developing appropriate public health responses 
to Q fever in Western NSW. While there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to Q fever, 
Figure 6 provides a model to assist government in any future Q fever community 
consultation. The model was largely based on my interpretation of how the advisory 
group developed and prioritised risk groups; as individuals/families with similar 
sensitivities but suffering different impacts from Q fever infection, with different 
resilience/resistance factors to manage or prevent Q fever. Consultation can identify risk 
groups through discussion about:  
a) Factors that may increase vulnerability to Q fever (sensitivity)  
b) How these factors may negatively impact people/community (potential impacts) 
c) What current capacity is available or can be introduced to build resistance and 
ultimately resilience against Q fever (adaptive capacity) 
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Figure 6 Proposed Q fever vulnerability and resilience response model to assist consultation groups to 
understand the context and potential responses to Q fever across New South Wales 
 
Recommendations: Western NSW  
Implement targeted education and awareness material  
The advisory group recommended the development of practical information towards 
hunters, primary industries job seekers and workers, students and people living in rural 
parts of NSW. We liaised with NSW Department of Education administrators for 
Catholic, Public and Independent schools to incorporate Q fever messaging into the 
agricultural studies curriculum.  These focal points agreed for us to target messaging 
toward these groups (Appendix B).  For hunters and shooters, we consulted with the 
Game Licencing Department of the Department of Primary Industries who will be 
sending our Q fever messaging through their education and licencing channels 
(Appendix B). For primary industries job seekers, we contacted major Aboriginal 
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employment agencies in Western NSW, and developed information for job seekers 
about Q fever. We attempted to contact shearing schools across NSW with mixed 
success, as a number of these schools were closed down due to the severe drought in 
NSW at the time of the analysis (Appendix B). (49) 
Improve the Q fever surveillance system (NCIMS) 
An evaluation of the current Q fever surveillance system (NCIMS) would be an 
appropriate start to improve the quality of data on the system. There were significant 
differences in interview formats, questionnaires and data input across the state. Many 
cases did not have exposure data until PDF attachments of questionnaires, clinical notes 
and discharge summaries were downloaded, read and entered manually into the 
extracted dataset. A high concern was that most reported shearing exposures were 
found in these notes and not in the dataset. The question should be asked, “who is using 
Q fever data on NCIMS, what are they using the data for, and what data do they need?” 
Exposure information recorded onto NCIMS should be collapsed into clearer categories 
and more exclusive variables. The addition of a variable that records persistent focal 
infections, and if present, the type of infection would be useful to further understand 
the epidemiology of Q fever. 
Limitations  
There were a number of limitations. Cases were not looked at by season as data was 
analysed by notification date, not calculated onset date (consistent with other NSW 
Health reporting). The four local health districts with the highest Q fever counts had 
awareness programs, which potentially increased testing in these areas and drove 
notifications. The study strived to have Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status 
data as complete as possible as to minimize bias on final estimates. As there was no 
 134 
2017 Aboriginal population data available, 2016 data was used as the denominator for 
2016 and 2017. It is estimated that the NSW Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
population grows between 1.8% and 2.1% annually. It is likely that the 2017 contribution 
to the indirectly standardised rates and ratios were counted with a denominator that is 
slightly smaller than it should be. A sensitivity analysis was not conducted on these rates 
to determine whether this influenced the data. As reported exposures were drawn from 
case interviews, NCIMS and clinical notes, recall bias may have occurred for people 
remembering exposures (particularly if diagnosed in later stages of disease).  
Before a standard national Q fever questionnaire was released across Australia in 2019, 
varied questionnaires were used across NSW, causing complexities in interactions of the 
data (which was already weakened by low numbers). There were difficulties selecting 
the correct method to standardise ages between the two groups and choosing 
appropriate tests to compare variables. The limitations began when the data was pulled 
from NCIMS, due to the extensive data cleaning and number of variables that had to be 
collapsed to find meaning within the data. After careful consideration by biostatisticians 
in NSW Health and the ANU, it was recommended that tests such as a multivariate 
analysis should not be performed. 
The consideration of testing bias was discussed extensively among the Aboriginal 
Research Advisory group. It was agreed by consensus among the group that any testing 
bias would have the opposite effect, in that Aboriginal people are less likely to present 
for medical care and identify as Aboriginal for infectious diseases generally. This was 
supported by two methods: 
1. Discussion with and comparison of rates against other Australian jurisdictional 
health departments, which had not detected a discrepancy between Q fever 
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notification rates in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people; and 
2. Data-completeness activities, as described on from pp.105, in which the ‘ever-
Indigenous’ algorithm was applied to determine if cases investigated for Q fever 
who were not reported as Aboriginal (or not Aboriginal) had either presented to 
a medical facility as Aboriginal. This activity led to a reclassification for 6 people 
from 57 with unknown status to Aboriginal, which further increased the rate of 
Aboriginal people notified with Q fever. In context of the discussions with the 
Aboriginal Research Advisory group and other Health Department, this providing 
provided sufficient evidence to exclude to impact of any testing bias towards 
Aboriginal people as a major factor contributing to the higher crude rates of 
reported disease. 
Conclusion  
Aboriginal people in Western NSW are disproportionately affected by Q fever.  While 
NSW Health was interested in comparing the factors leading to this disproportion with 
the rest of NSW, the main concern highlighted during Aboriginal Advisory Group 
consultations was that young Aboriginal people in Western NSW were getting Q fever in 
an area where community awareness was low. On-going engagement with the 
Aboriginal community in understanding the problem and finding culturally appropriate 
solutions was vital and should occur wherever an investigation has a focus on Aboriginal 
people. The advisory group identified meaningful messaging pathways toward groups 
where there would be value in targeted awareness. Actions were taken with key focal 
points in hunting and shooting; education; primary industries job seekers and workers; 
and other areas of rural NSW. Overall, best practice for prevention and mitigation 
strategies are required, as is the improvement of surveillance and notification data on 
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NCIMS. This may be facilitated by considering the sensitivities of an individual or 
community against the potential impacts they may face versus the adaptive capacities 
that they already have or could benefit from having. 
Q fever is an important zoonotic disease that can lead to debilitating illness and 
significant decrease in quality of life. (34) Although the ubiquitous nature of C. burnetii 
means that Q fever may never be eliminated or fully prevented, the risk of disease can 
be minimised through increased public and clinical awareness, vaccination of high risk 
groups and environmental regulation.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Q fever infographic for job seekers  
 
  
  
Appendix B. Target groups to build Q fever awareness 
Identified by the Aboriginal Research Advisory Group for Q fever in Western New South Wales at 30 March 2019. 
Target groups 
Advisory group 
discussion 
Messaging channels Objective Action 
People in rural 
NSW 
People do not need to 
have a high-risk 
occupation or animal 
exposure to get Q fever 
NSW Environmental 
Health Officers 
(EHOs) 
Environmental health 
can strengthen 
resilience against Q 
fever. Ensure EHOs 
are aware of Q fever 
prevention, 
legislative scope and 
health promotion 
In April 2019 at the NSW Environmental Health Policy & Practice Day a 
presentation was given to Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) across NSW. 
The presentation provided information about Q fever, the Western NSW 
study, types of initiatives they can do in response to Q fever in non-risk groups 
and the recommendations made by the advisory group.  
NSW health Q fever 
campaign adapted to 
target groups 
General awareness 
raising for those not 
in high risk groups 
 As part of the Q fever mainstream campaign NSW Health commissioned a Q 
fever artwork to be made into a poster by Mr. Garry Purchase, an Australian 
award winning Aboriginal artist. This was endorsed post development by the 
advisory group. 
A lay sheet for community was co-developed through the advisory group 
 
Hunters & 
shooters 
Hunting and shooting, 
and preparing meat is 
spontaneous and 
transient 
Collaboration with 
department primary 
industries Game 
Licencing Education 
& Stakeholder Space 
to implement Q fever 
messaging through 
their channels 
Raise awareness 
among hunter and 
shooters through the 
licensing process.  
NSW Health met with NSW DPI Game Licensing on 1 April 2019. The 
department had a large social media reach (10-50,000), plus a monthly 
newsletter with a subscriber list not exclusive to license holders. Education 
models must be completed before a license is issued. The trainer notes for the 
“Safe Game Meat Harvest” section could be amended, and they were also 
willing to spread Q fever and Brucellosis messaging through their networks. 
Hunters & 
shooters 
Additional strategies need 
to be developed for those 
To reach those 
exempt, Local 
Raise awareness 
among hunter and 
Unfortunately, this process was not within the time scope of the MAE 
however this recommendation has been added to the overall action plan of 
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Target groups 
Advisory group 
discussion 
Messaging channels Objective Action 
(continued) exempt from hunting 
licenses.  
 
Aboriginal Land 
Councils (LALCs) 
should be engaged.  
shooters. the Q fever campaign. 
High risk 
workers 
Transient workers, 
particularly shearers are 
groups for concern due to 
many of these roles 
undertaken via word of 
mouth and cash in hand. 
Collaboration with 
Safe Work NSW 
including Aboriginal 
Stakeholder 
Engagement & 
Aboriginal Programs 
To build interagency 
collaboration around 
fever awareness, 
including for target 
groups 
The manager of Aboriginal Stakeholder Engagement & Aboriginal Programs 
met with NSW to assist with the Q fever investigation. This builds upon pre-
established relationships between agencies for Q fever. The nature of 
employment was described from a programs perspective and guidance was 
given on how to reach specific groups.  
Advisory group 
discussion 
Develop methods to 
inform at-risk 
workers that may not 
be easily reached 
(e.g. casual cash in 
hand shearers) 
Strategies put forward included products like magnets for fridge, washing 
machine, carry bags for work cloths. However, this was not actioned during 
MAE involvement.  
Rural job 
seekers 
Job seekers are a critical 
group to contact before 
entering a high risk 
workforce which does not 
always guarantee that an 
employer will abide by 
WHS legislation  
 
Engagement with key 
employment 
agencies in the 
region to support job 
seekers entering 
high-risk industries 
Develop culturally 
appropriate 
information sheet to 
advise those seeking 
work in high risk 
areas.  
Agencies contacted and poster information distributed. Most employment 
agencies are independent, so we approached them one by one. We contacted 
the largest Aboriginal employment agency in the region who were willing to 
distribute materials sent from NSW Health. 
Students and 
teachers 
There are many 
agricultural high schools 
across the region, as well 
as schools that raise and 
present animals at shows 
Collaboration with 
dept education to 
provide Q fever 
education for public, 
independent and 
Development and 
distribution of flyers 
and information that 
is appropriate for 
school age children 
NSW Health met with education representatives from catholic, independent 
and public schools at the Annual meeting on the School Vaccination Program. 
Representatives were unaware of Q fever as an issue but indicated that they 
were the correct liaison point. NSW Health provided further information about 
Q fever and arranged a follow up meeting. Ongoing collaboration was 
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Target groups 
Advisory group 
discussion 
Messaging channels Objective Action 
(e.g. the Royal Easter 
Show). 
catholic high school 
students and 
teachers (in animal-
related studies) 
and their teachers  continuing in this space around prevention and vaccination messaging for 
students and teachers at the time of writing this chapter. We could not find an 
appropriate contact at TAFE for students undertaking rural skills subjects at 
the time of this analysis, however this contact has now been identified. 
Engagement with 
wool industry bodies 
and shearing schools 
across NSW 
Face to face 
presentations with 
the wool industry. 
Link-in with shearing 
schools to provide 
similar messaging as 
in the schools. 
A presentation was delivered to the Australian Wool Innovation as a “train the 
trainer” session. During the analysis Western NSW was in a period of 
prolonged drought which meant that all of the targeted shearing schools were 
closed. Engagement will recommence as they open 
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Prologue 
This chapter describes the overall picture of the largest novel Salmonella Typhimurium 
outbreak that occurred in Australia between 10 October 2018 and 30 May 2019. I will 
talk about the epidemiological, environmental and laboratory investigation, actions and 
outcomes. I will also discuss the egg industry in Australia, and recommendations to 
improve egg safety along the food supply chain. I demonstrate the power of multi-locus 
variable number tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) and whole genome sequencing (WGS) 
in the identification of outbreaks.  
MAE role  
The outbreak occurred over a holiday period where many public health units (PHUs) had 
skeleton staff so I interviewed cases across many jurisdictions while coordinating the 
follow up of PHUs. As lead investigator on the outbreak, my key roles were to: 
• Coordinate and record the epidemiological and environmental investigation 
• Interview cases using the OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating 
Questionnaire (1)  
• Add and collate interview data into a Microsoft Excel (2) line list 
• Analyse data and report findings through Situation Reports (SitReps), evidence 
summaries and the OzFoodNet quarterly report.  
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Lessons learnt  
Interviewing  
The most significant skill I learned from this opportunity was to apply theoretical skills 
into a real situation, and to interview well. Everyone has their own interview style and 
during this outbreak I found my own. I realised you need to be realistic with your 
expectations and learned that there is a bit of an art to prompting a case for information 
without leading them to an answer. I used this opportunity to focus on asking the right 
questions, actively listening and helping the case feel encouraged to respond honestly 
about their food history. For example, I spoke to a parent with a toddler who had mainly 
eaten tomato sauce (on its own) or chicken nuggets during the incubation period of their 
illness. The parent became anxious when I got to the questionnaire section relating to 
fresh and healthy produce. At the time my infant son had been insisting on water 
crackers over almost everything I cooked for him, so I paused the interview for a short 
time to share a laugh about the struggles of feeding fussy children, then resumed the 
questionnaire. 
Working across jurisdictions 
Although the outbreak began in Hunter New England, it quickly spread across the state. 
Many of the implicated PHUs had skeleton staff operating over the Christmas and New 
Year period. Hunter New England rapidly drew on resources to interview cases in other 
jurisdictions, and as measles cases began to emerge, I watched other districts offering 
to assist with outbreak cases to alleviate the pressures of inundated jurisdictions. This 
was a wonderful example about how even though we work in our own jurisdictions, we 
all have a common goal to serve the public in the fastest way possible, even if that means 
resourcing past our boundaries.  
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Hand-over and the roles and expectations of the host location 
This was a large protracted multijurisdictional outbreak with multiple point sources, and 
at the time I was the only one working on the investigation. In hindsight it would have 
been useful to clarify the roles, responsibilities and expectations in the outbreak at the 
beginning and put in a support structure to assist if required. I do feel the extended time 
on the outbreak was where I became an epidemiologist. I learned to lead an outbreak, 
prepare SitReps, evidence summaries, and surveillance reports. I know where to locate 
guidelines and have a better understanding of the aetiology of Salmonella. I learned to 
work under pressure, completing multiple tasks with little to no support or guidance. All 
attributes which will benefit me in the future.  
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Abstract 
Background 
A multijurisdictional outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium (S. Typhimurium) with a 
unique multi-locus variable number tandem repeat analysis type (MLVA) profile was 
identified on 14 December 2018 by NSW Health after a cluster of cases with the same 
profile was identified in two aged-care facilities (ACFs) owned by the same company. 
The outbreak quickly spread into the community, resulting in a large protracted 
multijurisdictional outbreak. The MLVA profile for this outbreak (5-17-9-13-490) had not 
been identified in humans since MLVA typing was introduced in NSW in 2008. On 14 
December 2018, investigation commenced between NSW Health and the NSW 
Department of Primary Industries Biosecurity and Food Safety (DPI-BFS).   
Methods 
Descriptive case series between 10 October 2018 and 30 May 2019. Cases were 
identified by routine surveillance and interviewed by trained public health staff using 
the OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire. (1) DPI-BFS conducted 
food premise inspections and egg trace-back. Environmental samples were taken from 
the implicated egg farm.  Whole genome sequencing (WGS) of a sample of human and 
environmental isolates was used to assist in the investigation.  
Results 
During the outbreak period S. Typhimurium MLVA profile 5-17-9-13-490 was responsible 
for 235 cases across the Australian Capital Territory (7), New South Wales (215), and 
Queensland (13). Eighty per cent (n=188) of cases were interviewed. Twenty-six per cent 
were children <10 years of age, and 33% (n=77) of cases were linked to 11 point source 
clusters. Five deaths occurred. Egg consumption was reported by 91% (n=171) of cases, 
 158 
including 71% (n=133) who ate eggs, and the remaining 29% (n=38) who ate egg-related 
products. A sample of 81 isolates (78 human, 3 environmental/food) underwent WGS 
and were found to be highly related, indicating a single originating source for all 
infections. 
Conclusion 
This was a large protracted multi-jurisdictional outbreak of S. Typhimurium linked to 
eggs through MLVA and WGS. Point source outbreaks were linked to one egg farm 
through complex distribution channels.  
Public Health Impact 
Salmonella is synonymous with eggs and can make its way into the egg supply despite 
high and active compliance at the industry level. Continued interagency and multi- 
organisational collaboration and communication is necessary to strengthen the egg 
supply chain, particularly in relation to efficient trace-back of eggs in an outbreak 
situation. Further, more emphasis is required on improving egg safety and awareness 
throughout the entire egg supply chain, including food produced in centralised kitchens 
and in the home.   
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Introduction  
From the Enterobacteriaceae family, non-typhoidal Salmonella is characterised as a 
gram-negative, non-spore-forming, facultative anaerobic bacilli, that generally 
manifests as the self-limiting gastroenteritis salmonellosis. (3) The two species of 
Salmonella are Salmonella enterica and Salmonella bongori. (4) S. enterica has six 
subspecies and approximately 2557 known serovars. Warm-blooded animals are more 
likely to have S. enterica. (4, 5) S. bongori has 22 known serovars and is found in cold-
blooded animals. (5)  
Due to the ubiquitous distribution of Salmonella, the mode of transmission can be found 
in both food and the environment. Most people become infected with Salmonella by 
eating food contaminated with animal faeces, or made from infected animals and their 
products. (6) The mode of transmission for some serovars (particularly environmental) 
is yet to be fully understood. Another less common mode of infection occurs after direct 
contact with another person that has been infected with Salmonella.  
Infected persons usually develop symptoms 6-72 hours after exposure and may 
experience fever, headache, stomach cramps, joint and muscle pain, diarrhoea, nausea 
and vomiting, for approximately 4-7 days. More severe cases may present with 
tachycardia, high white blood cell count, confusion or coma. (6) Children, the elderly and 
immunocompromised persons can be at higher risk of severe illness including infections 
to the bloodstream, which can result in a loss of disability adjusted life years (DALYs) and 
lead to further co-morbidities throughout the life course. (6-9)  
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Public health impact  
The estimated global burden of Salmonella is high, however cannot be accurately 
quantified due to the varied presence and quality of national surveillance systems. (3) 
In 2010, an extensive global study measured the burden of non-typhoidal Salmonella 
worldwide. (3) The researchers estimated that globally there are 93.8 million non-
typhoidal Salmonella illnesses per year, with 80.3 million of these related to food. The 
research also suggested that annually 155,000 people die from their infection. (3) 
Salmonella testing is reliant on both health-seeking behaviour and the clinician to take 
a specimen from the case. (3) Due to the self-limiting nature of the disease there is a 
good chance that the person infected may not attend a health facility at all. (10) 
Salmonella Typhimurium (S. Typhimurium), identified by antigenic formula 
1,4,[5],12:i:1,2 as described by the White Kauffmann-Le Minor Scheme for Salmonella 
subtyping (5), is one of the most common serovars of all Salmonella enterica species 
worldwide. (6, 11)  It is the primary serovar in Australia, followed by Salmonella 
Enteritidis. Like most Salmonella species, S. Typhimurium follows a seasonal pattern, 
with outbreaks more frequent between December and May (the summer to autumn 
seasons). (6, 12) This serovar was the causative serotype in 84% of all Salmonella 
foodborne outbreaks in Australia between 2001 and 2016 and was implicated in 61% of 
all foodborne outbreaks linked to food premises. (9)  
The most common source for infection is though the consumption of eggs and egg 
products. This includes raw egg sauces and butter, and desserts that involve raw or 
undercooked eggs. (13, 14) S. Typhimurium is primarily found on the outer shell of the 
egg. The bacterium is motile and can enter the egg through cracks or damage on the 
outer shell, or by direct contact such as using eggshells to separate yolk from albumen. 
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S. Typhimurium is highly attracted to egg yolk, and has been shown to travel through 
albumen despite its purpose as a chemical barrier to bacteria. (15, 16)   
Context 
Between November and December 2018, 17 people fell ill with gastroenteritis across 
two aged-care facilities (ACFs) that were geographically distinct (340 km apart) but 
operated by the same company. Of those who fell ill, 14 cases were residents and three 
were staff. Symptom onsets occurred between 12 November 2018 and 2 December 
2018. Of the 17 unwell, 13 were Salmonella positive, of which 12 were confirmed as 
Salmonella Typhimurium characterised as multi-locus variable number tandem repeat 
analysis (MLVA) 5-17-9-13-490. This MLVA profile had not previously been identified in 
humans in NSW since the introduction of routine MLVA in 2008. (17) The remaining four 
suspected cases who were unwell did not have a specimen collected. Seven cases 
presented to hospital and four cases were admitted. Three resident deaths occurred 
during the outbreak in persons who had acquired a Salmonella infection.  
The NSW Department of Primary Industries Biosecurity and Food Safety (DPI-BFS) 
conducted site inspections and collected environmental samples from both ACFs. The 
dishwashers at both facilities were not operating at an adequate sanitising temperature. 
One boot swab specimen in an entrance hallway was positive for S. Typhimurium 5-17-
9-13-490. Trace-back of the eggs used at each ACF identified a common egg grading 
facility. S. Typhimurium cases with the novel MLVA were subsequently identified in the 
community and were not able to be linked to the ACF. On 14 December 2018, NSW 
Health commenced a wider outbreak investigation. This chapter details the process of 
the investigation, the epidemiology of the outbreak and control measures that were 
taken during the period 14 December 2018 to 30 May 2019.  
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Methodology  
Epidemiological investigation  
Hypothesis generation  
A descriptive case-series investigation was conducted between 10 October 2018 and 30 
May 2019. 
Case definition 
A working case definition was created on 14 December 2018 and last amended on 10 
January 2019 to include and investigate epi-linked cases. The final case definition 
included any person with S. Typhimurium MLVA 5-17-9-13-490 (or related†) infection 
with illness onset since 10 October 2018 with at least some of their exposure period in 
Australia;  
OR  
Salmonella infection with illness onset since 10 October 2018 with an epidemiological 
link to a confirmed MLVA case or point source cluster, with at least some of their 
exposure period in Australia.  
Case finding and data gathering 
In Australia, Salmonella infections are laboratory notified under the relevant 
jurisdiction’s legislation. Cases who met the case definition were interviewed by trained 
public health officers using the standardised OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis 
                                                     
 
† Related MLVAs were those that were close enough to be deemed as likely from the same source. This 
was determined by ICPMR and epidemiological data. The MLVAs that were related to this outbreak were:   
5-17-8-13-490, 5-17-9-0/1-490, 5-17-9-13/14/15-490, 5-17-10-13-490 and 5-18-9-13-490 
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Generating Questionnaire (Appendix A). Questionnaire data was manually added to the 
line list maintained by the lead investigator. Cases who met the case definition were 
followed up by their jurisdictional health department. The exposure rate of cases to 
foods were calculated and cases were analysed on an epi curve that was filtered by 
location and point source.  
Environmental investigation and trace-back 
The coordination of the environmental investigation was performed by the DPI-BFS who 
inspected implicated food premises with assistance from local councils if necessary. Staff 
in the food premises were interviewed in regard to preparation techniques and storage 
of foods. The names of food suppliers were obtained for specific ingredients identified 
through hypothesis generation interviews. Food and environmental samples were 
taken, as appropriate. An egg trace-back was conducted, which involved taking details 
of the eggs used on site and following the chain of purchase back to the farm, grading 
and distribution centres, which were subsequently investigated. Environmental and 
food samples were taken at these sites.  
Laboratory investigation 
Serotyping and MLVA 
Individuals with S. Typhimurium were identified by public health reference laboratories 
in NSW (Institute of Clinical Pathology and Medical Research [ICPMR]) and QLD 
(Queensland Forensic and Scientific Services [FSS]) using the Kauffmann White Le Minor 
scheme. (5) All isolates were further characterised using the MLVA typing method. The 
process of MLVA is described in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Infographic from PulseNet, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (online), describing the 
laboratory process of multiple locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis that would be used to 
characterise strain specific profiles of Salmonella Typhimurium (18) 
 
MLVAs were classified as closely related and could be considered part of this outbreak 
if they shared the same outer two loci and if there was only a variation of 1-2 digits in 
one of the three inner loci. MLVAs that did not meet this requirement but had strong 
epidemiological evidence to suggest a relationship were also investigated. 
Whole genome sequencing 
The objectives for WGS was: 
1. To determine whether a genomic relationship existed between MLVA profile 5-
17-9-13-490 and the seven suspect MLVA profiles.  
2. Confirm link between human and environmental isolates. 
3. Determine if QLD cases were genetically related to the NSW cases 
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Process for WGS at ICPMR NSW 
WGS was performed at the Centre for Infectious Disease Laboratory Services (CIDMLS), 
ICPMR, NSW Health Pathology and CIDM-Public Health, Westmead Hospital. The 
process of WGS is described in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Infographic from PulseNet, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (online) describing the 
laboratory process of whole genome sequencing that would be used to characterise strain specific profiles 
of Salmonella Typhimurium (19) 
 
NSW Health submitted the accession numbers and the NSW Notifiable Conditions 
Information Management System (NCIMS) patient identification number of 44 MLVA 
cases for WGS. This included 41 MLVA 5-17-9-13-490 isolates that were either linked to 
point source outbreaks, or representative of the local health districts (LHDs) that were 
still being affected by the outbreak at the time of submission, three environmental 
isolates from the implicated farm.  
ICPMR reported that the Geneaid™ Bacterial DNA Isolation Kit (GeneAid) was used to 
extract genomic deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). The sequencing libraries were prepared 
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using Nextera XT DNA Library Prep Kit (Illumina) and sequenced on NextSeq 500 
instrument using NextSeq 500/550 v2 mid output Kits (Illumina). The sequenced raw 
reads were subjected to in–house quality control procedures prior to further analysis 
and the data was analysed using Nullarbor pipeline (v1.3). The raw reads were mapped 
to a S. Typhimurium complete genome strain LT2 (NCBI GenBank Accession NC_003197). 
The relationship between genomes was examined using single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) analysis where SNPs were defined as substitutions present in at 
least 90% of reads with minimum depth coverage of 30. Core genome SNPs from each 
sequence were aligned using Snippy-core. The SNP cluster was called based on the 
phylogenetic tree and the SNP distance, from which <5 SNPs was regarded as likely 
linked. The WGS-based multi-locus sequence type (MLST) was inferred from sequencing 
data using MLST 2.8 from the pipeline. The maximum likelihood tree was generated 
using FastTree 2.1.10. Antibiotic resistance genes were searched from the sequencing 
data by Abricate (v0.7) using ResFinder as the default database. 
A phylogenetic tree of the isolates was generated using Microreact, a visual online 
phylogenetic mapping tool developed by the Centre of Genomic Pathogen Surveillance. 
(20) A metadata file (.newick file) was uploaded to Microreact which contained all S. 
Typhimurium notified to NSW Health in the time period. A Microsoft Excel (2) file 
containing information about the isolates submitted to ICPMR for WGS was also 
uploaded into the system. Together this generated a phylogenetic tree which was 
adjusted to clearly show that the isolates were novel compared to all other strains in the 
tree.  
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Comparison with food/environmental isolates 
A subset of environmental S. Typhimurium isolates with matching MLVA to human cases 
were selected for inclusion in the WGS process described above. At least one person 
from each cluster had an isolate run through WGS to ensure all clusters were linked to 
the outbreak. 
Genomic comparisons with QLD 
NSW Health requested the QLD Public Health Microbiology Reference Laboratory run 
WGS analysis on eight QLD cases that were known at the time to have the MLVA 5-17-
9-13-490. ICPMR electronically sent a copy of the outbreak WGS strain to QLD Public 
Health Microbiology Reference Laboratory for comparison with QLD cases.  
Ethics  
This investigation of a multi-jurisdictional outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium was 
carried out under routine state and territory public health legislation. Public health units 
in NSW had an obligation to participate in the investigation as required by the NSW 
Salmonella Control Guidelines. (21) Participation in the investigation was voluntary for 
cases or their guardians, who were asked for verbal consent to interview using the 
OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire. As this was an issue of 
acute public health importance, clearance from a human research ethics committee 
(HREC) was not required, however approval was sought and granted by the Australian 
National University HREC under protocol number 2017/909.   
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Results 
Epidemiological results 
Case finding and demographics 
Between 10 October and 30 May 2019, 235 people met the definition for this outbreak 
of S. Typhimurium with MLVA 5-17-9-13-490 or similar. Notifications occurred in 
multiple Australian jurisdictions: Australian Capital Territory (7), New South Wales (215), 
and Queensland (13). A breakdown by state and territory is shown in Table , with NSW 
further divided into LHDs affected. The highest burden was in NSW with 92% of all cases.  
Table 1 Jurisdictions affected by Salmonella Typhimurium with multi-locus variable tandem repeat 
analysis profile 5-17-9-13-490 or similar, by location, from 8 October 2018 to 27 May 2019. 
Australian Jurisdiction NSW Local Health District 
Number of confirmed 
cases 
Percent of total 
cases 
New South Wales (NSW) All districts (NSW) 215 91.5 
Regional 
Hunter New England 79 33.6 
Mid North Coast 3 1.3 
Northern NSW 1 0.4 
Southern NSW 1 0.4 
Western NSW 1 0.4 
Murrumbidgee 0 0 
Far West 0 0 
 Metropolitan 
South Western Sydney 29 12.3 
Southern Eastern 
Sydney 
26 11.1 
Northern Sydney 25 10.6 
Sydney 22 9.4 
Western Sydney 13 5.5 
Nepean Blue 
Mountains 
6 2.6 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 5 2.1 
Central Coast 4 1.7 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
 7 3.0 
Queensland  13 5.5 
Grand Total  235 100 
 
  
 169 
The epi curve is presented in Figure 3 which describes cases by jurisdiction of residence 
(NSW is divided by local health districts) and week of symptom onset date between 8 
October 2018 and 20 May 2019.  
Figure 3 Epidemiological curve of Salmonella Typhimurium cases with multi-locus variable tandem repeat 
analysis profile 5-17-9-13-490 or similar, by local health district or state (ACT, QLD) and week of symptom 
onset date from 8 October 2018 to 27 May 2019. 
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Case series 
Of the 235 cases, 188 (80%) were interviewed, 47 cases were not interviewed, 30 could 
not be reached, ten were not attempted to be interviewed, two declined and five had 
died. Three cases were secondary infections, epidemiologically linked other cases. Table 
2 describes the demographic age, sex, clinical onset and severity data of the cases. 
Table 2 Demographic and epidemiological characteristics of Salmonella Typhimurium cases with multi-
locus variable tandem repeat analysis type 5-17-9-13-490 or similar notified in NSW between 8 October 
2018 and 30 May 2019 
For all notifications, the age range of cases were between 0-95 years, with a median age 
of 25. Children under 10 years of age were the most affected age group, carrying a 
quarter of the overall burden. Adults aged 21-30 was the next highest age group affected 
with 18% of the burden. The sex distribution of cases was higher in females (n=130, 
55%), with 81 males for every 100 females. Of those cases interviewed (n=188), over 
half of cases required acute care, including 64 hospital admissions (34%) with an average 
of 4.7 days spent in hospital (median 3 days), and 38 emergency department 
presentations (20%) and five were deceased.  
Characteristic Details Result 
Age (n=235) 
Average 32 years 
Median 25 years 
Range 0 - 95 years 
Youngest affected age group 
Oldest affected age group 
<10 years (n=62, 26%) 
21-30 years (n=42, 18%) 
Sex (n=235) 
Male 105 (45%) 
Female 130 (55%) 
Male/Female sex ratio 81:100 
Onset period 
(n=235) 
First notified case 10 October 2018 
Last notified case 24 May 2019 
Severity 
(n=188) 
Hospital admissions 64 (34%) 
Emergency department presentation (no admission) 38 (20%) 
Deaths  
Aged Care Facility (n=3) and Community residents (n=2) 5 (2%) 
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Food Consumption 
The most common food item consumed in the likely exposure period was eggs. The 
overall reported rate of exposure to eggs or egg products was 91% (n=171) (Table 3). Of 
these, 71% (n=133) reported eating eggs, and the remaining 38 of the 171 consumed 
foods that can be categorised as potentially containing eggs. Of the 133 who reported 
eating eggs, 53% (n=101) ate eggs at home and 42% (n=80) ate eggs away from home. 
Exposure to common sources drawn from case interviews is illustrated in Table 3.  
Table 3 Food exposure list of interviewed Salmonella Typhimurium cases with multi-locus variable tandem 
repeat analysis type 5-17-9-13-490 or similar notified in NSW between 8 October 2018 and 30 May 2019 
Item Food exposures 
Number reporting 
exposure (N=188) 
Percentage reporting 
exposure (%) N=188 
Eggs Total consumed eggs and/or egg-
related products 171 91 
Total consumed eggs (general) 133 71 
• Ate eggs at home 101 54 
• Ate eggs away from home  79 42 
Possibly ate eggs 17 9 
Did not eat eggs 17 9 
• No consumption of eggs or 
egg products 5 3 
No information provided 24 13 
• No information on eggs, ate 
egg products 53 28 
Chicken Total consumed chicken (general) 118 63 
• Cooked chicken 90 36 
• Raw chicken 67 48 
Possibly ate chicken 12 5 
Did not eat chicken 16 7 
Does not know if ate chicken 3 1 
No information provided 86 37 
Beef Total consumed beef  73 39 
• Ate beef mince 46 24 
• Ate sausages 36 19 
Pork Total consumed pork 55 29 
• Ate any pig meat 46 24 
• Ate bacon 34 18 
• Ate ham 31 16 
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Point source investigation 
Eleven point source clusters were identified from 10 October 2018 through case 
interviews, representing 77 cases (41%). Table 4 provides a summary of each point 
source cluster. No meal was common, however most meals contained eggs. Figure 4 is 
an epi curve illustrating eleven point source clusters identified during the outbreak. 
Table 4 Summary of each point source cluster of Salmonella Typhimurium with multi-locus variable 
tandem repeat analysis type 5-17-9-13-490 or similar notified in the ACT, NSW and QLD between 8 
October 2018 and 30 May 2019 
Cluster 
Cases 
(n) 
Dates of 
purchase 
Foods consumed Ingredients if relevant 
ACF (2 sites) 12 12 Nov-2Dec 
Multiple foods consumed. 
Two affected staff members 
consumed scrambled eggs  
Multiple ingredients.  
Food contained eggs 
Bakery 1 13 7-16 Dec 
Vietnamese pork rolls 
containing egg butter 
spread 
Pork, salad and egg 
butter spread 
Egg Farm B 
(Retail Stall) 
3 12 Oct- 9 Jan Fresh eggs Eggs 
Cafe 1 3 10-25 Dec 
Poached eggs, scrambled 
eggs Egg and mayo 
sandwich 
Food contains eggs 
Retirement 
Village 
3 6-11 Jan 
Take away cooked dinners 
and desserts 
Food contains eggs 
Cafe 2 2 11-14 Jan Eggs, beef nachos 
Eggs, potential cross 
contamination 
Cafe 3 2 16 Jan - 1 Feb 
Beef salad from display 
cabinet 
Food contains eggs. 
Potential cross-
contamination 
Bakery 2 24 3-21 Feb 
White cream cake, tiramisu 
and matcha cream cake 
Food contains eggs 
Bakery 3 6 7-20 Mar Cakes and custard buns Food contains eggs 
Bakery 4 3 20-22 Apr 
Potato pie, cheese and 
bacon pie. Cream bun, 
bread 
Multiple ingredients.  
Cafe 4 6 25-27 Apr Fried eggs, French toast Foods containing eggs 
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Figure 4 Epi curve of Salmonella Typhimurium with multi-locus variable tandem repeat analysis type 5-
17-9-13-490 or similar notified in the ACT, NSW and QLD between 8 October 2018 and 30 May 2019, 
including eleven point source clusters identified during the outbreak. 
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Environmental results  
All eleven point source clusters were identified and inspected by either the NSWFA or 
council as summarised in Table 5. All point source clusters were able to be linked to the 
one egg producer through various complex distribution channels (Table 6). The egg 
producer maintained one egg farm, “Egg Farm A”. Egg Farm A was inspected multiple 
times, with the first inspection conducted on 16 January 2019.  Inspection of the farm 
found no issues on site and the farm was highly compliant with directions made by the 
DPI-BFS. These directions included thorough cleaning and additional sanitation steps 
were introduced, however people continued to be infected with this strain regardless of 
the control measures introduced on farm. No eggs were withheld from sale.  
Environmental specimen results 
Twenty-seven environmental samples collected during food premises and farm 
inspections were positive for the MLVA. One isolate was from a boot swab collected 
during the initial ACF outbreak, and 26 were taken from Egg Farm A.    
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Table 5 Details of 27 environmental samples collected during food premises and farm inspections that 
were positive for Salmonella Typhimurium with multi-locus variable tandem repeat analysis type 5-17-9-
13-490.  
Premises Date Inspected 
Food 
Vehicle 
Suspected* 
Root Cause Samples 
Outbreak 
Strain 
Identified 
Control Action 
ACF (2 
Sites) 
25 Nov 
2018 
Unknown. 
Possible 
eggs 
Improper 
sanitising Yes 
Yes. 1 
boot swab 
Restricted use 
of third party 
ready to eat 
high risk foods 
until 
investigation 
complete 
Bakery 1 9 Jan 2019 Eggs Raw egg use Yes No 
Previous 
prohibition 
notice for raw 
eggs on 18 Dec 
2018 
Egg Farm B 
(Retail 
Stall) 
11 Feb Eggs  
Eggs sourced 
from Egg 
Farm A 
Yes No None  
Cafe 1 
Council 
inspection 
around 23 
Jan 
Egg 
Improper 
cleaning and 
sanitising 
Yes No 
Council 
Improvement 
Notice 
Retirement 
Village 4 & 7 Feb Eggs 
No obvious 
issues Yes No None  
Cafe 2 Council Egg 
Incorrect 
sanitiser and 
low 
dishwasher 
operating 
temp 
Yes No None 
Cafe 3 Council Eggs 
Dishwasher 
temperature 
low  
Yes No 
Issues 
addressed on 
the day 
Bakery 2 22 Feb 2019 Eggs 
Improper gg 
use Yes No 
None  
Bakery 3 12 April 2019 Eggs 
Pest, 
improper 
sanitiser, 
inadequate 
cleaning  
Yes No 
None  
Bakery 4 21 May 2019 Eggs 
Inadequate 
temps in 
dishwasher 
Yes No 
None  
Cafe 4 30 May 2019 Eggs 
No issues 
identified Yes No 
None  
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Table 6 Summary of point source clusters of outbreak strain of Salmonella Typhimurium with multi-locus 
variable tandem repeat analysis type 5-17-9-13-490 or similar, notified in NSW between 8 October 2018 
and 30 May 2019, in order of notification to NSW Health. 
Cluster name Egg supplier to business Egg Trace-back 
ACF (2 sites) Producer B, through grading facility A Egg Producer A- Egg Farm A 
Bakery 1 Producer A Producer A - Egg farm A 
Regional Area Producer C, side of road stall 
Rebranded eggs from producer A - Egg 
farm A  
Cafe 1 Distributor 1 and Distributor 2  Supply from Producer A- Egg Farm A 
Retirement 
village 
Producer C  Rebranded eggs from Egg Farm  
Cafe 2 Producer A direct Supply from implicated farm 
Cafe 3 Producer A direct Supply from implicated farm 
Bakery 2 Producer B Rebranded eggs from Egg Farm A 
Bakery 3 Producer B, through grading facility A Rebranded eggs from Egg Farm A 
Bakery 4 Producer A direct Supply from implicated farm 
Cafe 4 Producer B, through grading facility A Rebranded eggs from Egg Farm A 
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Laboratory results   
Genomic comparisons with QLD 
The QLD Public Health Microbiology Reference Laboratory confirmed that the eight QLD 
isolates tested were highly related and clustered together within 0-3 SNP differences of 
the NSW outbreak strain.  
Genomic analysis with NSW cases 
Of the 44 isolates that were sequenced, 43 were highly related within 0-5 single SNPs. 
This included 41 human isolates and 3 environmental isolates from the implicated farm). 
Table 7 indicates the cluster was made up of 7 MLVA patterns, 3 where considered 
closely related to primary MLVA pattern. 
Table 7 Whole genome sequencing results showing genomic relationship between isolates of Salmonella 
Typhimurium with multi-locus variable tandem repeat analysis type 5-17-9-13-490 or similar, notified in 
NSW between 8 October 2018 and 30 May 2019  
Source MLVA type Isolates submitted (n) 
Genomic 
relationship Actions (if required) 
Human isolate 
5-17-8-13-490 1 Not related (25 SNPs) 
MLVA sent for reanalysis. 
Dropped from line list 
pending confirmation 
5-17-9-13-490 33 
Highly related 
(between 0-5 
SNPs) 
NA 
5-17-9-14-490 2 
5-17-9-0-490 1 
5-17-9-1-490 1 
5-17-9-15-490 1 
5-17-10-13-490 1 
5-18-9-13-490 1 
Environmental 
isolate  
 
5-17-9-13-490 3 Highly related  (0-5 SNPs) 
NA 
 
Total  44   
 
  
 178 
The phylogenetic tree presented in Figure 5 demonstrated that this novel MLVA is not 
closely genomically related to other S. Typhimurium isolates in the sequencing library.  
The star symbols represent environmental samples and the circles represent human 
isolates in the outbreak cluster. The yellow colour represents genomic relatedness 
between 0-5 SNPs, and the green colour represents the isolate that was not shown to 
be related (25 SNPs).  
Figure 5 Phylogenetic tree generated by Microreact (20) illustrating the genomic relationship between 
the 40 isolates submitted for whole genome sequencing of outbreak strain of Salmonella Typhimurium 
with multi-locus variable tandem repeat analysis type 5-17-9-13-490 or similar, notified in NSW between 
8 October 2018 and 30 May 2019 
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Discussion  
This was a large protracted multi-jurisdictional outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium 
with a novel MLVA of 5-17-9-13-490 (or related) linked to eggs. Although there were 235 
cases notified as part of this outbreak the actual number of people infected is likely to 
be in excess of 1900 cases, for research indicates every Salmonella infection notified 
represents seven additional infections in the community. (22) The egg trace-back 
process was complex and implicated a single farm in NSW as the source of the outbreak. 
Environmental samples from the farm matched human cases via WGS. Eleven point 
source outbreaks were identified, indicating while it is important to address 
contamination at the farm the safe handling of eggs at both retail and consumer level is 
crucial to avoid egg related illnesses.  
In Australia, MLVA is used to improve the detection, monitoring and prediction of  S. 
Typhimurium clusters, trends and patterns. (12) WGS is an emerging technology that 
can be performed on Salmonella bacteria isolated from specimens to obtain a DNA 
fingerprint, which is the most definitive and detailed typing method available for this 
organism. (19) WGS characterised the bacteria isolated from a sample of ill people with 
this MLVA outbreak over the course of the outbreak (earliest to latest) and included a 
range of neighbouring MLVA profiles to determine the scope of the outbreak. WGS 
showed that all but one‡ of these isolates were closely related genetically. This shows 
WGS is able to provide a higher power of discrimination than MLVA and that ill people 
in this outbreak were more likely to share a common source of infection.   
                                                     
 
‡ MLVA isolate sent for reanalysis 
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Improving the capacity of food regulators to better manage food supply chain 
While the MLVA type was novel, outbreaks of this nature in NSW are not. Outbreaks 
such as these highlight the difficulties in trace-back when eggs from different farms are 
graded at one facility and/or rebranded under another company name. This was 
demonstrated in an Australian study published by Ford et al in 2018, who described 
seven outbreaks of S. Typhimurium across the country. (13) Five of the outbreaks were 
linked to a single egg grading facility. Similar to this outbreak, the outbreaks studied 
were across three states, and the grading facility was compliant with food safety 
requirements. The eggs stamped at the facility could not be traced as they were from a 
number of farms, and no egg packaging with the farm establishment number was 
identified during the investigation (13).  
While outside of the scope of this outbreak, this raises the question about whether the 
practice of sending surplus eggs to other farms to rebrand as their own is misleading the 
consumer. A consumer may have specific reasons for their purchasing choices of eggs. 
They may wish to buy locally, or from the region they believe the eggs are from, or by 
the number of chickens per hectare. On the other hand, selling surplus eggs to other 
companies may have economic and environmental benefits including minimising food 
waste, saving resources and ensuring supply meets demand for larger companies 
without placing additional burden on their farms. However, with the absence of stronger 
trace-back methods, this is not an ideal practice in an outbreak setting.  
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Supply chain – retail industry level  
The outbreak showed that it is possible for a carton of eggs from one company to include 
one or more eggs sourced from other companies. At the retail level, if an egg farm was 
subject to a recall, that recall would not extend to the farm that they distributed surplus 
eggs to, unless this was detected by the DPI-BFS. If there was only one egg in a carton 
from the implicated egg farm, and a person became unwell, we would not be able to 
determine where the egg came from. The eggshell and its identifying stamp would be 
long disposed of before the case was identified and interviewed. Given the complexities 
of the egg supply chain, had the point source clusters not occurred in this protracted 
outbreak, it is unlikely that a link would have been found between MLVA 5-17-9-13-490 
and Egg Farm A. This raises the need for improved trace-back methods, particularly for 
eggs that are sold and rebranded to other companies.  
This idea is not impossible and could potentially be factored into the Australian Eggs 
food safety portfolio. Australian Eggs is a voluntary governing body of the Australian egg 
industry that has made food safety and biosecurity a key portfolio priority. (23) In the 
July 2017 to June 2018 fiscal year, Australian Eggs reported that 515.7 million dozen eggs 
were produced in Australia. Around 32% of Australia’s poultry flock was located in NSW 
and the ACT. It was estimated that 245 eggs were consumed per capita, and both the 
sale and consumption of eggs overall is on an increasing trend. (23) Salmonella in 
Australia has a heavy impact on this industry. Multiagency and multidisciplinary 
consultations with the Australian egg industry and regulatory bodies acknowledged that 
the safety of eggs is a key priority for commercial egg farms. (24) During the consultation 
a survey found that many believed the spread of the pathogen is less likely to occur in 
an egg grading facility or during egg and poultry transport, and more likely to occur with 
the use of dirty or cracked eggs in food service outlets. There was a level of uncertainty 
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regarding the strength of the industry to successfully control Salmonella at the farm and 
industry level. (24) Egg related outbreaks and subsequent recalls contribute to 
decreased consumer trust which can negatively impact the entire industry long after the 
risk has been mitigated. The 2017/2018 Australian Eggs Annual Report detailed 
allocated funding toward measures that improve systems that build trust, safety and 
strengthen the entire industry. (23) This has been demonstrated through consultations 
between regulators and the Australian egg industry, who support MLVA and WGS as 
effective measures to detect and trace-back Salmonella clusters in the community. (24)  
During this outbreak, the DPI-BFS found that the farm had a good compliance history 
and a willingness to improve processes on site to reduce the occurrence of MLVA 5-17-
9-13-490. The farm complied with all directions from DPI-BFS, but cases continued to be 
linked to the farm. Despite their compliance efforts it is unlikely that the farm will ever 
be free of Salmonella. Salmonella enterica serovars will almost always be present in egg 
farms due to the high likelihood of intestinal colonization of serovars in chickens via their 
feed, environment or other animals. (25) Although the mechanism of infection is not 
fully understood, chickens have the ability to persistently shed these serovars without 
any indication that they are infected, leading to carcass and egg contamination which 
subsequently enters the food supply chain. (25). Being a novel MLVA, there is potential 
that more people could have been immunologically naïve to this strain. (12) There is 
however a knowledge gap in what constitutes the minimum acceptable level of S. 
Typhimurium and other S. enterica serovars at the primary production level.  
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Post supply – consumer awareness 
Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) is an independent statutory agency 
established by the Food Standards Australia New Zealand Act 1991 (FSANZ Act) which 
develops food standards for both countries. (26) FSANZ acknowledge that the majority 
of egg related illnesses are due to undercooked or raw contaminated egg products (at 
the retail level and in the home). If handled and prepared correctly, the chance of 
contracting a Salmonella infection is quite low. (15) Over half of those interviewed 
reported eating eggs at home. Of these, over a third of people reported eating eggs at 
home only. Regulatory authorities provide egg safety information on their websites for 
those who seek it, however this type of messaging is not readily available at the point of 
purchase. Since 2000, it has been a requirement of the United States Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to ensure that warning labels are provided on cartons of eggs that 
have not gone through processing steps to destroy Salmonella. (27) The statement on 
the egg carton must be written as follows and displayed on the main display panel to 
ensure it is noticed by the consumer. (27)  
 
In Australia, eggs must be listed as an ingredient on food labels due to its role as an 
allergen, and any product containing unpasteurised eggs must state this on the 
packaging. This is the only warning requirement relating to egg labelling in the Australia 
New Zealand Food Standards Code. (28) The reason there is no requirement for safe 
handling instructions on eggs in Australia is likely due to the absence of Salmonella 
species in egg laying flocks that can contaminate the inside of the egg, such as 
Salmonella Enteritidis, which is generally overseas acquired. (28)  
SAFE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS: 
To prevent illness from bacteria: keep eggs 
refrigerated, cook eggs until yolks are firm, and 
cook foods containing eggs thoroughly. 
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The primary barrier in this investigation was through the trace-back of eggs. The Food 
Standards Code requires businesses to have traceability of their eggs, however, a gap 
exists for an acceptable trace-back method for eggs purchased by the consumer. During 
the outbreak, interviewed cases had difficulty recalling the brands of eggs they used. 
Many respondents thought they had purchased a particular brand, but when they 
checked their fridge or grocery purchase history a different brand would be listed 
altogether.  
Consumers have the right to purchase safe food, but also have responsibility to safely 
handle and prepare potentially hazardous food to minimise food safety risks. Increasing 
public awareness about food safety is a final protective step to minimise the impact of 
foodborne illness. Although information is readily available by regulatory and health 
authorities on egg safety and high risk foods, the consumer has to a) demonstrate health 
seeking behaviour; b) be aware that egg and food safety information exists and c) know 
where and how to access this information. To give the public more control over their 
decisions when selecting and preparing risk foods, particularly eggs, the introduction of 
a warning label similar to that issued by the FDA, or at very least a link to egg safety 
information may increase food safety awareness and fill the gap left by inadequate 
trace-back measures at the consumer level. 
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Limitations  
Recall bias and interviewer bias was a risk in interviewing cases. However, jurisdictions 
were trained to use the OzFoodNet Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire 
which guided the respondent to describe their food history in several ways. Another 
limitation was that we did not run every case through WGS however, there is no 
standard requirement to do this, and the human isolates that were run represented 
each MLVA type identified and point source cluster during the outbreak period. (13)  
Recommendations 
It is recommended that trace-back methods for eggs that are passed through a number 
of distribution channels or rebranded are improved. Both the egg industry and 
regulators have a high investment and commitment to strengthening the biosecurity 
and food safety of eggs in Australia. (23, 24) It is recognised that to achieve this requires 
ongoing communication, collaboration and education of all involved in the egg supply 
chain. This also extends to the consumer who can greatly minimise the risk of foodborne 
illness through awareness about safe preparation of high-risk food in retail settings and 
in the home.  NSW Health will continue to improve surveillance and methods to control 
foodborne disease outbreaks, and it is recommended that more resources are invested 
to collaborate with the DPI-BFS in increasing awareness for businesses and the public. 
Recommendations specific to the MAE program 
Based on the experiences of my role as lead investigator, I would recommend the 
development of a model that designates any MAE on an outbreak as (1) lead, (2) co-lead 
or (3) team member. The designation should be based on who is accountable in an 
outbreak investigation and responsible for decisions made, as well as outline the level 
of participation and responsibility of the MAE in high level conversations, public health 
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decision making and the aspects of the outbreak they are required to monitor or 
manage. When I started on this outbreak, I learned much from a public health trainee 
who was already involved with another outbreak. Many lessons about how to do things 
were passed from trainee to trainee. The development of a consolidated model 
describing delegations including templates or procedures would improve the overall 
management and timeliness of outbreak response for the MAE.  
Conclusion  
Epidemiological, laboratory and environmental evidence suggest that a single egg farm 
was the source of an outbreak of S. Typhimurium with a novel MLVA 5-17-9-13-490. The 
identification of clusters through MLVA and WGS was essential in identifying the source 
of the protracted outbreak. Enhanced controls throughout the food chain are required, 
particularly for consumers at the point of sale as eggs will never be completely free of S. 
enterica serovars. The minimum acceptable level of contamination at the primary 
production level needs to be explored.   
 187 
References 
1. OzFoodNet. Salmonella Hypothesis Generating Questionnaire: OzFoodNet; 2016 [cited 
2019 29 Jun]. Available from: https://www.health.nsw.gov.au/Infectious/Forms/salmonellosis-
questionnaire.pdf. 
2. Microsoft. Microsoft Excel for Office 365 MSO (14.0) 32-bit. Microsoft; 2010. 
3. Majowicz SE, Musto J, Scallan E, Angulo FJ, Kirk M, O'Brien SJ, et al. The Global Burden 
of Nontyphoidal Salmonella Gastroenteritis. Clinical Infectious Diseases. 2010;50(6):882-9. 
4. Lamas A, Miranda JM, Regal P, Vazquez B, Franco CM, Cepeda A. A comprehensive 
review of non-enterica subspecies of Salmonella enterica. Microbiological research. 
2018;206:60-73. 
5. Grimont PA, Weill F-X. Antigenic formulae of the Salmonella serovars. WHO 
collaborating centre for reference and research on Salmonella. 2007;9:1-166. 
6. Parry CM, Thomas S, Aspinall EJ, Cooke RPD, Rogerson SJ, Harries AD, et al. A 
retrospective study of secondary bacteraemia in hospitalised adults with community acquired 
non-typhoidal Salmonella gastroenteritis. BMC Infectious Diseases. 2013;13(1):107. 
7. Antunes P, Mourão J, Campos J, Peixe L. Salmonellosis: the role of poultry meat. Clinical 
Microbiology and Infection. 2016;22(2):110-21. 
8. Crump JA, Sjölund-Karlsson M, Gordon MA, Parry CM. Epidemiology, Clinical 
Presentation, Laboratory Diagnosis, Antimicrobial Resistance, and Antimicrobial Management 
of Invasive Salmonella Infections. Clinical microbiology reviews. 2015;28(4):901-37. 
9. Ford L, Moffatt C, Fearnley E, Miller M, Gregory J, Sloan-Gardner T, et al. The 
Epidemiology of Salmonella enterica Outbreaks in Australia, 2001-2016. Frontiers in Sustainable 
Food Systems. 2018;2:86. 
10. Hall G, Yohannes K, Raupach J, Becker N, Kirk M. Estimating community incidence of 
Salmonella, Campylobacter, and Shiga toxin–producing Escherichia coli infections, Australia. 
Emerging infectious diseases. 2008;14(10):1601. 
11. Amavisit P, Boonyawiwat W, Bangtrakulnont A. Characterization of Salmonella enterica 
Serovar Typhimurium and Monophasic Salmonella Serovar 1,4,[5],12:i:- Isolates in Thailand. 
Journal of Clinical Microbiology. 2005;43(6):2736-40. 
12. Sotomayor C, Wang Q, Arnott A, Howard P, Hope K, Lan R, et al. Novel Salmonella 
enterica serovar Typhimurium genotype levels as herald of seasonal salmonellosis epidemics. 
Emerging infectious diseases. 2018;24(6):1079. 
13. Ford L, Wang Q, Stafford R, Ressler K-A, Norton S, Shadbolt C, et al. Seven Salmonella 
Typhimurium Outbreaks in Australia Linked by Trace-Back and Whole Genome Sequencing. 
Foodborne Pathogens and Disease. 2018;15(5):285-92. 
14. Moffatt CRM, Musto J, Pingault N, Miller M, Stafford R, Gregory J, et al. Salmonella 
Typhimurium and Outbreaks of Egg-Associated Disease in Australia, 2001 to 2011. Foodborne 
Pathogens and Disease. 2016;13(7):379-85. 
15. Zealand FSAN. Statement of egg food safety Online: FSANZ; 2016 [cited 2019 14 Jun]. 
Available from: http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/media/Pages/Statement-on-egg-food-
safety-.aspx. 
16. Okuno K, Xu J, Isogai E, Nakamura S. Salmonella Typhimurium is Attracted to Egg Yolk 
and Repelled by Albumen. Current microbiology. 2019;76(4):393-7. 
17. Heilbronn C, Munnoch S, Butler MT, Merritt TD, Durrheim DN. Timeliness of Salmonella 
Typhimurium notifications after the introduction of routine MLVA typing in NSW. New South 
Wales public health bulletin. 2014;24(4):159-63. 
18. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. PulseNet Methods & Protocols. Multiple 
Locus Variable-number Tandem Repeat Analysis (MLVA). Online: National Center for Emerging 
and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases (NCEZID), Division of Foodborne, Waterborne, and 
Environmental Diseases (DFWED); 2016 [cited 2019 13 Jun]. Available from: 
https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/pdf/Genome-Sequencing-508c.pdf. 
19. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. PulseNet Methods & Protocols. Whole 
 188 
genome sequencing (WGS). Online: National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious 
Diseases (NCEZID), Division of Foodborne, Waterborne, and Environmental Diseases (DFWED); 
2016 [cited 2019 13 Jun]. Available from: https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/pdf/Genome-
Sequencing-508c.pdf. 
20. Argimón S, Abudahab K, Goater RJE, Fedosejev A, Bhai J, Glasner C, et al. Microreact: 
visualizing and sharing data for genomic epidemiology and phylogeography. Microbial 
Genomics. 2016;2(11). 
21. Communicable Diseases Branch. Salmonellosis (excluding S. Typhi and Paratyphi 
Infection) Control Guideline for Public Health Units: NSW Health; 2017 [Available from: 
https://www.health.nsw.gov.au/Infectious/controlguideline/Pages/salmonellosis.aspx. 
22. OzFoodNet Working Group. Monitoring the incidence and causes of diseases potentially 
transmitted by food in Australia: Annual report of the OzFoodNet network, 2011. Communicable 
diseases intelligence quarterly report. 2015;39(2):E236. 
23. Australian Eggs Limited. Australian Eggs Limited Annual Report 2017/2018. North 
Sydney, NSW; 2018. 
24. Chousalkar KK, Sexton M, McWhorter A, Hewson K, Martin G, Shadbolt C, et al. 
Salmonella Typhimurium in the Australian egg industry: multidisciplinary approach to 
addressing the public health challenge and future directions. Critical reviews in food science and 
nutrition. 2017;57(12):2706-11. 
25. Harvey PC, Watson M, Hulme S, Jones MA, Lovell M, Jr AB, et al. Salmonella enterica 
Serovar Typhimurium Colonizing the Lumen of the Chicken Intestine Grows Slowly and 
Upregulates a Unique Set of Virulence and Metabolism Genes. Infection and Immunity. 
2011;79(10):4105-21. 
26. Zealand FSAN. Egg Standard Online: FSANZ; 2011 [cited 2019 14 Jun]. Available from: 
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/code/primaryproduction/egg/Pages/default.aspx. 
27. Food Labeling, Safe Handling Statements, Labeling of Shell Eggs; Refrigeration of Shell 
Eggs Held for Retail Distribution, 65 FR 76091 (2000). 
28. Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code – Standard 1.2.3 – Information 
requirements – warning statements, advisory statements and declarations [statute on the 
Internet]. (2017). 
 
 
 
 
  
 189 
Appendices 
Appendix C. OzFoodNet Salmonella hypothesis generating questionnaire  
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Chapter 5 
Evaluation of a public health surveillance 
system 
Evaluation of the acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease surveillance system, 
including the rheumatic heart disease register 
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 “It’s terrible, you know. 
These are young people, that won’t make old bones” 
- In conversation with Priscilla Stanley, Western and Far Western NSW local health district 
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Prologue 
On 10 November 2018, I was engaged by NSW Health to evaluate the acute rheumatic 
fever (ARF) and rheumatic heart disease (RHD) surveillance system, including the RHD 
Register. ARF/RHD carry serious health implications throughout the life course, and I 
was very appreciative of being the first person to undertake this task for NSW. This 
chapter presents the background, methodology, evaluation and recommendations 
relating to surveillance activities in the NSW ARF/RHD Programme.  
Public health impact  
ARF and RHD became notifiable in NSW on 2 October 2015 and was added as an 
amendment to the list of notifiable diseases in Schedule 2 of the NSW Public Health Act 
2010. (1) A surveillance system was launched in 2015, followed by a RHD Register in 
2016, (1, 2) structured by former MAE, Dr Chaturangi Yapa. (3) An evaluation of the 
surveillance system and register was necessary to determine whether the system was 
useful and had met its objectives for surveillance. The evaluation found that the 
surveillance system had improved epidemiological knowledge of ARF/RHD in the 
context of NSW. It is likely that recurrences of ARF was prevented and the severity of 
RHD minimised for some individuals through enrolment onto the RHD Register. Service 
provision and delivery was improved by the evaluation through the feedback provided 
by stakeholders of the system, particularly in the way information is presented and 
reported. The outcomes of the evaluation encourage focus toward building 
relationships between primary and secondary health care services and to find new 
strategies to build clinician awareness about ARF/RHD as a notifiable disease.  
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MAE role  
I coordinated the project proposal, questionnaire design, stakeholder consultation, 
qualitative and quantitative interviews, data collection and analysis. Working alongside 
the NSW RHD Network and the RHD Coordinator and Manager at Health Protection NSW 
I prepared recommendations based on these findings against attributes detailed in the 
Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems by the United 
States (US) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (1) I conducted a 
stakeholder session at a NSW RHD Network workshop on 4 April 2019, undertook 
qualitative semi-structured interviews and sent an electronic survey around the 
network. I provided a report to outline the evaluation findings and recommendations. 
Lessons learnt  
Community-based approaches  
Through semi-structured interviews I learnt about the initiative of one local health 
district, who held Town Hall meetings in communities with cases. Community members, 
General Practitioners (GPs) and Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Services 
(ACCHS) attended and were provided with information, education and opportunity for 
discourse. After these events, more cases were identified by clinicians and community 
members, demonstrating the benefit of meaningful community partnerships and 
prioritising resources toward building these relationships.  
Technical knowledge  
I learnt how to utilise appropriate guidelines such as the US CDC Updated Guidelines to 
Evaluate Surveillance Systems to evaluate the surveillance system by measuring 
attributes including simplicity, stability, flexibility, acceptability, data quality, sensitivity, 
predictive value positive (PVP), representativeness and timeliness. (4)  
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Abstract 
Background 
Acute rheumatic fever (ARF) and rheumatic heart disease (RHD) became notifiable in 
NSW on 2 October 2015. At this time the ARF/RHD surveillance system was launched, 
followed by a voluntary consent-based RHD Register in 2016 to help patients follow their 
long-term health plan, including secondary prophylaxis and clinical reviews. An 
evaluation was conducted to determine whether the system had met their objectives to 
monitor the epidemiology of ARF/RHD in NSW and enrol cases onto the RHD Register. 
Methods 
Microsoft Excel and STATA 15 (5) was used to calculate indirect age standardised rates 
and conduct a descriptive analysis of ARF/RHD notification data in NSW. Face to face 
network consultation, online open and closed questions survey and semi-structured 
interviews were undertaken to assess attributes of the surveillance system and register 
against an evaluation framework by the United States Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems. 
Attributes were evaluated for flexibility, simplicity, data quality, sensitivity, predictive 
value positive, acceptability, representativeness, timeliness and stability.  
Results  
The surveillance system has been useful in monitoring the epidemiology of ARF/RHD in 
NSW. Eighty-three cases of ARF and 81 cases of RHD met the case definition on the 
surveillance system, of which 36% consented to the RHD Register. The surveillance 
system is simple, flexible and stable from a systems perspective. Small improvements 
are required to enhance data quality and ensure sustainability of the program at the 
central level. Active surveillance is highly sensitive which results in many non-cases 
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although without a baseline it is unknown whether it has been effective in capturing all 
cases. Low clinician awareness affects the acceptability, sensitivity and timeliness of the 
system. The system is not likely to be representative of the true burden of disease due 
to unknown prevalence and people over 35 years of age excluded from the register.  
Conclusion 
The surveillance system is useful and should continue to monitor the epidemiology of 
the disease in NSW, and work toward understanding the prevalence of ARF/RHD to 
measure the true burden of disease. While the secondary objective to enrol cases onto 
the RHD Register have partially been met, eligible cases remain off the register.  
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Introduction  
Over a third of all throat infections are thought to be associated with Group A 
Streptococcus (GAS) which can cause an autoimmune response of the heart, brain, joints 
or skin. This response is described as acute rheumatic fever (ARF), which can reoccur in 
‘episodes’ which can cause severe and permanent damage of the heart valves. This is 
known as rheumatic heart disease (RHD), the leading cause of cardiovascular deaths in 
people under 40 years of age. (6) For the individual, this means long term heart problems 
including scarring and hardening of the valves, obstruction (stenosis), or reverse flow of 
blood into the heart (mitral regurgitation). It also means a higher chance of further 
illness and premature death, particularly for young children. (7) 
In 2005 there were an estimated 15.6-19.6 million cases of ARF worldwide. There are an 
estimated 471,000 ARF annually of which 336,000 were in children 5-14 years of age. 
Sixty per cent of all ARF cases are thought to develop into RHD. (8) At least 2.4 million 
cases of RHD are in children aged 5-14 years worldwide, illustrated by a prevalence map 
in Figure 1. (8) The global prevalence of RHD is estimated at 33 million, which contributes 
to 275,000 deaths annually. (9, 10) The number of reported cases of RHD in 2013 by 
country, and the change in age-standardized RHD prevalence from 1990 to 2013 is 
described in Figure 2. (10) It should be noted that global prevalence data is primarily 
calculated from schools, and as such, the burden is thought to be substantially 
underestimated for children as they may not have access to education. (8)   
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Figure 1 Global prevalence of rheumatic heart disease in children aged 5–14 years. (8) 
 
Figure 2 The global burden of rheumatic heart disease (RHD): Number of prevalent cases of RHD in 2013 
by country, as well as the change in age-standardized RHD prevalence from 1990 to 2013. Image courtesy 
of R. Seth, Telethon Kids Institute, Perth, Australia. (10) 
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Acute rheumatic fever in Australia 
Indigenous Australians have some of the highest rates of ARF in the world (85 per 
100,000), more than 250 times the rate than non-Indigenous Australians (4 per 
100,000). (7) The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare reported that from 2013 to 
2017 there were 1,897 people diagnosed with ARF in Australia, of which 94% (n=1,776, 
85 per 100,000) were Indigenous Australians. Of these, females were most affected with 
1006 cases (96 per 100,000). (7) Consistent with global research, children aged 5-14 
years were most affected with a rate of 195 per 100,000 (n=602) (Figure 3). (7)  
Figure 3 Rate of acute rheumatic fever diagnoses per 100,000 among Indigenous Australians by region of 
management, 2013–2017. Source: AIHW analysis of National Rheumatic Heart Disease data collection (7) 
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Rheumatic heart disease in Australia 
Between 2013 and 2017 there were 4259 people alive in Australia with RHD recorded 
on a jurisdictional register. Eighty-seven per cent (n=3690) were Indigenous Australians, 
and of these, 65% were female (n=2787). Approximately 60% of all individuals diagnosed 
with RHD were under the age of 25. The national crude rate for RHD is around 0.4 per 
100,000 compared to 48 per 100,000 for Indigenous Australians (Figure 4). (7) 
Figure 4 Rate of rheumatic heart disease (RHD) cases among Indigenous Australians per 100,000 by region 
of management, as at 31 Dec 2017. Source: AIHW analysis of National RHD data collection (7) 
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Acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease in NSW 
Although the burden of ARF/RHD is unknown in NSW, internal surveillance reports have 
found the majority of cases are Aboriginal, Maori and Pacific Islander children. (11) The 
over-representation of Aboriginal people with ARF/RHD is consistent with other states 
and territories in Australia, as is the overrepresentation in Maori and Pacific islander 
children in New Zealand, where the incidence of ARF/RHD is believed to be 20 to 40 
times higher than non-Indigenous children. (12) 
Risk factors and inequities  
The risk factors for ARF/RHD are driven by social inequity. At greatest risk are children 
5-14 years of age and pregnant women, particularly those facing social deprivation, 
isolation from health and educational services, or who cannot access housing suitable 
for the size of their families. (7, 13, 14) Four out of five people with RHD live in countries 
with a low development index, however this is reality for many Indigenous Australians 
and Pacific Islander communities of Australia. (8, 12, 13) Given the context of Australia’s 
prosperity, universal health coverage and high development index, the existence of a 
preventable and uncommon disease such as ARF/RHD is a tremendously important 
public health and social justice issue.  (13) 
Prevention  
The gold standard testing method relies on clinical diagnosis using the modified Jones 
criteria to categorise clinical symptoms and use of echocardiography based on the 2012 
World Heart Federation evidence-based guideline. (15) When a patient commits to 
treatment, they must also make a commitment to endure physical, psychological and 
logistical burdens associated with receiving prophylaxis at the right time. Treatment for 
ARF/RHD is usually with benzathine penicillin G (BPG) by intra-muscular injection (IMI) 
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every 21 days (for high risk), to 28 days, for a minimum 10 years after the last episode 
of ARF, or until they turn 21 (whichever is longer). People with RHD may require 
secondary prophylaxis until 35–40 years of age. (16) The potential clinical course in the 
absence of an intervention and prevention strategies to counteract these include 
primordial, primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, illustrated in Table 1. Primordial 
prevention reduces the risk of ARF/RHD by addressing inequalities and social 
deprivation. (10, 13, 17) Primary prevention aims to improve clinical management of 
sore throats and skin infections to reduce the risk of ARF and its recurrence. (6, 18) 
Secondary prevention includes adherence to secondary prophylaxis through a consent-
based register.  (18) Tertiary prevention improves access to specialist services and long-
term care, including medical and dental check-ups, echocardiograms and specialist 
reviews. (6, 16)Without prevention strategies, individuals with ARF/RHD are at genuine 
risk of increased complications or premature death (Table 1). (19) 
Table 1 Potential clinical course of acute rheumatic fever (ARF) and rheumatic heart disease (RHD) in the 
absence of an intervention, and prevention strategies undertaken by New South Wales (NSW) Health at 
30 May 2019. Sourced from NSW Health RHD Program 
Casual pathway of ARF/RHD Prevention strategies 
Exposure to Group A Streptococcus (GAS) 
↓  
Bacterial GAS infection 
↓  
Primordial prevention 
Reduction in overcrowding, poverty and 
malnutrition 
Improved access to healthcare 
Acute rheumatic fever (ARF) episode 
↓  
GAS infection & recurrences of ARF 
↓  
Primary prevention 
Treating sore throats with antibiotics in high 
risk populations 
Reduction in skin infections 
Rheumatic heart disease 
↓  
Secondary prevention 
NSW RHD Register  
Regular antibiotics for people at risk of ARF 
recurrence 
Complications of RHD 
↓  
Heart failure 
Tertiary intervention 
Medical management of symptomatic RHD 
Heart surgery 
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The NSW ARF/RHD Surveillance System and RHD Register 
ARF/RHD is not notifiable across all Australian states and territories, nor is there 
requirement to have a RHD register. The variable uptake is attributed to differing 
jurisdictional needs and levels of perceived risk. In 2014 federal, state and territory 
health departments participated in the Better Cardiac Care (BCC) for Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander People Forum. Initiatives to improve cardiac outcomes for 
Indigenous Australians were endorsed to address the high associated mortality 
compared to non-Indigenous Australians (1.7 times higher).  A specific priority was to 
“Strengthen the diagnosis, notification and follow-up of RHD”. (18) This led to the NSW 
ARF/RHD control program in 2015. Table 2 outlines the national and jurisdictional 
positions on ARF/RHD and Figure 5 provides a timeline of actions since the BCC forum. 
Table 2 National and jurisdictional position on acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease as 
notifiable conditions, and details of jurisdictional rheumatic heart disease registers, at 30 May 2019. 
Jurisdiction 
Year ARF 
notifiable 
Year RHD 
notifiable 
Year RHD register was created 
Commonwealth Not nationally notifiable 
A national data collection system for 
register data is in development  
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Not notifiable Not notifiable No register 
New South Wales 2015 
2015 (<35 
years age) 
May 2016 
Northern Territory 1994 Not notifiable 
Top End (1997) and Central Australia 
(2000) merged in 2007 
Queensland 1999 Not notifiable 2009 
South Australia 2016 2016 2012. SA uses NT’s RHD Register platform 
Tasmania Not notifiable Not notifiable No register 
Victoria Not notifiable Not notifiable 
Cases are referred to specific clinics 
available to children and adults  
Western Australia 2007 2015 2010 
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Figure 5 Timeline of New South Wales Health program activities relating to acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease from 1 May 2015 and 30 June 2019 
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ARF/RHD is managed in NSW by a surveillance system based on the case definition for a 
confirmed, probable or possible case in the NSW ARF/RHD Control Guideline: (16) 
Acute rheumatic fever 
Confirmed: “Clinical definitive evidence and laboratory suggestive evidence or 
Rheumatic (Sydenham’s) Chorea (with other forms of chorea excluded).” (16) 
Probable: “Clinical definitive evidence or clinical suggestive evidence and 
laboratory suggestive evidence and where ARF is considered the most likely 
diagnosis by the treating clinician.” (16) 
Possible: “Clinical definitive evidence or clinical suggestive evidence and 
laboratory suggestive evidence and where the treating clinician has less 
confidence about ARF as the correct diagnosis, but other differential diagnoses 
have been excluded.” (16) 
Rheumatic heart disease 
Confirmed: “Clinical definitive evidence in a person less than 35 years of age. An 
echocardiogram with valve changes consistent with RHD as defined by the World 
Heart Federation criteria” (16) 
The consent-based RHD Register was launched in May 2016 for people with ARF or RHD 
(under 35 years of age). NSW Health works with local health districts to enrol cases onto 
the register to enable long term management. Individuals can go on the register if they 
are not considered notifiable in NSW, (diagnosed with RHD over the age of 35 years of 
age or who have had episodes of ARF in other jurisdictions but not in NSW) or should 
their clinician feel this is beneficial for the individual to maintain treatment. (16) 
Although the surveillance system and register in NSW have two different functions, they 
are both overlapped, housed in the NSW Notifiable Conditions Information 
Management System (NCIMS) administrative package. The type of information collected 
on the surveillance system and register is in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Information available on the New South Wales (NSW) Acute Rheumatic Fever and Rheumatic 
Heart Disease (RHD) Surveillance System and RHD Register at 30 June 2019 
Information  Details Authorisation to use information 
Demographic 
Name, date of birth and 
address 
Family or next of kin 
contact details 
• NSW Health staff with access to the NSW Notifiable 
Conditions Information Management System  
• Other groups to assist with the care of people who 
are on the register (with consent from the 
individual, including: 
• General Practitioners (GPs) and staff at the 
patient’s local clinic to remind about appointments 
• Specialists involved in the patients’ care plan.  
• NSW RHD Network  
• Identified data from the Register can be provided to 
Medicare to look for patients lost to follow-up 
• De-identified data to the National data collection. 
Dates, 
treatment and 
appointments  
Dates of illness, death, 
treatment or related 
appointments 
Health 
practitioner 
and specialist 
information 
GP and/or local health 
clinic details  
Heart tests or operations 
(past and future) 
 
Flow of information  
For diagnoses made at primary or secondary health services (ACCHS, GP or hospital), the 
clinician notifies the jurisdictional PHU, where staff or the LHD Coordinator will follow 
up the case. Each LHD was required to nominate a coordinator (not appointed by PHU). 
The LHD Coordinator may have a clinical or a public health role and may be located 
elsewhere (e.g. Cardiac Clinic). Ideally, patient consent and enrolment onto the Register 
is requested by the clinician at the point of notification (Figure 6) however many 
jurisdictions do this later in the process. The PHU enters the notification onto NCIMS. All 
individuals on NCIMS have a numerical identifier and any notifiable disease they may 
have will be reported under this identifier. The LHD Coordinator is engaged (if not 
already) and obtains consent to the RHD Register (if not already consented). The LHD 
Coordinator liaises with the patient, family and the treating clinician to ensure the 
patient is engaged with primary care services, has a case manager and is consented to 
the register where appropriate. The RHD Coordinator is based centrally and liaises with 
care providers to ensure treatment, referrals and appointments occur. They are also 
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responsible for overseeing the RHD Register, preparing audits and reporting to 
stakeholders, the NSW RHD Network.  
Active surveillance is an essential component for case finding due to the complex 
diagnostic pathway and chance that ARF/RHD will not be investigated when an 
individual presents to a health service. (6) Active surveillance uses 10th revision of the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD) 
codes I 00-002 relating to ARF and ICD codes I 05-09 relating to RHD (for individuals 
under the age of 35) and includes those who have died in hospital. A list of these codes 
is routinely obtained from the Combined Admitted Patient Epidemiology Data (CAPED) 
by the RHD Coordinator, who provides these possible cases to the PHU or LHD 
Coordinator to review and follow up.  
Governance  
The NSW RHD network comprises public health staff and clinicians involved in ARF/RHD 
management at all levels. Governance of the system was centralised in the 
Communicable Diseases Branch (CDB).  
Legislation  
Decisions and responsibilities of the program are under Schedule 1 of the NSW Public 
Health Act 2010. People interacting with the surveillance system and register comply 
with notifiable disease legislation by following the NSW ARF/RHD control guideline. (16) 
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Figure 6 Flow of data for the NSW acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease surveillance system 
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Cost 
Since January 2015, an estimated $583,750 has been invested into the overall RHD 
program. Costs were allocated toward the appointment of a centralised RHD 
Coordinator, education and awareness materials, and face to face meetings (Table 4). 
Table 4 Funding to the acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease surveillance system by financial 
year 2014-2019 
 
Evaluation objectives 
The objectives of the evaluation were to:  
1. Determine whether the surveillance system had met the objective to monitor 
the epidemiology of ARF/RHD, and gain participation onto the RHD Register. (16) 
2. Assess the usefulness of the surveillance system and register by measuring 
attributes based on the CDC guidelines. (4) 
3. Present findings and recommendations to the NSW RHD Coordinator in the form 
of a final report which can be used to inform stakeholders. 
Ethics 
The evaluation was undertaken under the ANU HREC approval 2017_909.  
  
Financial year Funding Inclusions 
2014-2015 
$27,500+ 
$7,500 
MAE scholar (25%) 
1-day workshop May 2015 
2015-2016 
$12000+ 
$7,500 
1 FTE RHD coordinator + Resources 
1-day communicable disease workshop 
2016-2017 
$150,000+ 
$13,500 
1 FTE RHD coordinator + Resources 
0.1 FTE Program Manager 
2017-2018 
$153,750+ 
$13,500 
1 FTE RHD coordinator + Resources 
0.1 FTE Program Manager 
2018-2019 
$157,500+ 
$13,500 
$27,500 
1 FTE RHD coordinator + RHD network F2F Workshop + Resources 
FTE Program Manager 
MAE scholar (25%) 
Total $583,750   
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Methods 
The evaluation of the NSW ARF/RHD Surveillance System including the RHD Register was 
undertaken in five stages. 
i. Project planning and development 
A project proposal was developed with the NSW RHD Coordinator and Program 
Manager in November 2018 to confirm evaluation objectives and other project 
parameters including stakeholder consultation and interviews, attribute assessment 
and the type of data required to complete the evaluation. 
ii. Stakeholder engagement 
Ministry of Health, public health unit staff and LHD Coordinators involved in notification, 
data entry, follow-up, clinical care and secondary prophylaxis of ARF/RHD were engaged 
as stakeholders. The RHD Program Manager informed the RHD network about the 
evaluation during routine teleconferences and also communicated that a network 
discussion would occur at the NSW RHD Network face to face meeting in April 2019.  
iii. Stakeholder interviews 
The US CDC Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance Systems was 
used to evaluate the surveillance system and register. (4) ARF and RHD were evaluated 
separately as directed, in line with ARF/RHD reporting at the CDB. Three surveys were 
conducted using research methods in healthcare epidemiology by Safdar et al. (20) 
including a face-to-face consultation with the NSW RHD Network, an online mixed-
methods survey and semi-structured interviews with select local heath districts:  
Face-to-face consultation with NSW RHD Network 
Public health unit staff, LHD coordinators, RHD Coordinator and the RHD Program 
Manager discussed key barriers, strengths and improvements needed in the surveillance 
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system and register at the NSW RHD Network Forum in April 2019. At the meeting, 
stakeholders were informed that an online survey would be sent out to them, and that 
some would be approached to participate in a more in-depth semi-structured interview.  
Online survey  
A link to an online survey created with Google Forms was sent by email to 78 people in 
the NSW RHD Network, using open ended and closed questions to measure the 
performance of the surveillance systems attributes, including simplicity, data quality, 
acceptability, sensitivity, timeliness, representativeness, stability. Appendix A details the 
survey questions asked to specific stakeholders to evaluate these attributes.  A process 
flow chart was created that described the surveillance system in partnership with the 
stakeholders, and review of existing documents. The accuracy of the flow chart was 
evaluated in the online survey. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews about system strengths and weaknesses were held with at 
least one local health district with the following characteristics: 
• high case load/metro 
• high caseload/regional 
• median caseload/metro  
• median caseload/regional areas  
• low caseload/metro 
• low caseload/regional 
Ad hoc discussions were held with a senior analyst who had responsibilities around 
building and maintaining the system.  
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iv. Evaluation and desktop data analysis 
Information from the stakeholder interviews were collated and analysed using Microsoft 
Excel. A Microsoft Excel (21) .csv dataset of all ARF/RHD cases from 1 October 2015 to 
30 June 2019 was extracted from NCIMS and analysed with Microsoft Excel (21) and 
STATA 15 (5) to calculate indirect age-standardised rates and conduct a descriptive 
analysis of ARF/RHD notification data in NSW.  Confirmed and probable cases of 
ARF/RHD were defined as per NSW Health’s ARF/RHD control guidelines (16) by 
notification date (not date of onset of symptoms). Using descriptive epidemiology, these 
cases were described person, place and time; clinical and laboratory features; Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander status, and Maori and Pacific Islander status. Possible and 
excluded cases were included in the analysis of active surveillance and the RHD Register. 
This was relevant to describe the overall system and assess the sensitivity of active 
surveillance. Additionally, some individuals who consented to the RHD Register 
ultimately did not meet the case definition for a confirmed or probable case. Appendix 
A outlines the desktop data analysis undertaken for each attribute. 
v. Production of a final report 
A bound volume chapter was produced which outlined evaluation findings, conclusions, 
recommendations and lessons learnt.  
Pilot 
The online survey and semi-structured interview were piloted at a local health district 
to ensure the research methods used to make the survey resulted in an understandable, 
focused tool with minimal burden on resources required from the participant. (20)  
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Evaluation of attributes  
Usefulness  
“A public health surveillance system is useful if it contributes to the prevention and 
control of adverse health-related events, including an improved understanding of the 
public health implications of such events.” (4) 
The evaluation framework provided by the CDC Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public 
Health Surveillance Systems was used to assess the usefulness of the surveillance system 
and register by measuring key attributes listed in the framework including flexibility, 
simplicity, data quality, sensitivity (of active surveillance), predictive value positive (of 
the RHD Register), acceptability, representativeness, timeliness and stability. (4) 
Simplicity 
 “The simplicity of a public health surveillance system refers to both its structure and 
ease of operation”. (4)  
A flowchart was created describing the overall surveillance system (Figure 6) and shown 
to online survey participants who were asked: 
a)  Is the flowchart accurate? If no, please describe alternative processes used. 
b) How simple is the process of notifying a case to the PHU? (Very simple, Simple, 
Neutral/unsure, Difficult, Very difficult) 
c) How simple are methods used to collect and manage the data on the surveillance 
system (NCIMs)? (Very simple, Simple, Neutral/unsure, Difficult, Very difficult) 
d) Do you feel you have received adequate training and supervision to record and 
enter data? (Yes, Unsure, No) 
e) Do you think that the system design allows for easy follow-up of cases? (Yes, 
Unsure, No) 
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f) How easy is it to ascertain a confirmed case using the diagnostic criteria?  (Very 
easy, Easy, Neutral/unsure, Difficult, Very difficult) 
Flexibility 
 “A flexible public health surveillance system can adapt to changing information needs 
or operating conditions with little additional time, personnel, or allocated funds.” (4) 
A discussion was held with a senior analyst to clarify the process of making changes onto 
the surveillance system and register. As NSW Health centrally coordinates and facilitates 
operating system changes, the RHD Coordinator and RHD Program Manager were asked: 
a) Have any of the following items changed since the creation of the system? If yes, 
has the system successfully adapted to these changes? 
i. Case definition 
ii. Funding 
iii. NCIMs functionality 
iv. Medication changes 
v. Additional data sources 
Data quality  
“Data quality reflects the completeness and validity of the data recorded in the public 
health surveillance system.” (4) 
Data quality was assessed by measuring the proportion of complete and incomplete 
data for confirmed and probable cases of ARF/RHD. Data completeness was then 
assessed for the following information types:  
a) Identifying/ contact information 
b) Demographic 
c) Important dates 
d) Medical information 
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e) Symptoms 
In the online survey, participants were asked to rank: 
a) The usual speed to upload and download data (Very unsatisfactory, 
Unsatisfactory, Neutral/unsure, Satisfactory, Very good, Excellent)  
b) The relevance of the data on the surveillance system (Very unsatisfactory, 
Unsatisfactory, Neutral/unsure, Satisfactory, Very good, Excellent) 
Stability 
 “Stability refers to the reliability and availability of the public health surveillance 
system”. (4) 
A discussion was held with a senior analyst to further understand the stability of the 
surveillance system. To assess whether users of the surveillance system can rely on 
NCIMS to collect, manage and provide data without failure, online survey participants 
were asked to: 
a) Rate the stability of the surveillance system when inputting or exporting data 
(Very unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Neutral/unsure, Satisfactory, Very good, 
Excellent) 
Sensitivity 
 “Sensitivity relates to “the proportion of cases of a disease detected by the 
surveillance system” and may “refer to the ability to detect outbreaks, including the 
ability to monitor changes in the number of cases over time.” (4) 
There were complexities in measuring the sensitivity and PVP in this surveillance system, 
given the absence of a baseline prevalence of ARF/RHD. In the CDC guidelines, sensitivity 
relates the proportion of true cases on the system, whilst the PVP relates to how many 
people without the disease are erroneously included as cases in the surveillance system. 
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For the purposes of this evaluation there was greater value in assessing specific aspects 
of the surveillance system for sensitivity and PVP. Active surveillance has been an 
integral tool in ARF/RHD surveillance, and it was important to analyse how many true 
cases were detected (sensitivity) because the system must be able to cast a wide net to 
ensure that these are detected. Sensitivity was calculated using the following formula: 
Sensitivity = True Positive (a) 
True Positive (a) + False Negative (b) 
Where true cases detected through active surveillance were divided by the sum of true 
cases detected through active surveillance and cases detected through other 
surveillance (e.g. indicator based). However, this calculation must be interpreted with 
caution as there is no baseline prevalence available for ARF/RHD in NSW. Desktop data 
analysis identified the proportion of cases found through clinical notification or active 
surveillance:   
Detected by active 
surveillance 
ARF OR RHD present 
Total Disease 
present (n) 
Disease 
Absent (n) 
Yes  True positive a= False positive c= a+c 
No False negative b= True negative d= b+d 
Total  a+b  c+d  
Confidence intervals for sensitivity were automatically calculated using the Microsoft 
Excel Analytical Tools for Public Health by Public Health England. (22) The tool provides 
the following explanations as to how the confidence intervals are calculated: 
The proportion is given by: 
    
where:   
O is the numerator observed number of individuals in the sample/population having the specified characteristics; 
n is the denominator total number of individuals in the sample/population. 
Using the Wilson Score method, the 100(1–a)% confidence limits for the proportion p are given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where: q is 1–p; z is the 100(1–a/2)th percentile value from the Standard Normal distribution. For example, for a 95% 
confidence interval, a = 0.05 and z = 1.96 (i.e. the 97.5th percentile value from the Standard Normal distribution). 
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We were unable to calculate specificity of the system as the proportion of true negatives 
are unknown. Online survey participants were asked: 
a) How effective is active surveillance in finding cases? (Very effective, Effective, 
Neutral/Unsure, Ineffective, Not effective) 
Predictive value positive 
“Predictive value positive (PVP) is defined as is the proportion of reported cases that 
actually have the health-related event under surveillance” (4) 
The predictive value positive was calculated as follows to find how many notifications 
(probable and confirmed) did not meet the case definition (PVP). 
PVP = True Positive 
True Positive + False Positive 
The PVP was calculated for the RHD Register because false positives on a register 
program would likely result in an individual unnecessarily adhering to regular injections 
with secondary prophylaxis.  
Acceptability 
 “Acceptability reflects the willingness of persons and organizations to participate in 
the surveillance system”. (4)  
Desktop analysis determined to what degree were active surveillance cases followed up. 
Questions were asked in an online survey to measure the acceptability of the system: 
a) The interactions between myself and other stakeholders are satisfactory 
(Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly disagree) 
b) The overall system is acceptable to me (Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, 
Strongly disagree) 
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c) The information I receive such as reports or PopNet§ is appropriate (Strongly 
agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly disagree) 
d) The information I receive at network meetings is appropriate (Strongly agree, 
Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly disagree) 
e) I am satisfied with the outcomes of the information flow (Strongly agree, Agree, 
Neutral, Disagree, Strongly disagree) 
Representativeness 
 “A system that can describe the disease under surveillance over time and in a 
population by place and person”. (4) 
Representativeness involved ascertaining whether the information in the surveillance 
system reflects the occurrence of ARF/RHD in NSW. Populations excluded from the 
surveillance system were identified and NSW rates based on surveillance data was 
calculated and compared to national rates. Desktop data analysis will quantify the 
proportion of those who consented to the register versus those that did not. In the 
online survey, participants were asked: 
a) Do you think that the system data accurately represents what is happening in 
NSW? (Yes, Unsure, No)  
  
                                                     
 
§ PopNet is NSW Health online platform for the public health network to share information with each 
other. 
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Timeliness 
“Timeliness reflects the speed between steps in a surveillance system”. (4) 
Timeliness was determined by calculating the median and range of days it takes for a 
case to consent to the register, information on delays and how these are impacted by 
Active surveillance. Online survey participants were asked: 
a)  How timely is the system? Rank the systems ability to keep cases up to date with 
scheduled treatment. (Very timely, Timely, Neutral, Unreliable, Very unreliable) 
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Results  
Epidemiology of acute rheumatic fever in New South Wales 
There were 83 individuals who met the confirmed (n=63) and probable (n=20) case 
definition for ARF between 1 October 2015 and 30 June 2019, with a median of 5 cases 
per quarter (range 3-13 cases). The overall average crude notification rate per 100,000 
population per year was 0.3 cases (Figure 7). 
Figure 7  Number and crude rate per 100,000 of acute rheumatic fever notified in New South Wales by 
year and quarter, 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019 
 
Most cases were in Western Sydney (n=27), Hunter New England (n=14), South Western 
Sydney (n=9) and Northern NSW (n=9). Forty-nine percent (n=41) were Indigenous 
Australians with a crude rate of 4.8 per 100,000 per population year and an indirectly 
standardised rate of 4.6 per 100,000 per population year (95% Confidence Interval (CI) 
3.3-6.2) (Appendix B). Twenty-seven per cent (n=22) were Pacific Islander or Maori. 
Consistent with Australian and international research (6, 8), children <15 years were 
most affected with 63% (n=52) of all ARF notifications (Figure 7). The median age at 
diagnosis was 13 years (standard deviation 11.8 years, 95%CI 10.4-15.6). Forty-five per 
cent (n=37) of all ARF notifications were in children aged 10-14 years, and 46% of all 
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cases were female (n=37). 
Epidemiology of rheumatic heart disease in New South Wales 
During the same period there were 81 individuals who met the confirmed case definition 
for RHD (median 5 cases per quarter, range 0-12 cases). The overall average crude 
notification rate per 100,000 population per year was 0.2 cases (Figure 8 8). These 
reported rates are higher as the population of people aged <35 years are used to 
calculate rates given that RHD is only notifiable in people aged <35 years. 
Figure 8 Number and crude rate per 100,000 of rheumatic heart disease notified in New South Wales by 
year and quarter, 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019 
 
The majority lived in Western Sydney (n=27) and South Western Sydney (n=19). In 
Western Sydney, 74% (n=20) were Pacific Islander. The majority of Indigenous 
Australians with RHD lived in Hunter New England (n=5) and Mid North Coast (n=5) 
(Appendix C).  Indigenous Australians were overrepresented with a crude rate of 4.1 per 
100,000 per population year. Children under 15 years of age accounted for 30% (n=43) 
of all RHD. The median age at diagnosis was 13 years of age (standard deviation 8.7 
years, 95% CI 11.1-14.9). Children aged 10-14 accounted for 32% (n=37) of all RHD 
notifications, and 62% of all cases were female (n=50).  
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The ARF/RHD Surveillance System and Register  
At 30 June 2019 a total of 482 individuals were recorded on the surveillance system. Of 
these, 164 met the case definition for ARF (n=83) or RHD (n=81) and were eligible for 
inclusion onto the RHD Register (Table 5). 
Table 5 Health information about all individuals on the New South Wales acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease surveillance system. 
Condition Alive Died Unknown (blank) Total 
Acute Rheumatic Fever - Initial 171 3 1 14 190 
Case - Confirmed 58 
  
5 63 
Case - Possible 20 
 
1 
 
21 
Case - Probable 15 
  
4 20 
Excluded 78 3 
 
5 86 
Rheumatic Heart Disease 261 12 
 
19 292 
Case - Confirmed 69 2 
 
10 81 
Case - Possible 31 
  
1 32 
Excluded 161 10 
 
8 179 
Grand Total 432 15 1 34 482 
Sixty-one people consented to the RHD Register, of which 59 met the confirmed or 
probable case definition for ARF/RHD. Most were from local health districts with high 
caseloads. Seven individuals were recorded as having withdrawn consent from the RHD 
Register. As per data entry guidelines people have only withdrawn consent if there is an 
earlier entry saying they have granted consent. 
Table 6 Local health districts who had received consent to the New South Wales rheumatic heart disease 
register between 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019*. 
LHD name 
Year of consent  
(brackets indicate additional cases that were on the RHD 
Register but had withdrawn consent) 
Grand 
Total 
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Western Sydney  1 9 (-2) 5 (-1) 4 1 20 
Hunter New England 
  
3 6 4 13 
Western NSW 
 
6 
 
3 
 
9 
Mid North Coast 
 
1 4 (-1) 
 
5 
South Western Sydney 
 
1 1 (-1) 2 
 
4 
South Eastern Sydney 
   
2 
 
2 
Northern Sydney 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 
Northern NSW (-1) 
 
1 
 
1 2 
Nepean Blue Mountains 
  
1 
  
1 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 
   
1 
 
1 
Grand Total 1 18 15 19 6 59 
*2015 data includes October to December (3 months). 2019 data includes January to June (6 months) 
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Benzathine penicillin was the secondary prophylaxis for 36 (61%) cases. Three (5.1%) 
used phenoxymethylpenicillin and one (1.7%) used erythromycin. Nineteen (32.2%) did 
not have any treatment recorded (Table 7). At 30 June 2019, 89% (n=54) were alive. It 
was unknown whether the remaining cases were alive due to data incompleteness. 
Table 7 Individuals on the New South Wales acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease (RHD) 
surveillance system by treatment and consent status to the RHD Register, 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019. 
Condition Consent to the register Granted Withdrawn Eligible Total 
Acute Rheumatic Fever - Initial 30 2 50 83 
Benzathine penicillin 19 
 
16 35 
Other antimicrobial/ antimalarial 
  
1 1 
Phenoxymethylpenicillin 2 1 3 6 
No treatment indicated 9 1 30 41 
Rheumatic Heart Disease 29 4 48 81 
Benzathine penicillin 17 
 
13 30 
Erythromycin 1 
  
1 
Phenoxymethylpenicillin 1 
  
1 
No treatment indicated 10 4 35 49 
Total 59 6 99 164 
The majority saw a GP (47%) or AMS (31%) as their primary care provider (Table 8). The 
primary care provider was unknown for 8% (n=5) on the RHD Register.  
Table 8 Primary care provider for individuals who consented to the New South Wales rheumatic heart 
disease register between 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019. 
Primary care provider Acute Rheumatic Fever Rheumatic Heart Disease Grand Total 
GP 13 15 28 
AMS 10 8 18 
(blank) 2 3 5 
Hospital 4 
 
4 
Justice Health 1 1 2 
Youth Health Service 0 2 2 
Grand Total 30 29 59 
The severity of disease was not recorded for almost a third of cases on the register (Table 
9). Two of four cases who withdrew consent were categorised as having severe disease. 
Table 9 Severity of rheumatic heart disease (RHD) and consent to the NSW RHD Register 
Severity of RHD Consent type Grand Total Granted Withdrawn (blank) 
Mild 6 0 5 11 
Moderate 4 0 3 7 
Severe 9 2 12 23 
(blank) 10 2 28 40 
Grand Total 29 4 48 81 
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Survey Results 
Online survey  
The online survey was emailed to 78 people and had a 23% completion rate (n=18), 
representing 69% of all LHDs (n=16) (Table 10). The low response rate was mostly due 
to varied proxy server permissions across NSW Health, a factor that was unknown until 
some LHDs indicated they could not open the survey due to firewalls. The proxy server 
changed at the Ministry of Health, creating barriers to access survey data for analysis. 
Although there was a low individual response rate it was reasonable given that a very 
small number of staff would be responsible for ARF/RHD notifications per LHD. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were in person or over the phone, and included LHDs from 
metropolitan and regional areas (Table 10).  
Table 10 Online survey response rates for local health districts by location characteristics and caseload 
type for the NSW acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease control programme at 30 June 2019. 
Caseload and area type 
Online survey Semi-
structured 
interviews 
(n) 
LHDs in 
category 
(n)* 
LHDs 
participated 
(n) 
LHDs 
participated 
(%) 
Staff 
responses 
(n) 
Surveillance and program 
overview level NA NA NA 2 0 
High case load/metro 2 2 100 2 1 
High caseload/regional 3 2 66.7 4 1 
Median caseload/metro 2 1 50 2 0 
Median caseload/regional 4 3 75 5 1 
Low caseload/metro 2 1 50 3 1 
Low caseload/regional 2 1 50 1 0 
Justice health (low caseload) 1 1 100 1 0 
Grand total 16 11 68.8 18 4 
*Number 
NSW RHD Network Face to Face Meeting 
Themes from the network meeting focused on reporting, low clinician awareness and 
issues with stakeholder engagement. Feedback from this consultation is woven into the 
attributes they applied to.  
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Attributes of the ARF and RHD surveillance system and the RHD register 
Results from the online survey and feedback from the semi-structured interviews were 
recorded for the following attributes. 
Simplicity 
Recommendation  
• Ensure LHDs are aware of the NCIMS user guide, and who they can speak to if 
they are unsure of training, diagnosis and follow-up of cases  
• Nominate ‘champions’ of the RHD network who can provide ground knowledge 
of these processes, particularly for LHDs with minimal or no cases. 
 
Methods to input data, follow-up cases and ascertain a confirmed case using the 
diagnostic criteria were thought to be simple, as was accessing the RHD Register, an 
advantage of being nestled within the surveillance system. (Figure 9). Despite 
differences across LHDs, 83% (n=15/18) of respondents agreed the flowchart accurately 
described the surveillance system. Variations in the flow of information included LHDs 
who received cases solely via active surveillance, and others with limited or no 
notifications via primary health services. Feedback from the online survey included: 
“We are never notified by a doctor, always via active surveillance. We went case 
finding and randomly found two boys, who are now on Bicillin”  
“All cases except two have been notified via active case finding. We have not 
received a notification from a doctor treating a person with symptoms. The two 
cases that were not identified via active case finding, were identified via word-
of-mouth”  
 “GP's and AMS rarely refer to our PHU. The bulk of referrals are from hospitals 
or active surveillance “ 
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Figure 9 Online survey responses relating to the simplicity of the NSW acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease (RHD) surveillance system, including the RHD Register (n=10), at 30 June 2019. 
 
Although the structure of the system was thought to be simple and easy to use, the 
simplicity of the system was affected by data quality. Suggestions to improve simplicity 
were provided by stakeholders: 
“Improve automation of register follow-up.” 
“Streamline/automate follow-up processes (more Register than surveillance 
system).” 
Summary 
Methods for entering and analysing the data were simple. Staff are trained to use NCIMS 
as part of routine public health work. An explanation of NCIMS variables is available in a 
user guide however reference to this was not mentioned by stakeholders. Most were 
unsure about how easy it would be to follow-up cases on NCIMS which was anticipated 
given this is done centrally. 
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Data Quality  
Recommendation  
• Schedule centralised audit of ARF/RHD notification data to improve completeness 
• Work with clinicians to design strategies to improve clinical awareness around 
diagnosis  
• Addition of a field that indicates the date when an individual has been asked to 
consent to the RHD Register, separate to whether they have consented or not 
• Ensure that all variables are described in the NCIMS data entry guidelines
 
Data completeness for confirmed and probable cases of ARF/RHD was 25%, which was 
anticipated due to varied information requirements for each individual on the 
surveillance system. Patient identification and demographic information was mostly 
complete, including the variables: birth date, gender, race** and address. No telephone 
number was listed for 96 individuals (58.1%), and three individuals (1.8%) had no contact 
information at all. Consent status for the RHD Register was not recorded for 60% of 
individuals. There is no indicator that a request for consent had occurred. Medical 
information, including who notified the condition, whether the case was hospitalised 
and how they were diagnosed was varied. Severity of illness data was missing for 124 
individuals (75%), including a third of people who were on the RHD Register. There were 
high levels of incompleteness relating to symptoms and duration of illness.   
Data completeness of key variables, all of which have 164 fields, are presented in 
                                                     
 
** See limitations section for comments on the use of the word ‘race’ as a variable and inclusion of this 
terminology in this chapter 
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Appendix D. Some errors were detected in the dataset. For example, one person had 
the variable ‘race’ listed as ‘not Aboriginal’, but their specific culture was listed as 
‘Aboriginal’. The town ‘Blackett’ was incorrectly recorded as ‘Blacklet’ on two occasions. 
In the online survey, 83% of participants were satisfied with the data quality of the 
system (Figure 10). Much feedback relating to data quality was solution-based and 
related to building linkages with other programs such as Medicare and medical practice 
software. 
“A system that enables GP's to directly refer online from their own medical 
databases. Ministry of Health provides education and resources to GPs and 
hospital clinicians” 
“Improve linkage with Medicare data - if they've had the vaccination, ECHO, 
specialist appointment, etc then it should show on their Medicare record” 
Figure 10 Online survey responses relating to the data quality of the NSW acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease (RHD) surveillance system, including the RHD Register (n=8), at 30 June 2019. 
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authorised user can generate ARF/RHD reports but is mostly relied upon centrally. This 
process does simplify the overall process of the system. Although it was easy to identify 
who had been identified through active surveillance, it is less simple to analyse data and 
determine how cases were notified onto the system as there are some records missing 
about of where information about the case came from. 
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Flexibility  
Recommendation  
1. Ensure the procedure for making amendments and changes to the surveillance 
system is detailed in a handover guide. This procedure should include describing 
the priority of the request to guide administrators. 
 
Findings  
Data for the evaluation was easily downloaded and integrated into other computer 
programs (Microsoft Excel (21) or imported directly into STATA 15 (5)). There were 
minor changes to the surveillance system including adjustments to NCIMS functionality 
and integrating additional data sources to improve information collection and patient 
follow-up on the RHD Register. Interviewed individuals were asked what degree of 
success the system had in adapting to these changes.  
 “I think the changes to NCIMS functionality have made it easier to collect 
information on various aspects follow-up for patients on the register.” 
“NCIMS changes are slow but possible - functionality includes workflows, ability 
to add additional fields for data collection.” 
The system has proven flexible for the management of cases who have changed address: 
“The system & register is great in managing cases that move across LHD/state 
borders” 
 “Allow ongoing monitoring of patients. Helps ensure people don't get lost in the 
system when moving” 
A senior analyst clarified that to make changes to the surveillance system, a NCIMS 
Change Request/Issue Form on PopNet should be submitted to the Senior Applications 
Administrator. A weekly meeting facilitates these requests on a priority basis, which may 
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explain why the changes appear to be slow. There was no information readily available 
that described this process. 
Summary 
The surveillance system and register have been flexible enough to respond to the 
changing needs of ARF/RHD, demonstrating capacity to easily accommodate changes. 
Over the last four years, the system has evolved from an empty database to having 482 
potential cases notified into it. The system has been flexible enough to accommodate 
the unique characteristics of each case particularly as they meet or are excluded against 
the case definition. A definitive result on flexibility was difficult to ascertain as there 
have been no significant changes to test it.   
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Stability 
Recommendation 
Organise the network drive so that all information pertaining to the tasks of central staff 
are simple to locate. This could be in the form of a document that lists all the information 
that is available and where to access it.  
 
Findings  
From a system perspective, the surveillance system and register are stable, an 
advantage of being housed in NCIMS where outages are rare. Clear processes occur if 
issues arise including emailing staff about any outages or issues that are being changed 
or repaired. No respondent was unsatisfied with the stability of the system with 83% 
reporting the system to be satisfactory to excellent. (Figure 11). The stability of the 
system was identified as a strength for some. 
“Centrally collected on NCIMS, is a very stable system with good security systems 
and backup. Available to PHUs and LHD coordinators.” 
“The strengths of the register are the centralised surveillance system in NCIMS, 
availability of state-wide surveillance & register information with 24/7 access via 
on-call.” 
Figure 11 Online survey responses relating to the stability of the NSW acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease (RHD) surveillance system, including the RHD Register (n=8), at 30 June 2019. 
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From a program perspective, the system is not stable. There was no guide available to 
easily handover the role of the RHD Coordinator that includes methods to export data 
to produce reports or standard operating procedures of the position. The surveillance 
system and the RHD Register are essentially the one database (NCIMS). There is no way 
to extract register or surveillance system information exclusively, so it is confusing to 
distinguish between the two. Separating RHD Register data from the surveillance system 
is a manual process on Microsoft Excel (21) which requires clearer instruction. 
Both online survey and semi-structured interviews highlighted that despite some 
opinion that this role could be managed at the LHD level, most areas rely heavily on this 
central position for notifications through active surveillance, information and reporting. 
“The RHD coordinator role. This really could be completed by the local PHU.” 
“Currently very reliant on the RHD Coordinator for reporting purposes, and two 
people for ongoing management of follow-up.” 
“Despite education we don't get notified of ARF/RHD until the RHD Coordinator 
notifies us (luckily only a few!).” 
Summary 
There was strong evidence to suggest that the surveillance system and register are 
stable and can be relied upon to collect, manage and provide data without failure. The 
positive feedback demonstrates the benefits to having the surveillance system and 
register housed in NCIMS. As one staff member coordinates the program, more detail 
about data analysis and reporting procedures are required to ensure sustainability of 
the overall program. 
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Sensitivity 
Recommendation 
1. A prevalence study on ARF/RHD is necessary to understand the context of 
ARF/RHD in NSW. 
2. An evaluation on active surveillance alone is necessary to determine whether the 
processes and specificity of the system is acceptable.  
3. Ensure that active surveillance is based the cases residential jurisdiction  
4. Improve strategies to improve clinician awareness around diagnoses  
 
Findings  
Desktop data analysis found that the majority of notifications were detected through 
active surveillance. Other cases were notified through doctors, hospitals, incidental 
finding and other health authorities (Table 11). 
Table 11 Proportion of acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease cases found through active 
surveillance or clinical notification 
Condition and detection method 
Disease present Disease not present Grand 
Total Case - 
Confirmed 
Case - 
Probable 
Case - 
Possible Excluded 
ARF - Initial 63 19 21 86 189 
Active surveillance 45 12 19 84 160 
Doctor 7 3 1 
 
11 
Hospital 9 4 
 
1 14 
Incidental finding by PHU 
   
1 1 
New Zealand health authority 
  
1 
 
1 
NSW RHD Coordinator 1 
   
1 
School Principal 
 
1 
  
1 
(blank field) 1 
   
1 
RHD 81 
 
32 179 292 
Active surveillance 68 
 
31 178 277 
Doctor 4 
 
1 
 
5 
Hospital 6 
  
1 7 
Immunisation Team 1 
   
1 
New Zealand 1 
   
1 
(blank field) 1 
   
1 
Grand Total 144 20 53 265 482 
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Active surveillance was integrated into the system to improve case ascertainment and 
fix issues relating to the complex diagnostic pathways of ARF/RHD, both of which rely 
on clinical diagnosis. Aside from diagnoses made through hospitals and clinicians, other 
potential cases have been notified through the NSW RHD Coordinator, school principal, 
New Zealand health authorities, Immunisation team and an incidental finding by a PHU. 
“It is likely that a doctor will never see a case of ARF or RHD in their entire career, 
especially if their training had been in inner-metro areas or areas with low 
prevalence.” 
The calculated result of active surveillance was highly sensitive at 76.2% (95% CI: 68.96-
82.51). Of the 482 individuals on the surveillance system, 91% (n=437) were identified 
through active surveillance. Of the 437, 34% (n=125) were confirmed as either ARF (36%, 
n=57) or RHD (25%, n=68). Based on calculations, active surveillance had high sensitivity 
and low specificity to detect potential cases with an overall 76.22% (95%CI 68.96-82.51) 
probability that the individual identified through active surveillance will be diagnosed 
when the disease is present. 
These results should be interpreted with caution. The baseline prevalence of ARF/RHD 
is not known in NSW, and the case definition (particularly for ARF) is based on complex 
clinical diagnoses. One of the key issues highlighted with the system related to low 
clinician awareness, and as such we cannot truly determine that the case definition is 
specific enough to capture all cases or be confident that all cases in the community who 
are admitted to hospital are detected by clinicians or active surveillance.  
  
 262 
This concern was echoed by the network: 
 “I suspect there are a lot of unreported cases. Data from active surveillance often 
pertains to patients’ months after discharge.”  
“Active surveillance over-estimates number of cases due to poor specificity and 
issues with ICD-10 coding for ARF and RHD. It also only picks up cases severe 
enough to present to hospital. Poor recognition of ARF and RHD as diseases in 
children in NSW is likely to lead to under diagnosis. Under reporting is also likely 
to occur.” 
“Cases admitted near jurisdictional border missed as NSW does not have data 
access”. 
Perceptions around the effectiveness of active surveillance were mixed. In the online 
survey, seven individuals reported that active surveillance satisfactory or very good, five 
were unsure or neutral, and six people felt that it was poor to fair (Figure 12). Without 
a baseline, it was difficult to determine whether the system accurately described the 
occurrence of ARF and RHD over time and its distribution in the population by place and 
person. However, the system is making progress toward establishing this. The 
information collected on NCIMS is able to effectively describe the epidemiology of ARF 
and RHD in NSW as shown in the demographic section of this paper. All areas 
interviewed that had tertiary or major hospitals reported that cases from other LHDs are 
often sent to these hospitals with severe illness, often being the first time ARF or RHD 
had been diagnosed. These cases were then picked up by active surveillance and 
submitted for follow up to the LHD where the case presented. During the evaluation, 
this process was changed whereby the RHD Coordinator submits active surveillance line 
lists to LHDs for follow up based on the cases known residence.  
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Figure 12 Effectiveness of active surveillance and levels of clinician awareness of acute rheumatic fever 
(ARF) and rheumatic heart disease (RHD) in New South Wales (n=18), at 30 June 2019. 
 
Misdiagnosis or underdiagnosis will affect notification rates which will influence the 
sensitivity, specificity and representativeness of the system. All respondents of the 
online survey, qualitative interviews and the network consultation felt that clinician 
awareness about ARF/RHD was not satisfactory which would also imply that sensitivity 
is not high (Figure 12). A number of respondents reported sending information to GPs 
and AMSs with mixed results. 
“Would be helpful to resend information to all the medical services in the LHD and the PHNs 
on notification. This was last sent in 2015 and helped raise awareness that RHD is notifiable.” 
“I think knowledge among medical staff in our metro LHD is very low, even Cardiologists.” 
“Unless people are out educating it can be assumed that it is low. Unless they worked in 
the NT they are fully unaware of the symptoms or that it is notifiable. A 6 year old female 
was seen at (hospital name) ED, with severe chorea. She couldn’t toilet or feed herself and 
the ambulance thought she had taken pills. Only an overseas doctor picked up on it.” 
“After presenting a case study at a paediatric conference, three weeks later an ED doctor 
picked up on a case. Three other recent cases were picked up after a presentation.” 
“Up until January 2019, we had cases with at least three and up to seven ED presentations. 
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All presented with symptoms, not one was diagnosed. We had a big education blitz (at the 
town) by holding an evening seminar with 52 clinicians including people from PHUs, AMS’s 
and Paediatrics – the whole town was there. Since then we have been getting diagnoses 
from primary care providers, so people are not getting to point where they have to turn up 
to the ED. In the future, when get a diagnosis in a new town – we’re going to the town.” 
Although guidelines exist for potential ARF/RHD outbreaks, and screening programs 
have detected clusters of ARF/RHD such as in the Northern Territory, it is not known 
whether this was influenced by other factors such as increased clinician awareness. (23) 
At this stage we are unable to determine whether the surveillance system is able to 
detect clusters or outbreaks in NSW. 
Summary 
Active surveillance is an effective tool to detect ARF/RHD in NSW compared to indicator 
based surveillance methods, however without a baseline it cannot be determined active 
surveillance does capture all cases on ARF/RHD. A limitation of active surveillance is that 
it does not use emergency department data and may not be sensitive to the entire 
population. Diagnosis requires the case/carer having health seeking behaviour, ability 
to access a health facility and then to be diagnosed correctly by a clinician. Clinician 
awareness was highlighted as a critical issue affecting the sensitivity of the system. 
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Predictive value positive 
Recommendation  
Review probable cases on the RHD Register to ensure they are appropriately assigned 
according to the case definition. 
 
Findings  
It was anticipated that there would be minimal (if any) false positives on the RHD 
Register, as much caution is taken to avoid administering unnecessary secondary 
prophylaxis to an individual. Of the 61 people who consented to the RHD Register, two 
(3.3%) were excluded as cases. However, these were likely to have a diagnosis of ARF or 
RHD but were notified outside NSW so were not counted for surveillance purposes, but 
placed on the Register as a means to provide follow-up.  As 59 met the confirmed or 
probable case definition (true positives) it was determined that the PVP of the RHD 
Register at 30 June 2019 was 96.7%. This calculation should be interpreted with caution 
as the baseline prevalence of ARF/RHD is not known in NSW. Further, three of the eight 
probable ARF cases on the RHD Register appear to only have enough evidence to be 
assigned as a possible case. 
Summary 
There were a low number of false positives on the RHD Register, and therefore high 
confidence that cases are not unnecessarily provided with prophylaxis.  
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Acceptability  
Recommendation 
1. Improve engagement with stakeholders at primary and secondary health level, 
and develop strategies to improve clinician awareness.  
2. Streamline quarterly ARF/RHD reports based on stakeholder feedback (this 
action was completed at the time of writing) 
 
 Findings 
Sixty-five per cent (n=55) of online survey respondents felt the system was acceptable. 
Almost a quarter (n=20) were neutral about acceptability, which was not unexpected 
given the differing characteristics of the jurisdictions surveyed.  Eleven per cent (n=9) 
did not find the surveillance system to be acceptable (Figure 13).   
Figure 13 Online survey responses relating to acceptability of the NSW acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease (RHD) surveillance system, including the RHD Register (n=18), at 30 June 2019.  
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Acceptability of information sharing  
Most agreed the information received at meetings was acceptable, however some felt 
there was little space to focus on complex LHD-specific issues. This was emphasized at 
the stakeholder session, where many felt the NSW RHD Network teleconferences were 
too long and could be focused differently to ensure issues can be discussed. Others felt 
the regular teleconferences should be LHD-specific as some areas have higher case 
volumes and some have none, however it was recognised that this would place a burden 
on the RHD Coordinator and minimise opportunities to discuss matters as a network. 
The quarterly and annual ARF/RHD reports were not read by the majority of the 
network, who agreed that presenting key data upfront and having less pages of 
information would improve the acceptability of the reports.  
Stakeholder interactions 
Some stakeholders were very willing to participate in the system by providing timely, 
accurate, complete and consistent data, while others expressed a level of frustration 
with imbalances in engagement across primary and secondary health services. Although 
the online survey presented a largely neutral or acceptable picture of interactions 
between relationships with primary and secondary health services, thematic analysis of 
qualitative information highlighted difficulties in stakeholder interactions and 
engagement at the LHD level. 
“LHDs were asked to identify their LHD Coordinators. Some coordinators are 
more proactive or stronger than others.” 
“The relationship with the LHD Coordinator is difficult” 
“There seems to be difficulties in understanding the role of the PHU and RHD 
Coordinator” 
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“Lack of uniformity in commitment to the RHD program in different LHDs. Lack of 
dedicated resources to carry out case management” 
“The system aims to engage primary health care providers to provide local care 
to patients. Developing network of LHD coordinators with some increased 
engagement over time.”  
As ARF/RHD is intrinsically linked to inequity, this disease is an important social justice 
issue that a surveillance system alone cannot fix. Therefore, meaningful collaboration 
between jurisdictions and clinicians is essential to improve ARF/RHD outcomes in NSW. 
Feedback about stakeholder interactions at the primary health care level raised 
concerns about awareness, engagement and issues around notification and follow-up: 
“There were several cases I only found out about via word of mouth from AMS 
staff” 
“Hopeless - the AMS is apathetic at kindest, the LHD coordinators are nice but 
don't grasp their role isn't to treat, just to facilitate patients”  
“I think we need to work closer with AHMRC in developing the relationships 
within ACCHSs. Some areas are more engaged than others. Funding has not 
changed, however further funding would allow more local engagement and 
education” 
“Large number of cases of people being managed in bulk billing medical 
practices” 
 “Notification of cases from clinicians is slow or non-existent. Getting clinician 
response to obtaining consent from patients for adding to register is difficult”  
“Engaging GPs to provide information on follow-up is sometimes challenging. 
Some of the LHD Coordinators do not have the time or resources to manage RHD 
cases and can be difficult to engage” 
“Lack of uniformity of access to subsidies for treatment in different populations 
in NSW” 
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Low clinician awareness impacting acceptability  
All respondents believed that clinician awareness of ARF/RHD was not acceptable. Most 
clinicians are trained in metropolitan areas and may never see a case of ARF in their 
careers. High and median caseload LHDs reported that children in their jurisdictions 
have presented to emergency departments numerous times before ARF/RHD was 
investigated. These children often became so unwell they were transferred to tertiary 
hospitals and diagnosed for the first time there. Many had disease so severe they 
required surgery.  
Some districts reported attempts to increase clinician awareness with mixed success. 
One LHD highlighted the power of a holistic whole-of-health approach to improving 
ARF/RHD awareness in high-risk areas, and has demonstrated positive results through 
closer community bonds and increased case notifications.  
 “A great deal of emphasis is placed on the register and not enough on how to 
improve the identification of ARF cases by GPs”  
“Low knowledge about ARF/RHD in NSW. Low understanding about the 
requirement for notification. Large number of cases being managed in primary 
care clinics with one case” 
Summary 
Despite the positive feedback around the system in terms of reporting, network meeting 
information and outcomes of the information flow, aspects of the system are not 
acceptable. Key themes highlighted issues in reporting and fractures in interactions with 
other stakeholders relating to roles, responsibilities and level of engagement. Low 
clinician awareness was also identified as an issue affecting the acceptability of the 
system.  
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Representativeness  
Recommendation  
Establish the burden of ARF/RHD for at-risk groups, potentially through a prevalence 
study and determine whether this would be appropriate for ARF and RHD. 
 
Findings  
It unlikely that the surveillance system is representative of the true burden of ARF/RHD 
in NSW (6). Anecdotal information from the RHD Coordinator stated that since the 
implementation of the surveillance system and register, the burden of ARF/RHD in NSW 
has been higher than anticipated. People diagnosed with RHD over the age of 35 are not 
notifiable in NSW and not included on the system. Although RHD screening programs in 
other parts of Australia have contributed to regional baseline denominator data, this 
has not occurred in NSW. (23) Rates are required to determine the representativeness 
of the surveillance system. The notification rate of ARF per 100,000 population per year 
in NSW was 4.8 per 100,000 for Indigenous Australians and 0.1 per 100,000 for non-
Indigenous Australians, under the national rate of 85 per 100,000 for Indigenous 
Australians and 4 per 100,000 for non-Indigenous Australians. The notification rate of 
RHD per 100,000 population per year in NSW was 4.1 per 100,000 for Indigenous 
Australians and 0.4 per 100,000 for non-Indigenous Australians, lower than national 
rates of 85 per 100,000 for Indigenous Australians and 4 per 100,000 for non-Indigenous 
Australians. In other parts of Australia, rates of ARF/RHD appear to increase with 
remoteness of location so it would not be reasonable to use denominator data from 
elsewhere to gauge representativeness. (7) In the online survey, a third of respondents 
(n=6, 33%) felt confident that the system accurately represents the true burden in NSW. 
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The majority were not confident of this, with 39% unsure and 28% not confident (Figure 
14). The main concern relating to representativeness was under-reporting and missed 
notifications. Case increases had occurred in areas after clinician education targeted in 
that community.  
Figure 14 Online survey responses relating to representativeness of the NSW acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease (RHD) surveillance system, including the RHD Register 
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adults over 35 years of age as these individuals are not notifiable in NSW. 
Timeliness  
Recommendation  
1. Review active surveillance protocols to ensure follow-up is efficient and useful. 
2. Increase clinician awareness of ARF/RHD to strengthen timeliness of indicator 
based surveillance.
 
Findings 
Almost 40% of respondents felt that the timeliness of the system to keep up to date with 
scheduled treatment was satisfactory to very good, however 65% felt the length of time 
it took between finding a case and the patient’s diagnosis was poor to fair (Figure 15).  
Figure 15 Online survey responses relating to timeliness of the NSW acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic 
heart disease (RHD) surveillance system, including the RHD Register 
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consented to the register before they were notified on the surveillance system. When 
asked how timeliness is affected by active surveillance at the program level: 
“Active surveillance means that it takes at least 3 months for cases to be 
reported. It probably doesn't improve timeliness, but it will reduce under 
reporting.” 
“Active surveillance is only reported at least one quarter in arrears so cases 
identified through that process should be more a mop-up rather than the primary 
source of identification. Hopefully as awareness builds, those cases will be 
notified before they are found on active surveillance.”  
“Active surveillance is not timely, but it is working, not in kids though.” 
“We do not have any active cases in our LHD but I have registered patients from 
other LHDs. I'm not sure I hear about all potential patients” 
 “Register is a good means of cross checking notifications against EMR but data 
often happens months after discharge” 
Summary 
The timeliness of the system is one of the most important attributes because without it, 
children with ARF run the risk of disease progression to RHD, which may result in early 
death. As such, it is crucial that the system can detect cases early. Active surveillance 
can take months, yet this has been the most useful method to find cases.  
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Discussion on usefulness of the system 
This evaluation assessed whether the ARF/RHD surveillance system and RHD Register 
fulfilled its purpose for surveillance, to monitor the epidemiology of ARF/RHD in New 
South Wales; and prevent recurrence of ARF and severity of RHD through enhanced case 
follow up via the NSW RHD register.  
Establishing the ARF/RHD surveillance system in NSW undoubtedly had a positive public 
health impact through increased understanding of the epidemiology of ARF/RHD in the 
context of NSW, focused mobilisation of resources, increased awareness and capacity 
for RHD network staff, and support for patients to receive timely and appropriate 
treatment. At this point it appears the greatest priority relates to the acceptability of the 
system, particularly around strengthening relationships between primary and secondary 
health services. This would require initiatives to address low clinician awareness which 
may be done through sharing processes that have worked for other LHDs.   
From a systems perspective the system is simple, stable and flexible. Centrally, the 
system was useful in identifying risk areas for environmental health related primordial 
prevention strategies, including Housing for Health interventions in areas of higher 
prevalence. Instabilities were detected relating to the program sustainability. There is 
one staff member responsible for the central coordination of the program, and it is 
important that there is a detailed handover available for this position in the event of 
sudden staffing changes. There is a RHD Management Protocol to handover notification 
management and follow-up of RHD cases, and the knowledge of this and where to 
access it should be clear. Although the majority of respondents in the online survey felt 
that it was easy to ascertain a case using the diagnostic criteria, Australian research has 
pointed to limitations to the Jones criteria. Some Indigenous Australian cases with ARF 
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have been found not to meet the criteria (6), and if the criteria were to ever change to 
accommodate for this, it may potentially be more difficult to ascertain cases. 
Due to fragmented stakeholder relationships at differing health care levels it is unknown 
whether the system has led to improved clinical, behavioural, social or policy practice as 
a whole. Most certainly clinician awareness has improved in some areas however it 
should be noted this was mostly dependent on the initiative of local health districts who 
developed and led their own interventions.  
The surveillance system has stimulated research intended to lead to prevention or 
control. Since the ARF/RHD became notifiable, some local health districts with higher 
caseloads have undertaken their own studies to address inequities experienced by 
communities affected by ARF/RHD. This includes assessments on the number of times a 
case attends a health facility before being correctly diagnosed, improvements in case 
ascertainment after clinician education and best practices to engage communities.  
Without understanding the prevalence of ARF/RHD in NSW, it is unknown whether cases 
on the surveillance system were representative of the true burden. While information 
on the system has been used to develop epidemiological and surveillance reports to the 
NSW RHD Network, this information was not available in the public domain at 30 June 
2019. This was made publicly available in October 2019 which may be valuable to those 
wanting to improve their understanding of the overall RHD program, surveillance, and 
outputs of the RHD Register. 
Before the system was launched it was anticipated that indicator-based surveillance 
would not be efficient in determining cases due to low clinician awareness levels. While 
active surveillance has been successful in finding cases, this generates large number of 
possible or excluded cases. Active surveillance is also not timely, which is a critical factor 
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to avoid disease progression. Some LHDs have found timeliness to diagnoses has 
improved, particularly for indicator-based surveillance after appropriate education and 
engagement has been delivered to a particular community.  
It is likely the system has prevented the recurrences of ARF and reduced the severity of 
RHD for some individuals, particularly through the enrolment of cases onto the RHD 
Register. Just over a third of confirmed and probable cases on the surveillance system 
are enrolled on the RHD Register. It was difficult to determine through the data whether 
every individual had been asked if they would like to consent to the register. The 
predictive value positive for the RHD Register is high, however this should be reviewed 
for the entire surveillance system along with sensitivity. The process of consent is a 
controversial topic, particularly as to whether it is necessary, culturally appropriate, or 
if there should be more communications between the register and the case. These 
questions will be best answered through an appropriate consultation process with 
stakeholders and communities, particularly Indigenous Australians and Pacific Islanders. 
Achieving consent and adherence to secondary prophylaxis can be influenced by the 
provision of culturally appropriate and holistic support services.  (18) 
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Limitations  
When the pilot was undertaken, it was unknown at the time was that this was one of 
the few local health districts that were able access Google Forms, and later proxy servers 
at NSW Health changed which barred access to this program. Regarding the low 
response rate in the online surveys, in hindsight, to have prevented that issue occurring 
I could have checked the internet accessibility of LHDs instead of assuming information 
technology (IT) rules were uniform across the state although I argue that this was a 
reasonable assumption to make. All NSW Health employees abide by the same IT 
policies, which assumes you are meeting these. The survey platform I used, Google 
Forms, was the most suitable and available program for me to use at the time and was 
able to be accessed by the LHD where I piloted the study. The reason I chose this 
program was because I was unable to access other survey programs including Formstack 
or RedCap due to licensing, access and login reasons. It is remarkable that 
epidemiologists rely so heavily on surveys yet there appears to be no standard survey 
platform used across NSW Health. Another limitation was through not including 
GPs/AMS/clients in the evaluation. This was initially planned for however given 
resources available the evaluation focused on the surveillance aspects only.  
There was not enough scope in this surveillance evaluation to explore potential biases 
the system may have on populations such as older people or people from culturally and 
linguistically diverse backgrounds. Although the RHD Register appears useful in 
following up cases for secondary prophylaxis, the value of having a voluntary consent-
based register warrants further analysis. At 30 June 2019 just over a third of cases 
consented to the RHD Register, requiring understanding as to whether all cases have 
been asked to consent.  
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The final limitation was in relation to the datasets that I received having the variable 
‘race’. I raised the question around the appropriateness of using terminology such as 
this, as the term ‘race’ is a clear social construct, not biological. I have left this 
terminology in the chapter, to be consistent with reporting, and to hopefully elicit future 
conversations as to the appropriateness and acceptability of words like this in datasets 
and reporting in contemporary public health. 
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Recommendations 
Recommendations from each attribute section have been collated in this section for the 
convenience of the NSW RHD Program. 
Table 12 Recommendations for the New South Wales acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease 
surveillance system including the RHD Register 
Attribute Recommendations 
Simplicity 
 
1. Ensure LHDs are aware of the NCIMS user guide, and who they can speak to 
if they are unsure of training, diagnosis and follow-up of cases  
2. Nominate ‘champions’ of the RHD network who can provide ground 
knowledge of these processes, particularly for LHDs with minimal or no 
cases. 
Data Quality  
 
3. Schedule centralised audit of ARF/RHD notification data to improve 
completeness 
4. Work with clinicians to design strategies to improve clinical awareness 
around diagnosis  
5. Addition of a field that indicates the date when an individual has been 
asked to consent to the RHD Register, separate to whether they have 
consented or not 
6. Ensure that all variables are described in the NCIMS data entry guidelines 
Flexibility  
 
7. Ensure the procedure for making amendments and changes to the 
surveillance system is detailed in a handover guide. This procedure should 
include describing the priority of the request to guide administrators. 
Stability 
 
8. Organise the network drive so that all information pertaining to the tasks of 
central staff are simple to locate. This could be in the form of a document 
that lists all the information that is available and where to access it. 
Sensitivity 
 
9. An evaluation on active surveillance alone is necessary to determine 
whether the processes and specificity of the system is acceptable.  
10. Ensure that active surveillance is based the cases residential jurisdiction  
11. Improve strategies to improve clinician awareness around diagnoses  
Predictive  
value positive 
12. Review probable cases on the RHD Register to ensure they are 
appropriately assigned according to the case definition. 
Acceptability  
 
13. Improve engagement with stakeholders at primary and secondary health 
level, and develop strategies to improve clinician awareness.  
14. Streamline quarterly ARF/RHD reports based on stakeholder feedback (this 
action was completed at the time of writing) 
Representativeness  
 
15. Establish the burden of ARF/RHD for at-risk groups, potentially through a 
prevalence study and determine whether this would be appropriate for ARF 
and RHD. 
Timeliness  
 
16. Review active surveillance protocols to ensure follow-up is efficient and 
useful. 
17. Increase clinician awareness of ARF/RHD to strengthen timeliness of 
indicator based surveillance 
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Conclusion  
Acute rheumatic fever and rheumatic heart disease are of high public health 
importance, particularly due to the inequities associated with the disease, and the high 
morbidity and inequities associated with the disease. The ARF and RHD surveillance 
system and the RHD register have met their objective to monitor the epidemiology of 
ARF/RHD in NSW through a centralised, simple however just above a third of eligible 
cases have enrolled onto the RHD Register. There are aspects of the surveillance system 
and register that require improvement, and these include strengthening elements of 
stakeholder engagement and clinician awareness. Building stakeholder relationships 
between the primary and secondary health care levels with a secondary aim to increase 
clinician awareness will dramatically improve the acceptability of the system. Low 
clinician awareness also impacts the timeliness of the system, which is crucially 
important to avoid preventable disease progression in an individual with ARF/RHD.  
 
More action is required centrally to ensure that stakeholders who identified ARF and 
RHD as priority actions are engaged with the overall programme, so that LHDs can be 
supported on improving engagement within their own jurisdiction. Consultation is 
required to determine whether the consent process is culturally appropriate for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and whether the register should provide 
information back the case or their family. Overall the surveillance system and register 
must be equitable for all, particularly Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander and Pacific 
Islander people; and this evaluation may provide a foundation to build future work 
around this.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Tool to measure attributes of the acute rheumatic fever and 
rheumatic heart disease (RHD) surveillance system and RHD Register 
Attribute Survey question 
Assessment 
method 
De
sk
to
p 
 
PH
U 
st
af
f 
LH
D 
Co
or
d 
RH
D 
Co
or
d 
Usefulness 
What does the system do well?  X X X 
What are weaknesses of the system?  X X X 
What improvements would you make to the system?  X X X 
Simplicity 
A flowchart will outline the system and describe the flow 
of case management and data.  
X    
 Is the flowchart accurate? If no, please describe 
alternative processes used. 
 X X X 
How simple is the process of notifying a case to the PHU? 
(Very simple, Simple, Neutral/unsure, Difficult, Very 
difficult) 
 X   
How simple are methods used to collect and manage the 
data on NCIMs (Very simple, Simple, Neutral/unsure, 
Difficult, Very difficult) 
 X X  
Do you feel you have received adequate training and 
supervision to record and enter data? Yes, Unsure, No 
 X X  
Do you think that the system design allows for easy follow-
up of cases? Yes, Unsure, No 
 X X  
How easy is it to ascertain a confirmed case using the 
diagnostic criteria? (Very easy, Easy, Neutral/unsure, 
Difficult, Very difficult) 
 X X  
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Attribute Survey question 
Assessment 
method 
De
sk
to
p 
 
PH
U 
st
af
f 
LH
D 
Co
or
d 
RH
D 
Co
or
d 
Flexibility 
Discussion held with senior analyst to clarify  process of 
making changes to the system 
    
Have any of the following items changed since the creation 
of the system? If yes, has the system successfully adapted 
to these changes? 
    
1. Case definition    X 
2. Funding    X 
3. NCIMs functionality    X 
4. Medication changes (Bicillin)    X 
5. Additional data sources    X 
If no to these, this attribute would be difficult to assess and 
be less important than other attributes.  
    
Data 
quality 
Proportion of complete and incomplete data (Demographic 
and contact information, important dates, medical 
information, symptoms) 
X    
Percentage of ‘unknown, blank or missing’ fields X    
Data entry errors (NCIMs Data Entry guidelines) X    
The usual speed to upload and download data (Very 
unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Neutral/unsure, 
Satisfactory, Very good, Excellent) 
X X  X 
 286 
Attribute Survey question 
Assessment 
method 
De
sk
to
p 
 
PH
U 
st
af
f 
LH
D 
Co
or
d 
RH
D 
Co
or
d 
The relevance of the data on the surveillance system (Very 
unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Neutral/unsure, 
Satisfactory, Very good, Excellent) 
    
Stability 
Discussion with a senior analyst to understand  stability of 
the system. 
X    
Rate the stability of the surveillance system when inputting 
or exporting data (Very unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, 
Neutral/unsure, Satisfactory, Very good, Excellent) 
 X  X 
Sensitivity 
Proportion of cases found through clinical notification or 
active surveillance  
X    
How effective is active surveillance in finding cases? (Very 
effective, Effective, Neutral/Unsure, Ineffective, Not 
effective 
 X X X 
Predictive 
value 
positive  
Proportion of cases enrolled on the RHD Register who did 
not meet the case definition for ARF/RHD 
X    
Acceptabil- 
ity 
The interactions between myself and other stakeholders 
are satisfactory (Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, 
Strongly disagree) 
X    
The overall system is acceptable to me (Strongly agree, 
Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly disagree) 
 X X  
The information I receive such as reports or PopNet is 
appropriate (Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, 
Strongly disagree) 
 X X  
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Attribute Survey question 
Assessment 
method 
De
sk
to
p 
 
PH
U 
st
af
f 
LH
D 
Co
or
d 
RH
D 
Co
or
d 
The information I receive at network meetings is 
appropriate (Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, 
Strongly disagree) 
 X X  
I am satisfied with the outcomes of the information flow 
(Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, Strongly 
disagree) 
 X X  
Represent-
ativeness 
Proportion of groups who consent to the register versus 
not consenting 
X    
Do you think that the system data accurately represents 
what is happening in NSW? (Yes, Unsure, No) 
   X 
Timeliness 
Time to consent to the register X    
Information on delays  X    
How are these impacted by Active surveillance? X   X 
How timely is the system? Rank the systems ability to keep 
cases up to date with scheduled treatment. (Very timely, 
Timely, Neutral/unsure, Unreliable, Very unreliable) 
 X X X 
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Appendix B. Notifications and rates of acute rheumatic fever in NSW by 
Indigenous status and local health district, 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019 
Local health district (LHD) 
Ab
or
ig
in
al
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St
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it 
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To
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es
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t I
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00
,0
00
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 1
00
,0
00
 
In
di
ge
no
us
 c  
Cr
ud
e 
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te
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
 
No
n-
In
di
ge
no
us
 d  
Albury Wodonga & Murrumbidgee e 2 0 0 1 0 3 0.3 3.8 0.1 
Central Coast  1 0 0 0 0 1 0.1 2.1 0 
Far West 0  0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
Hunter New England 13 0 0 0 1 14 0.4 6.5 0 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 0  0 0 0 1 1 0.1 0 0.1 
Justice Health 0 0 0 0 0 0 NA NA NA 
Mid North Coast 3 0 0 0 0 3 0.4 5.9 0 
Nepean Blue Mountains 1 0 0 1 1 3 0.2 2.3 0.1 
Northern NSW 8 0 0 0 0 8 0.7 14.1 0 
Northern Sydney 0 0 0 1 3 4 0.1 0 0.1 
South Eastern Sydney 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.0 3.1 0 
South Western Sydney 0 0 1 4 4 9 0.2 1.6 0.2 
Southern NSW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
Sydney 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 0 
Western NSW 9 0 0 0 0 9 0.9 7.3 0 
Western Sydney  1 1   15 10 27 0.7 3.4 0.7 
Grand Total 39 1 1 22 20 83 0.3 4.8 0.1 
a) Other includes people who are not of Indigenous, Pacific Islander or Maori descent. This category 
includes unknown ancestry for 3 cases across ISLHD, SWSLHD and WSLHD.  
b) Indigenous includes Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander descent.  
c) Non-Indigenous includes people who are not of Aboriginal and /or Torres Strait Islander (n=1). e 
d) Albury Wodonga was combined with Murrumbidgee for meaningful rate calculations, and due 
to management of these cases by Murrumbidgee LHD. 
e) Justice Health case is Pacific Islander (Samoan) notified in 2019 and not included in rate 
calculations 
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Appendix C. Notifications and rates of rheumatic heart disease in NSW by 
Indigenous status and local health district, 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019 
Local health district 
(LHD) 
Ab
or
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al
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Ra
te
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 1
00
,0
00
 
No
n-
In
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 c  
Albury Wodonga & 
Murrumbidgee d 
1 1 0 2 0.41 2.8 0.2 
Central Coast  0 0 0 0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Far West 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Hunter New England 5 0 0 5 0.04 3.7 0.0 
Illawarra Shoalhaven 1 0 2 3 0.02 2.8 0.5 
Justice Health e 0 1 0 1 NA NA NA 
Mid North Coast 5 0 1 6 0.04 14.3 0.4 
Nepean Blue Mountains 1 1 0 2 0.01 3.3 0.2 
Northern NSW 3 0 0 3 0.02 7.8 0.0 
Northern Sydney 0 1 1 2 0.01 0.0 0.1 
South Eastern Sydney 1 1 4 6 0.04 4.7 0.3 
South Western Sydney 1 5 13 19 0.14 2.3 1.0 
Southern NSW 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Sydney 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.0 0.0 
Western NSW 4 1 0 5 0.04 4.8 0.3 
Western Sydney  2 20 5 27 0.20 4.9 1.4 
Grand Total 24 31 26 81 0.59 4.1 0.4 
a) Other includes people who are not of Indigenous, Pacific Islander or Maori descent. This category 
includes unknown ancestry for 3 cases across ISLHD, SWSLHD and WSLHD.  
b) Indigenous includes Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander descent.  
c) Non-Indigenous includes people who are not of Aboriginal and /or Torres Strait Islander (n=1). e 
d) Albury Wodonga was combined with Murrumbidgee for meaningful rate calculations, and due 
to management of these cases by Murrumbidgee LHD. 
e) Justice Health case is Pacific Islander (Samoan) notified in 2019 and not included in rate 
calculations 
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Appendix D. Data completeness of key variables in the NSW ARF/RHD 
surveillance system, 1 October 2015 to 30 June 2019. 
Category Variable 
Number of 
incomplete 
fields 
Percentage 
incomplete 
(%) 
 
Percentage 
complete 
(%) 
Identifying/ 
contact 
information 
Event ID 0 0.0 100 
Full name 0 0.0 100 
Street 7 4.2 95.8 
City 4 2.4 97.6 
State 0 0.0 100 
Zip 4 2.4 97.6 
Country 4 2.4 97.6 
Jurisdiction 0 0.0 100 
Owning jurisdiction 0 0.0 100 
Statistical local area 0 0.0 100 
Telephone number 96 58.1 41.9 
Demographic 
Gender 0 0.0 100 
Birth date 0 0.0 100 
Country of birth 5 3.0 97 
Race (see limitations section) 0 0.0 100 
Ancestry or ethnic origin 20 12.1 87.9 
Specific cultural or ethnic group 21 12.7 87.3 
Primary language 18 10.9 89.1 
Important 
dates 
Diagnosis date 96 58.2 41.8 
Notification received date 0 0.0 100 
Earliest received or create date 0 0.0 100 
Event date 0 0.0 100 
Public health follow-up 0 0.0 100 
Consent date 99 60.0 40 
Consent status 99 60.0 40 
Medical 
information 
Condition 0 0.0 100 
Case type (case definition)  0 0.0 100 
Reporter type  4 2.4 97.6 
Reporter type address 153 92.7 7.3 
Reporter type city  143 86.7 13.3 
Case hospitalised 21 12.7 87.3 
Severity stage classification 124 75.2 24.8 
Patient on drugs 85 51.5 48.5 
Positive throat culture 122 73.9 26.1 
Positive throat culture date 153 92.7 7.3 
Diagnosed by echocardiogram* 91 55.2 44.8 
Symptoms 
Symptoms 27 16.4 83.6 
Symptom onset date 58 35.2 64.8 
Duration of symptoms 138 83.6 16.4 
Carditis 110 66.7 33.3 
Chorea 124 75.2 24.8 
Elevated CRP 94 57.0 43 
Elevated ESR 102 61.8 38.2 
Erythema marginatum 131 79.4 20.6 
Fever 107 64.8 35.2 
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Category Variable 
Number of 
incomplete 
fields 
Percentage 
incomplete 
(%) 
 
Percentage 
complete 
(%) 
Mono arthralgia aseptic 139 84.2 15.8 
Mono arthritis aseptic 137 83.0 17 
Polyarthralgia 106 64.2 35.8 
Polyarthritis 122 73.9 26.1 
*Using the 2012 World Heart Federation diagnostic criteria  
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Acronyms  
ANU Australian National University 
EHO Environmental Health Officers  
GP General Practice 
LFF Lessons From the Field 
LHD Local Health District 
MAE Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology 
NSW New South Wales 
PHU Public Health Unit 
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Prologue  
During the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology (MAE) placement I 
participated in a number of teaching activities, demonstrating competency in this area. 
As per the requirements under the MAE competencies I designed and delivered a Lesson 
from the Field (LFF) for my peers. I also developed a half day workshop on Q fever for 
Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) across New South Wales (NSW). co-prepared a 
case study on foodborne disease outbreaks for the Australian National University (ANU) 
Indigenous Summer School and worked as an Academic Tutor for Indigenous 
undergraduates through Western Sydney University’s Badanami Centre. 
Lessons learnt  
During this time, I learned valuable lessons from my peers through participation in all 
the LFFs. Peer to peer learning provided an insight into the diversity of talents coming 
from all people in our cohort. During my own LFF I learnt how to structure a lesson using 
Robert Gagné's Nine Steps of Instruction. (1) This was important as I used the same 
structure to develop a half-day workshop on Q fever at the NSW Health Policy and 
Practice Day. 
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Lesson from the Field 
For the lessons from the field (LFF), my role was to develop and present a lesson to a 
small group of MAEs base on a challenge I had experienced in my placement. At intervals 
of 6 to 8 weeks one group member was scheduled to present to the others. The lessons 
were on the following topics: 
1. Investigation of cancer clusters: Belinda Jones  
2. Clinical epidemiology - Preventative screening: Cushla Coffey 
3. Nginda MAE waala wiitha (Throwing the MAE into the fire!): implications of 
investigating disease with limited Indigeneity data: Charlee Law 
4. Causal Diagrams in Epidemiological Research: Jana Sisnowski  
5. Linked Data Analysis: Julia Maguire 
6. Rapid Risk assessment for outbreak investigation: Bernadette Kenny  
I developed a worksheet and dataset for my peers to work on before the LFF, and the 
answers would make up a large part of the discussion in the lesson. I developed a Master 
Sheet which is included in this chapter, which included questions, answers and 
conversation prompts for the lesson. When the worksheet was returned, I collated the 
responses and decided which person I would prompt to give feedback for further 
discussion to the group. When the worksheet was returned, I collated the responses and 
decided which person I would prompt to give feedback during the group discussion. 
Throughout the MAE I also worked as an academic tutor for Western Sydney University, 
which will be explained further in the appropriate section.  
The lesson from the field (LFF) was completed in February 2018. The Gamilaraay title 
‘nginda MAE waala wiitha’ means “throwing the MAE into the fire”. I felt this was an 
appropriate feeling for those who are put into situations where they suddenly have 
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questions but don’t know how to ask them. Many of my peers were doing data linkage 
projects and expressed interest in gaining a better understanding about what to do 
around inconsistent or missing Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status data. I saw 
an opportunity in these questions to start a conversation about some of the reasons 
why the data might be like that in the first place, and prompted the group to explore 
why someone may want to identify in one organisation but not in another, and some 
ways we can consider and analyse these data. The Q fever investigation in Chapter 3 had 
challenges with missing Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status data. The ways 
we were able to improve this were also included in the LFF. I provided hyperlinks to 
resources as well as the page numbers of texts to lead the reader to an answer as the 
activity was not a lesson in how to find information, but about gaining an understanding 
about specific matters that are well described in specific reports and documents. I also 
wanted to show that nothing is perfect in health, and there is no one size fits all 
approach to choosing how to analyse and interpret Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait 
Islander data. But if we can start understand the systemic and institutional barriers 
around health service access and delivery, then perhaps we can increase our chances of 
having more accuracy in the future about Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander status 
data. The flow-on effects from this would result in the improvement of public health 
resource mobilisation, which in my opinion, is what public health is all about. The LFF is 
detailed in Appendix A.  
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Additional teaching roles 
1. Development of workshop and case study 
NSW Environmental Health Policy and Practice Workshop  
The NSW Environmental Health Policy and Practice Workshop was held on 18-19 
February at Northside Conference Centre, Crow’s Nest. The objectives of the workshop 
were to build professional development for Environmental Health professionals in NSW, 
provide a networking opportunity and to discuss strategies to improve collaboration in 
the Environmental Health Network. Q fever was one of five workshop topics, with 101 
people in attendance at the Q fever workshop on Day 2. Attendees included Public 
Health Unit Directors, Environmental Health Officers, Environmental Health Branch 
staff, Public Health Registrars, Aboriginal Environmental Health Officer Trainees and 
Public Health Officer/Aboriginal Population Health Trainees.  
The Q fever workshop included a presentation on Animal Epidemiology and Serotyping  
which provided an overview on Q fever in animals as well as animal care and welfare.  
I presented the second session on Human Epidemiology and use of the Q Fever Series 
of National Guidelines (SoNG) documents and how these apply to EHOs. The 
presentation provided an overview of the human epidemiology for Q fever, risk factors 
and management strategies from both public health and regulatory approaches. 
I also wrote a scenario and workshop activity on communication strategies in Aboriginal 
communities. This was presented by another presenter, while I assisted participants 
with the activity. Attendees formed groups and worked through a case scenario to 
identify what environmental risk factors may be causing Q fever in a rural community. 
They then identified public advice and management strategies to reduce exposure to 
risk factors and limit further cases. Evaluation forms were distributed and returned with 
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a 68% response. Most responses were positive with the Q fever session (and Clandestine 
Drug Labs session) receiving the most positive feedback. The presentation for the 
session is located in Chapter 7: Presentations. 
2. Tutoring as an Academic Tutor for Western Sydney University  
During my MAE I tutored undergraduates through Western Sydney University’s 
Badanami Centre. I provided tutoring for Toxicology, Epidemiology, Field Project (a year-
long environmental health project), Food Safety and Environmental Risk Assessment.  
3. Indigenous Summer School at ANU 
I co-produced a case study and workshop on foodborne disease outbreaks for the ANU 
Indigenous Summer School. My other Aboriginal MAE peers also worked on this with 
me. This is presented in Chapter 7: Presentations.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Lesson from the Field Master Sheet 
 
Nginda MAE waala wiitha! (Throwing the MAE into the fire!) 
The implications of investigating disease with limited Indigeneity data 
Worksheet distributed 24 January 2018 
The LFF Skype conference is scheduled for Wednesday 14 February 2018 at 6.00pm EST.   The answers 
are due back on Monday 12 February 2018. 
All participants need to log into Skype as usual. If anybody has problems during the teleconference, 
message the group in the Skype text field or text the LFF Whatsapp Group. 
Instructions 
This LFF has four parts:    
Part 1  has calculations relating to a dataset with poor indigeneity data  
Part 2 has short answer questions about which algorithm to use when improving data 
Part 3 has no particular right/wrong answer and is primarily to get you thinking about factors 
influencing Indigeneity identification 
Part 4  has calculations that should show the different outcomes that may arise from too much 
missing Indigenous data.  
 
There are three readings which you may find useful for this LFF.  These are: 
1. The quality of Indigenous identification in administrative health data in Australia: insights from 
studies using data linkage  
2. Data about and for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians Intro on page 4 and page 27 
is useful, but if you look at the contents page it may help you in the future (2) 
3. National best practice guidelines for data linkage activities relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people 2012  Part 5, page 41 (3) 
4. National best practice guidelines for collecting Indigenous status in health data sets  Page 2,3, 
13-15) (3) 
For further reading, this article is quite good, provides a basic overview about how racism is a significant 
barrier to Aboriginal health improvement. (4) Let me know if you have not received these with this 
document. 
Learning objectives 
By the end of this LFF you should be able to: 
1. Understand the issues and importance around using Indigenous data in research  
2. Be aware of some different algorithms used to derive Aboriginal status across different datasets 
and know some ways to minimise some of the drawbacks of using the ‘Ever-Indigenous’ 
algorithm commonly used in health.  
3. Understand some factors contributing to mixed Indigeneity data on datasets on both sides 
(patient/health)  
4. See the potential impact of conducting research with high and low Indigeneity data by 
completing basic tables.  
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SCENARIO 
You are a MAE working in Enterics and Zoonoses the Communicable Diseases Branch at the Ministry of 
Health. Due to various pressures from the public relating to Q fever awareness and vaccination funding, 
the Minister of Health is now extremely interested in this topic.  
At the same time, your team has just produced an annual zoonoses report which has described a 
disproportionate rate of Q fever infection amongst Aboriginal NSW residents compared to non-
Aboriginal residents. Unsurprisingly, the Minister wants a reason for this immediately.  
Your role in this is to: 
Determine whether any LHDs, occupational exposures or vaccine exposures are of potential interest 
for Q fever in Aboriginal people, by doing basic data analysis tasks  
Assess the data quality and determine whether you have enough evidence to undertake a full 
investigation on this matter.  
PART 1 
Open up the Excel spreadsheet LFF dataset. After eyeballing the Raw data tab, refresh the Pivot table in 
the Counts by LHD tab and fill in the Dataset 1 table.  
 
# Question Suggested answer 
1 
What PHU has the highest column percentage of Aboriginal Q 
fever cases in NSW? 
Summer PHU 
Despite higher Aboriginal column % counts in this PHU, you decide to investigate West PHU as they have 
the highest Q fever counts for the time period, and the highest number of Unknown Aboriginal status.  
Repeat the process for the Occupational pivot and Vaccine pivot tables     
 
# Question Suggested answer 
2 
What seems to be the main occupational risk factors 
associated with Q fever for Aboriginal people? 
Farming, stock yard work 
3 
What are the main reasons Aboriginal Q fever cases are 
unvaccinated? 
Too young, employer 
delay/refusal 
4 
What is the quality of the dataset? Is it acceptable to 
commence an analysis that will provide answers to the 
Minister? Why or why not? 
No. The unknown status is too 
high 
 
5 What could be done to improve this dataset? 
Source Indigeneity data to 
minimise Unknowns 
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PART 2 
You decide to investigate the Indigenous status of those who have not specified their Aboriginality 
(categorised as Unknown, Not stated and blanks) using the hospital electronic medical record system, 
Powerchart. You look at three algorithms and determine the best fit for your situation. See part 5 of 
the AIHW paper, pg. 41, for guidance. (3) 
 
Which algorithm is which (ever-Indigenous, frequency-based, single-source)? Fill in the blanks††. 
# 
Algorithm type 
How Aboriginal status is 
determined 
More information (3) 
(This section to be discussed in the LFF) 
6 
Ever-Indigenous 
algorithm 
A person is recorded as 
Aboriginal on any data set, even 
if the person is recorded as 
non-Indigenous on all other 
data sets. 
This approach is the most widely used 
method for determining Indigenous status 
because of its simplicity and minimal data 
requirements, particularly where there are 
only two data sets to link. 
7 
Frequency-
based 
algorithms 
A person is recorded as 
Aboriginal on more than one 
dataset 
This approach allows for validation of a 
person’s Indigenous status from at least 
two other data sets. It is widely used 
because of its simplicity and minimal data 
requirements. 
8 
Single source 
methods 
 
A person is recorded as 
Aboriginal based on the status 
listed on the ‘most trusted’ 
dataset 
This approach uses the Indigenous status 
from a single data set which is assessed to 
have high quality information about 
Indigenous status and therefore to be 
considered as having a higher level of trust 
than others 
 
  
                                                     
 
†† In this Master Sheet, blanks are filled with recommended answers, written in Italics 
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As you only have two datasets, you have chosen to use the ‘Ever-Indigenous’ algorithm. 
# Questions written in bold and suggested answers written in Italics 
9 Why is the ‘Ever-Indigenous’ algorithm commonly used in health research, and why is it a good 
fit for your current purpose? 
 Suggested answer  
This is the most widely used method for determining Indigenous status because of its simplicity 
and minimal data requirements, particularly where there are only two data sets to link. 
10 Name one benefit and one limitation of using the Ever-Indigenous algorithm to determine the 
Indigenous status of your cases. 
 Suggested answers  
BENEFITS 
Minimal data requirements, particularly where there are only two data sets to link. 
Simplest of all the methods for deriving Indigenous status 
LIMITATIONS 
• Inconsistencies in a person’s status are not accounted for even if most of the datasets 
state ‘not Indigenous even if that database is of lower quality as the others.  
• The algorithm is prone to over-count due to errors in data processing and the quality of 
the linkage process. Errors in the coding may cause some non-Indigenous people to be 
incorrectly coded as being Indigenous.  
• Another drawback of the ‘ever-Indigenous’ approach is related to the quality of the 
linked data used in deriving an individual’s Indigenous status, especially where the 
linked data set is created from probabilistic linkage (AIHW 1.5.3. pg. 9). (3) 
11 Why might we be less likely to choose the frequency-based algorithm? 
 Suggested answer 
• It could be argued that the frequency-based algorithm may be better as it validates a 
person’s Indigenous status by using confirmation through another dataset. For health 
this may not be always appropriate as there may be complex reasons why a person will 
identify in one health place and not another. (3) 
 Discussion for the LFF 
• An example of the above could be an Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander person 
identifying at a GP but never at a hospital. For many people being in a hospital 
environment conjures up memories of racism and mistreatment, leading to mistrust 
towards the existing health system.  
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# Questions written in bold and suggested answers written in Italics 
• Despite the increased burden of disease, Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander 
patients are three-quarters as likely as non-Indigenous people to undergo a procedure 
once admitted to hospital, with studies showing there may be systematic differences in 
the treatment of patients identified as Indigenous in Australia’s public hospitals.(2) 
•  Other studies show that Aboriginal people have to wait longer for surgery and are 
referred later for specialist treatment. There are also many scenarios of Aboriginal 
people thought to be seriously intoxicated when in fact they were seriously ill. 
• The systemic differences in care provided by hospitals contribute to low levels of trust 
in hospitals and hospital case by many Aboriginal people. The 2008 National Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Social Survey found that only around 60% of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people felt hospitals could be trusted(2) 
• This level of distrust is reflected in the fact that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people are five times as likely to leave hospital against medical advice or be discharged 
at their own risk compared to other Australians. (2) 
12 What do you think you could do to minimise some limitations associated with this algorithm? 
 Suggested answer 
• If you are using a health database, check written notes associated with another health 
service that they may attend 
• If unsure of the Indigenous status of the case, where appropriate you could contact the 
PHU, health service or the case themselves  
 
 
 
PART 3 
Within the Excel file, open the tab titled “Powerchart data”. Copy and paste the updated Indigeneity data 
into the Q fever dataset to update those with unknown status. Ensure the Case ID is in numerical order 
for both tabs! Before you rerun your analysis, you start to wonder why Aboriginal status is so inconsistent 
across databases. We are all in health, so we should all have similar data, right? 
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The National best practice guidelines for collecting Indigenous status in health data sets  page 2,3, 13-15 
(3) and the article by the Central A (4, 5) may help you with this. 
# Question Suggested answers 
13 
What sort of factors may 
influence whether an 
Indigenous person 
identifies on some 
health databases but not 
on others? 
 
• Institutional racism 
• May fear that they will receive different levels of care 
• Premises is not culturally appropriate  
• Inconsistent hospital collection practices and admission forms 
• Patient aversion to identifying religious or cultural origins 
• Concern for privacy and confidentiality 
• Lack of patient understanding what the information is used for 
and how it is used 
• Language barriers 
14 
What factors may 
influence whether the 
interviewer accurately 
records Indigenous 
status onto a health 
database? 
• May assume that the person is not Aboriginal based on their 
name or appearance 
• May not be trained, encouraged or prompted to ask the 
question 
• Health staff reluctance to ask ‘sensitive’ questions 
• Status information may be obscurely recorded on the form 
• Systemic and institutional racism  
15 
Name a reason why 
accuracy of Indigenous 
status is so important in 
health research. ‡‡ 
• Data quality – definition of public health issues 
• Appropriate mobilisation of public health resources  
• Closing the gap  
 
  
                                                     
 
‡‡ Data about and for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians Intro on page 4 and the journal may 
help with this one. 
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PART 4 
Using the updated Q fever dataset, you rerun your pivot tables.  Rerun the Counts by LHD, Occupation 
and Vaccination status. 
 
# Question Suggested answers 
16 
What seems to be the main occupational 
risk factors associated with Q fever for 
Aboriginal people? 
Shearing, farming  
 
17 
What are the main reasons Aboriginal Q 
fever cases are not vaccinated?  
Employer delay/refusal, too young and chose not 
to have vaccine 
18 
What are the main differences between 
the datasets after improving Aboriginal 
and/or Torres Strait Islander status data?  
LHD, shearing wasn’t even on the radar before, 
personal choice not to be vaccinated was not listed 
19 
If 10% of your dataset had missing 
Indigeneity data, would you continue to 
investigate this issue?  
Yes, in health this is in line with our ABS pop 
dataset 
20 
Would you steer your study in a different 
direction now? Why or why not?  
Yes, probably warrants an investigation now as the 
risk factors are varied between Aboriginal and 
Non-Aboriginal populations  
 
  
 309 
Appendix B. Lesson from the field feedback 
 
What did you like about this LFF? 
• I really enjoyed this topic. I have experience in Indigenous health research in the 
Northern Territory and a keen interest in the area. Dealing with Indigenous status 
of records where Aboriginality has not been identified is a very topical issue in 
Queensland. Indigenous status is poorly recorded on health condition notification 
records. The reasons behind why Indigenous status may not be recorded are not 
well understood by many researchers and important to highlight. The readings 
were excellent and very useful. I used some of the content in my dissertation.  It 
was great to learn further about projects other MAEs are undertaking. 
• A well organised and clearly presented LFF which included an initial explanation 
of the structure of the LFF and the learning objectives. 
• The Excel spreadsheet which Charlee prepared for the exercises worked perfectly. 
The LFF exercises using the Excel spreadsheet clearly demonstrated how missing 
data on Aboriginal status results in incorrect interpretations of the data. 
• Question 2 provided us with an understanding of the algorithm types for 
determining indigeneity; ever-Indigenous, frequency-based and single source. 
Question 3 encouraged us to think about various reasons why Indigenous status 
might be inaccurately recorded. 
• The topic was a great choice for an LFF- missing Indigeneity data is relevant to a 
lot of public health work in Australia and can be extrapolated to a range of other 
scenarios in which key population information might be missing differentially. 
The short data analysis section at the beginning was a great way to demonstrate 
in very simple terms the impact of missing data on the conclusions that may be 
drawn. 
What could have been improved? 
• It would have been interesting to learn a bit more about strategies to improve 
reporting of Aboriginal status at the time of notification. Also, I was wondering if 
there is any research assessing the accuracy of the ever-Indigenous approach?  
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 To what extent has this LFF been useful for your work? 
• The LFF inspired me to take further action beyond the program. I will also be 
advocating for the Indigenous status field to be a compulsory component of the 
case report forms for lead.  
• This LFF was a great illustration of how missing data could potentially prevent or 
misdirect public health action. More generally, it has reinforced the importance 
of ‘knowing your data’ and possible questions to ask when working with 
secondary data and particularly with linked data were information may be 
derived in a number of ways.  
• In my MAE placement, we attempt to pursue missing data on Aboriginal status 
for the notifiable diseases by asking the doctor who requested the laboratory test 
but, this LFF made me think more about the accuracy of this data and other 
options for determining Aboriginal status and the importance of accurate data 
for a variety of notifiable diseases. 
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Appendix C. Collated resources for the NSW Policy and Practice Day 
a. Agenda for the workshop 
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b. Q fever workshop scenario presentation and instructions 
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c. Q fever workshop scenario handouts 
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Chapter 7 
Presentations 
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. 
Prologue 
During the Master of Applied Epidemiology (MAE) I delivered a number of presentations at 
local, state and international levels, including:  
• 3x Field reports for the MAE at Australian National University (ANU) 
• 3x Placement reports for Health Protection NSW (HPNSW) 
• Immunisation Policy and Practice Day 2017  
• Salmonella presentation to NSW Department of Primary Industries, Australian 
Veterinary Association and HPNSW 
• Conducting ethical research in vulnerable populations, ANU  
• 16th PHAA National Immunisation Conference Adelaide 
• 9th Southeast Asia and Western pacific Bi-regional TEPHINET Scientific Conference, 
Vientiane, Laos. November 5-9, 2018  
• Environmental Health Policy and Practice Day: Q fever in Aboriginal communities, 
February 2019 
Table 1 outlines the presentations delivered during the MAE. As there were numerous, a 
sample of presentations is included in this chapter. Appendix A details a Salmonella 
presentation to the Health Protection NSW and the Department of Primary Industries. 
Appendix B is a presentation of the audit of the Australian Immunisation Register at the 9th 
Southeast Asia and Western Pacific Bi-Regional TEPHINET Scientific Conference in Laos from 
5-9 November 2019, and Appendix C details a Q fever presentation delivered at the 
Environmental Health Policy and Practice Day in February 2019. 
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Table 13 Presentations delivered during the Master of Philosophy in Applied Epidemiology at the 
Communicable Diseases Branch, Health Protection NSW 2017-2019 
Study name Presentation 
An Audit of the Australian Immunisation 
Register 
Immunisation Policy and Practice Day 2017  
Long oral: 9th Southeast Asia and Western Pacific Bi-
Regional Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public 
Health Interventions Network (TEPHINET) Scientific 
Conference. Vientiane, Laos. November 5-9, 2018 
Investigation into increased Q fever 
notifications in Aboriginal people living in 
Western NSW local health district 
 Short Oral: 16th PHAA National Immunisation Conference 
2018. Adelaide, South Australia. June 5-7, 2018  
Nginda MAE waala wiitha! The implications of investigating 
diseases with limited data Environmental Health Policy and 
Practice Day: Q fever in Aboriginal communities, February 
2019 
Multi-state outbreak of Salmonella 
Typhimurium caused by a novel multi-
locus variable number tandem repeat 
analysis type, 2018-19 
Rapid fire presentation 
Communicable Disease Control Conference 2019. Canberra, 
Australian Capital Territory.  
November 19-21, 2019. 
Evaluation of the NSW Acute Rheumatic 
Fever and Rheumatic Heart Disease 
Surveillance System, including the 
Rheumatic Fever Register 
 NSW RHD Network Workshop 
Other 
3x Field reports for the MAE at Australian National 
University (ANU) 
3x Placement reports for Health Protection NSW (HPNSW) 
Conducting ethical research in Aboriginal Communities, 
ANU  
Salmonella presentation to NSW Department of Primary 
Industries, Australian Veterinary Association and HPNSW 
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Appendix A. Salmonella presentation to the Health Protection NSW and the 
Department of Primary Industries  
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Appendix B. Australian Immunisation Register presentation at the 9th Southeast 
Asia and Western Pacific Bi-Regional TEPHINET Scientific Conference 
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Bonus slides in anticipation of questions 
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Q fever presentation at the Q fever Policy and Practice Day  
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